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 Throughout this paper I refer to places and people using the spellings em-
ployed by those who lived through the Boxer Rebellion in lieu of the preferred 
contemporary spellings.  Thus, for example, the cities today identified as Baoding 
and Beijing I identify as Paoting-Fu and Peking.  Where there was a great deal of 
variation for the spelling of names, I have elected to use a spelling most common 
to those who wrote of the events at issue (i.e., Paoting-Fu for Pao-Ting-Fu, Pao-
tingfu, Pautingfu, etc.), except where the name is part of a quotation, in which 
case the original spelling has been preserved. 
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ABSTRACT 
China was in the wrong in failing to protect non-combatant, pri-
vate subjects of even the nations upon whom she was declaring 
war.  For such a crime there would come most drastic retribution.  
So far as the [I]mperial Government is concerned, she either 
forced such persons to become belligerent in self-defence, or vio-
lated all feelings of humanity by encompassing their death, and 
that, too, by barbaric methods.  To be shot down, as dies the sol-
dier on the battle-field, may be passed calmly by; but one's blood 
boils to think of delicate women, little children, and strong men, 
beheaded, outraged, cut to pieces, their bodies cast to dogs and 
wolves.  The American missionaries, burned or slaughtered at 
Pao-ting-fu, had never given the slightest offence, and were from 
homes of Christian culture and refinement. 
  
- Gilbert Reid, The Ethics of the Last China War, 32 THE FORUM 
446, 454 (1901) 
 
Literature concerned with the history of international criminal 
law omits a major advancement in the field; the fin de siècle trial of 
four Chinese officials in an international theatre for their participa-
tion in the massacre by Boxers of Chinese and Western Christians 
in the city of Paoting-Fu.  Before the matter was resolved the mur-
ders exacerbated tensions between the Allies and the Qing gov-
ernment, and would be acknowledged by the Great Powers as 
“crimes against the laws of humanity.”  The trial and execution of 
the guilty officials excited international attention, and forced a dip-
lomatic and public conversation on the limits and appropriateness 
of international criminal punishment and retaliatory sentiment.  
The case offers a cogent illustration of the dilemma confronting 
the more conscientious elements of the Allied command; how to 
honor the spirit of the new Hague Conventions, which were un-
precedented in the degree to which they humanized war, while 
preserving national honor.  Ultimately, General Gaselee, com-
mander of the Paoting-Fu expedition, managed to craft a judicial 
forum for the trial which, while imperfect by modern standards, fit 
squarely in the interstices between the old world of empire and the 
emerging world of universal international law.        
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  
 The birth of international criminal law is typically traced to 
the post-war prosecutions of Nazi and Japanese war criminals by 
the Allies,1 when in fact the Great Powers frequently turned to in-
ternationalized criminal or quasi-criminal forums, as well as the 
rhetoric of ‘humanity’ and ‘civilization,’ to project power, establish 
narratives, manage public opinion, express dissatisfaction, and de-
fend humanitarian values in the century after the Napoleonic 
wars.2  That these stories have been relegated to a narrative hinter-
land belies the important role each played in establishing an inter-
national criminal law vocabulary and shaping subsequent expecta-
tions of accountability.3  The purpose of this paper is to restore one 
such significant but unexplored caesure—the trial of a number of 
Chinese officials, accused of participating in Boxer atrocities, before 
an ‘International Commission’ by the Great Powers in 1900. 
The Boxer Uprising was an anti-Western and anti-Christian 
peasant insurgency mostly located in Northeast China.  A series of 
Boxer attacks on Western missionaries, Christian Chinese converts, 
and foreign legations and diplomats in Peking in early 1900 
prompted the Great Powers (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Rus-
sia, Great Britain, the United States, and neophyte Japan) with in-
terests in China to dispatch an international relief force in the 
summer of that year.  During the early stages of the intervention it 
was reported that seventy Christians had been gruesomely mur-
dered in Paoting-Fu;4 securing and punishing that city thereafter 
became a priority for the Allies, who organized a punitive expedi-
tion after securing footholds in the nearby cities of Tientsin and 
Peking.  
The operation could have taken the form of other Allied expe-
ditions, which were characterized by acts of extreme violence to-
                                                          
1 See, e.g. A. CASSESE & P. GAETA, CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 247 
(2013) (explaining the origins of international criminal law).  
2 See, e.g., infra notes 83, 158, 159. 
3 See Jenny S. Martinez, Human Rights and History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 221, 237 
(2013) (discussing how past ideas provide a vocabulary that shape the ways in 
which we think about problems).  
4 Department of State, No. 376 Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Inclosure 2, Bishop 
Favier to Mr. Pichon, French Minister, in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT, TRANSMITTED 
TO CONGRESS, 180 (1900) (reporting that more than seventy Christians have been 
massacred in Paoting-Fu) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901].  
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ward Boxers (or unlucky civilians who came from villages suspect-
ed of harbouring Boxers).  But the Paoting-Fu expedition was dif-
ferent.  When the Allies reached the city in mid-October 1900, they 
established an “International Commission” to inquire into the 
cause of the massacres and apportion responsibility among guilty 
parties who fell into their hands.  In what was widely hailed as 
“one of the most satisfactory aspects of the campaign,”5 the French, 
German, Italian and British commissioners gathered evidence for 
seven days and ultimately recommended death by beheading for 
three Chinese officials, removal from office for another, and an ad-
ditional trial in Tientsin for a fifth.  The punishment was approved 
by the Allied Field Marshal, the German General Alfred von Wal-
dersee, and carried out on November 7, 1900.  The trial was the on-
ly one of its kind held as a result of the intervention, as the pun-
ishment of other middle and high-ranking Chinese officials 
proceeded on the basis of negotiations between the Qing govern-
ment and the intervening powers. 
Although the Commission has recently received some brief at-
tention by a few dedicated historians, it has so far escaped scrutiny 
within the international criminal law community.6  Accordingly, a 
number of questions about the trial have remained unanswered.  
What actually happened at Paoting-Fu?  Was it fair?  Why did this 
operation, unlike others, result in an international criminal trial?  
What meaning did the trial have for the belligerents and the com-
munities they represented?  What consequences did the trial have 
for the development of international criminal law?  
Drawing on previously unexplored material from state ar-
chives, published and unpublished missionary correspondence 
and military memoirs, and contemporaneous press reports, this 
paper addresses these questions in four parts.  Part 2 of this article 
first sets the scene by briefly describing the state of the armed con-
                                                          
5 See Notes on Current Events, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 17, 1900, at 525 
(commenting that if the officials responsible for the massacre can be found guilty 
and sentenced to death, it would be “one of the most satisfactory incidents of the 
campaign.”).  
6 See Jérome Bourgon, Obscene Vignettes of Truth – Construing Photographs of 
Chinese Executions as Historical Documents, in VISUALIZING CHINA, 1845–1965: 
MOVING AND STILL IMAGES IN HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 46–52 (Christian Henriot & 
Wen-hsin Yeh eds., 2013) (discussing the organization of an international commis-
sion to investigate the killings of missionaries); JAMES L. HEVIA, ENGLISH LESSONS: 
THE PEDAGOGY OF IMPERIALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA 224–29 (2003) (re-
counting the arrival of an international commission that was set up in Paoting-Fu 
to determine the circumstances of the deaths of Western missionaries). 
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flict in October 1900, then recounts the story of the Commission’s 
day-to-day operation, culminating in the execution of three Chi-
nese officials.  Part 3 sets the trial in its legal, cultural and strategic 
context, positioning it as an event framed by, among other factors, 
the concomitant coherence of international criminal law and a shift 
in thinking about the role of collective punishment in war.  Part 4 
highlights how the relevant constituencies viewed the trials, and 
traces the influence of this seminal experiment with individual ac-
countability for international crimes on later efforts to create an in-
ternational jurisdiction to try the Kaiser in the wake of the First 
World War.  Finally, Part 5 explores the judicial character and fair-
ness of the Commission. 
 
2.  JUSTICE AT PAOTING-FU 
 
The Boxers, named for their distinct martial art style, were a se-
cret society that capitalized on the hardships resulting from pro-
longed drought, floods and poor harvests to galvanize popular 
opinion against foreigners in fin de siècle China.  Initially sup-
pressed by the Qing government, the Boxers achieved first a dé-
tente with, and eventually the patronage of, the Chinese court.  
Throughout June and early July 1900 anti-foreign violence escalat-
ed in China’s Chili province as Boxers, with Imperial imprimatur, 
attacked Christian missionaries and Chinese converts, and partici-
pated in the attacks on the foreign legations in Peking.7  The refusal 
of the Chinese government to discourage or punish Boxer violence 
against foreign nationals, as well as the threat of imminent Boxer 
and Imperial attack on the legations in Peking, united wartime 
opinion in Europe, the United States, and Japan against “the awful 
catastrophe that cast its shadow over the whole world,”8 and in-
spired an unprecedented joint military intervention.  
                                                          
7 See JOSEPH W. ESHERICK, THE ORIGINS OF THE BOXER UPRISING 302–09 (1988) 
(showing that contemporaneous estimates suggest that over the course of the war 
Boxers were responsible for approximately 230 Western civilian and 30,000 Chi-
nese deaths).  See also Henri Frey, L’Armee Chinoise 17 REVUE DES DEUX MONDES 
528, 549 n.11 (1903) (citing similar numbers to Esherick).  See also The National Ar-
chives of Great Britain [hereinafter NA], Foreign Office [hereinafter FO] 405/104, 
No. 107 Sir E. Satow to Marquess of Lansdowne (March 13, 1901) (containing a table 
listing the number of missionaries and other men, women, and children murdered 
in Peking). 
8 Gilbert Reid, The Ethics of the Last China War, 32 THE FORUM 446, 447 (1901).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/6
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By mid-August 1900, Peking and Tientsin had been occupied 
by Allied troops and the Dowager Empress and her court were in 
exile in Xi’an.9  With the immediate threat to foreigners in these cit-
ies abated, the Allied strategy shifted to sending punitive military 
expeditions to smaller cities where Boxers and pro-Boxer Imperial 
Army elements were thought to operate.  Foreign troops cut a vio-
lent swath through the countryside, meting out whatever ‘justice’ 
they saw fit.10  The only limit to the grotesqueries that could be 
perpetrated on these expeditions was the imagination of the com-
manding officers.  In one case, a British officer held half of the 
headmen of a village hostage until the other half produced “those 
whom they considered as the most guilty parties” for trial before a 
Chinese magistrate.11  Other commanders preferred collective pun-
ishment, destroying physical symbols of local pride and power, in-
cluding temples, city walls and gates, and pagodas.  Still others 
adopted a scorched earth policy, whereby villages associated with 
Boxers were simply burnt to the ground and their inhabitants sub-
jected to extensive depredations.12 
                                                          
9 PAUL A. COHEN, HISTORY IN THREE KEYS 15–56 (1997).  These occupations 
were marked by mass plunder, rape, and violence.  Id. 
10 War Department, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal 
Year Ending June 30, 1901.  Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900, 
part 4 [hereinafter ARWD 1901] 495–498 ‘Roster of All Expeditions Made by Al-
lied Forces, December 12, 1900 to May 10, 1901’ (outlining the forty-plus expedi-
tions in late 1900 and early 1901 and showing the overwhelming majority being 
done unilaterally by Germany with only seven consisting of mixed forces).  Dur-
ing some expeditions missionaries and local magistrates cooperated to sentence 
Boxers or obtain monetary settlements for deaths or damage to mission property.  
See, e.g., Id. at 491 (‘Adjunct, Camp Reilly, from Wm. Lee Karners’); Id. at 501 (‘Re-
port of Operations in China from November 30, 1900, to May 19, 1901, by Maj. 
Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U.S.A.’).  
11 See Department of State, No. 64 Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay (April 15, 1901), In-
clsoure with dispatch No. 64, Maj. H. Gould-Adams, special-service officer, to the gen-
eral officer commanding Third Brigade, C. F. F. (April 9, 1901), in Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1901: Affairs in China.  Report of William W. Rockhill, Late 
Commissioner to China, with Accompanying Documents 129 (1902) (providing an 
officer’s detailed report of the event). 
12 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 173–210 (recounting scenes of rampant 
death and brutality in Chinese cities caused by foreign troops); 7 BATTLES OF THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 623–636 (special ed. 1901) (describing invasions of Taku 
Forts, the battles around Tientsin, and the capture and occupation of Peking); 
GEORGE LYNCH, THE WAR OF THE CIVILIZATIONS, BEING A RECORD OF A "FOREIGN 
DEVIL'S" EXPERIENCE WITH THE ALLIES IN CHINA 41–47, 177–92, 207 (1901) (recount-
ing the terrible looting and torture that British soldiers did to Chinese villagers); 
ARTHUR H. SMITH, 2 CHINA IN CONVULSION 567–68, 577–78 (1901) (describing the 
destruction and pillage of the city T’ung Chou).  See also Treatment of Chinese Pris-
oners and Wounded, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, July 21, 1900, at 7 (“. . . all prisoners 
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When it was announced in October 1900 that Paoting-Fu, the 
provincial capital located approximately 85 miles southwest of Pe-
king, would be the target of a punitive expedition, most observers 
expected the harshest of possible fates to befall the city.  Paoting-Fu 
had reportedly served as a fallback position for Imperial troops al-
ready bested by Western forces.13  More critically, the city was 
known to have been a hotbed of Boxer activity; by October, the city 
was notorious for the brutal attacks on American and British mis-
sionaries that had been perpetrated there some months before 
(Chinese Christians had been attacked as well, but it was stories of 
the attacks on Western missionaries that captured foreign interest).  
Reports (exaggerated) that missionary children “were butchered 
before their parents’ eyes, white women were ravished and carried 
into captivity, mothers and fathers were tortured and murdered.”14  
They shocked the foreign community in China, as it did the West-
ern world, and it was widely expected that the city would be de-
stroyed in retaliation.15  Finally, concern that missionary families 
                                                                                                                                   
taken [were] shot, the brutalities practiced by the enemy on European wounded 
who fall into their hands justifying such a drastic measure.”).  
13 See Proposed Further Operations, THE TIMES, Sept. 10, 1900, at 3 (reporting 
that the Western military was organizing an expedition to Paoting-Fu, where the 
Chinese were reported to be massing). 
14 Massacres at Pao-Ting-Fu, THE TIMES, Sept. 12, 1900, at 3 (“Surely the civi-
lized world will not suffer this cruel massacre to remain unavenged and raise no 
hand to ascertain the fate of the poor martyred Christians and white women”).  
The Lahore Tribune stands out among papers responding to the Paoting-Fu mas-
sacre for its effort at establishing a counter-narrative.  The Tribune positioned the 
massacres at Paoting-Fu as a reaction to Western hypocrisy, aggrandizement, op-
portunism, imperialism, and violence.  China and the Chinese, THE TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 
1900, at 2. 
15 See Allied Forces in China, MANCHESTER COURIER AND LANCASHIRE GENERAL 
ADVERTISER, Sept. 13, 1900, at 6 (reporting that “severe measures” and “a terrible 
lesson” were anticipated); The Crisis in China, THE TIMES, Aug. 27, 1900, at 3 (re-
porting widespread support for a punitive expedition to Paoting-Fu and the de-
struction of that city); Paotingfu Expedition, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Dec. 18, 1900, 
at 5 (“If ever a city deserved condign punishment it was Paotingfu.”).  See also Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration [hereinafter: NARA], R[ecord] 
G[roup] 59/ M[icrofilm] 102/R[oll Number] 6, No. 312 Fowler, US Consul in Che-
foo, to Hill (August 14, 1900) (transmitting firsthand accounts of murders at Pao-
ting-Fu); NARA, RG 59/M102/R6, No. 352 Fowler to Hill (September 18, 1900) 
(urging a military expedition to Paoting-Fu be organized, as “[w]e have evidence 
enough to hang the Empress Dowager in any Court of law.  If she escapes her just 
desserts it will be only to punish us for our kindness”), forwarded to Secretary of 
War at NARA, RG 59/130 Secretary of State John Hay to the Secretary of War Elihu 
Root (Oct. 29, 1900).  
 It was not uncommon for Westerners to declare that the city should be razed 
to the ground.  American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Records 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/6
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were still trapped in the city lent the expedition an air of urgency 
absent from other field operations.16 
On October 12, 1900, Alfred von Waldersee, Field-Marshal in 
command of Allied forces in China, dispatched approximately 
6,000 soldiers in two columns from Tientsin and Peking with the 
objectives of (1) crushing the Boxers; (2) liberating the captive 
Westerners; and (3) punishing Paoting-Fu.17  These columns met 
                                                                                                                                   
[hereinafter ABCFM], Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 124, Porter to Smith (Oct. 10, 1900) (“It 
does not appear to any of us a matter of vengeance, but of simple justice that a 
punitive expedition should go to Pao Ting and destroy the city where such enor-
mities against the nations have been committed.”).  See also NARA, RG 
59/M102/R6, No. 335 Fowler to Hill (September 5, 1900) (discussing the deaths of 
missionaries in Paoting-Fu and stating that “if this massacre is true, then it will be 
the duty of our Government to raze that City to the ground.”) forwarded to Presi-
dent McKinley at RG 59/130, Acting Secretary of State David J. Hill to Secretary to the 
President George Cortelyou (September 8, 1900).  See also Thomas F. Millard, Pun-
ishment and Revenge in China, 29 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 187, 189 (1901) (reporting on the 
tendency of foreign residents in China to call for the razing of Paoting-Fu). 
16 See No. 210 Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury, in CHINA NO. 5 
(1901), FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE DISTURBANCES IN CHINA (HMSO 
1901) 126–27 (1901) [hereinafter CHINA NO. 5] (suggesting that native Christians 
and possibly also European missionaries were holding out for the preceding two 
months against the Boxers and in some cases were still besieged and in danger of 
massacre); No. 335 Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury, in 
CHINA NO. 1 (1901) FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE DISTURBANCES IN 
CHINA (HMSO 1901) 151, 151 (1901) [hereinafter CHINA NO. 1] (“The withdrawal of 
all troops now would mean a general massacre of all converts and such Chinese 
as have shown themselves friendly to foreigners.”).  See also No. 348 Consul Carles 
to the Marquess of Salisbury, in Id. at 159 (describing Carles’s uncertainty regarding 
the fates of missionaries remaining in Paoting-Fu); China’s Paying Guests, PEKING 
AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Sept. 29, 1900, at 82 (“while we are lingering around loot auc-
tions, and discussing minutæ of plans which never seem to be carried out, there 
are still two parties of our countrymen and women lying virtual prisoners in the 
hands of the Chinese.”). 
17 A copy of Waldersee’s order may be found in the Archivo Dell’uficio Stori-
co Dello Stato Maggiore Dell’esercito [hereinafter AUSSME], E-3, [Rac]coglitore 
52, [fol]der 2, ‘Due Ordini Del Comte Delle Forze Internazionale in Cina Gen 
Wardersee All’Oggetto: operazione di Pao-Ting’.  With respect to punishment, the 
order states that Gaselee was to (1) perpetrate neither violence against the inhabit-
ants nor “requisition against the rules”, and (2) punish Boxers “with maximum 
severity.”  There is no mention as to the form that punishment should take, who 
should be punished (All Boxers? All suspected Boxers? All Boxer collaborators, 
including government officials?), and for what acts.  See also CHINA NO. 5, supra 
note 16, at 32, No. 54 General Sir A. Gaselee to India Office (“Under orders of Field-
Marshal I am to exact at provincial capital reparation for murder missionary con-
verts [sic].”); Id. at 44, No. 80 Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury (explain-
ing that operation was to “bring rescue to the missionaries there” and “avenge 
upon the town the massacres of last July.”).  James William Jamieson, British Con-
sul at Shanghai, accompanied General Gaselee and later reported that the troops 
had set out to punish the city and “determine the guilt of such persons concerned 
in these massacres as were to be found on the spot.”  Inclosure No. 1, Memoran-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
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up just outside of the city on October 19, 1900, where they were 
approached by a deputation of civic officials and prominent Chi-
nese citizens.18  The fantai (provincial treasurer and, in this case, 
acting governor) Ting Yung, eager to forestall the occupation of his 
city, offered to provision the soldiery with food and other supplies 
if they remained outside the city.  But British General Alfred Gas-
elee, who had assumed overall command of the French, German, 
Italian, and British troops, insisted on entering and inhabiting the 
city.  Thus overcome, Ting Yung assured him that the occupation 
would be a bloodless affair and offered to loan the General his se-
dan chair for his entry into Paoting-Fu, an honor General Gaselee 
brusquely refused.19    
The next day Gaselee led his cavalcade of Allied troops 
through the city’s maze-like streets.  The march should have been 
one of the high points of the campaign, but in the absence of ar-
rests, fighting, or executions there was little satisfaction in the exer-
cise.  Press reports from the frontline were subdued and generally 
preoccupied with the contrast between the punishment Paoting-Fu 
‘deserved’ and the unremarkable reality of the orderly transfer of 
power to the occupiers.  From the Pall Mall Gazette: 
  
It was a miserable morning.  As we filed in, the horses in 
the van churned the road into mud, and the mud presently 
became slush, while as the rain increased our splashed and 
bedraggled appearance was altogether out of keeping with 
the dignity of the Powers.  Indeed, there was no doubt that 
the procession of our generals through the streets of a Chi-
nese city was as preposterous as occurrence as anything  . . .  
The Allied procession arrived in due course at the city 
gates, where a group of Chinese officials in Sedan chairs 
were ready to meet them, chief among whom was the act-
ing Treasurer of the Province, a man whose iniquities and 
cruelties to missionaries should have made him a subject 
more fitted for the gallows than for the pleasing duty of 
                                                                                                                                   
dum of Mr. Jamieson’s Visit to Paoting [hereinafter JAMIESON MEMORANDUM], No. 40 
Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury, in CHINA NO. 6 (1901), in FURTHER 
CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE DISTURBANCES IN CHINA (HMSO 1901) 15, 16 
(1901) [hereinafter CHINA NO. 6]. 
18 See Annex 2, Figure 1. 
19 See Dr. T. J. N. Gatrell, The Expedition to Paotingfu, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 
17, 1901, at 148 (describing the instance from General Gaslee’s interpreter’s per-
spective). 
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meeting the generals of the Allied forces in an official ca-
pacity.  We know this man to have maltreated and person-
ally persecuted the unfortunate missionaries who fell into 
his power; nevertheless. . ., the whole of Europe was 
abashed and degraded in the face of such a man . . .   
 . . .  As another pleasant way of making manifest their 
opposition to the precepts of Christianity, the Chinese in 
Pao-ting-fu caused the death of fourteen missionaries, 
among whom were four women, upon whose bodies, both 
before and after death, the most outrageous atrocities were 
committed . . . With the memory of these events still fresh 
in the minds of the inhabitants of the town all that was suf-
ficient . . . was an empty parade of forces, which was ac-
companied by no endorsement of that policy of firmness 
which is said to be the new method of treating with China.  
It was an empty show yesterday, devoid of meaning and 
the more strikingly a failure because it did not even come 
up to the estimate which the Chinese themselves had 
thought would be their just punishment.20 
  
 What the correspondents did not know was that an investi-
gation into the role local officials had played in the massacre of 
Christians had begun even before the international forces entered 
the city.  According to Captain Grote Hutcheson of the Sixth Unit-
ed States Cavalry, who accompanied General Gaselee as an attaché 
and was one of only two US citizens to join in the expedition, as 
soon as the two columns had met outside the city, an inquiry into 
“the harsh, cruel, and inhuman treatment of foreigners” was com-
menced.21  The results were “so damaging for officials and the in-
                                                          
20 Angus Hamilton, Pao-Ting-Fu, THE PALL MALL GAZETTE, Jan. 3, 1901, at 3.  
See also The Pao-Ting-Fu Expedition, THE TIMES, Dec. 26, 1900, at 9 (“The Chinese are 
going about the streets as if they had done nothing; they laugh as you pass by, 
they hustle up against your horse; if one could understand their language, doubt-
less they are calling you all sorts of filthy and disgusting names.”).  Another cor-
respondent noted more outright hostile behaviors: “Though Pao Ting Fu had been 
occupied without opposition, it was plainly apparent to the most casual observer 
that the Chinese were in a very disturbed state.  Europeans going through the city 
were received with insolent and insulting remarks, and on several occasions were 
the objects of spitting, a favorite form of insult.” Marching to Pao Ting Fu, THE LOS 
ANGELES HERALD, Dec. 13, 1900, at 3.  
21 ARWD 1901, supra note 10, at 466, Report on the Paotingfu Expedition and 
Murder of American Missionaries at that place [hereinafter HUTCHESON REPORT].  
Hutcheson’s report is also available in NARA, RG 395/913.  See also NARA, at RG 
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habitants generally that it seemed some steps in the way of pun-
ishment” were called for.22  As the preliminary inquiry revealed 
that the number of Americans deceased surpassed those of any 
other country, Gaselee sought Hutcheson’s opinion “as to the pun-
ishment of any persons guilty of atrocious conduct.”23  Hutcheson 
replied that he could not speak on behalf of his government, but 
that: 
  
First.  In my opinion the United States would uphold the 
prompt punishment of any officials whose guilty conniv-
ance was clear and plain, provided such punishment was 
meted out for the purpose of example and not to satisfy any 
petty feeling of revenge or retribution.  
Second.  That any steps General Gaselee thought necessary 
and proper under the circumstances would in my opinion 
meet with the approval of and be indorsed by [commander 
of US forces] General Chaffee; and  
Third.  That in view of the tense state of feeling because of 
the stories of the atrocious treatment and brutal murder of 
missionaries that had come to light, I suggested that a 
commission or board of inquiry should be instituted to 
                                                                                                                                   
395/911, Special Order No. 55 signed by Adjunct General Chafee (11 Oct. 1900) 
(Ordering Captain Grote Hutcheson and 1st Lieutenant Soulard Turner to accom-
pany the Paoting-Fu expedition). 
 That the US declined to contribute troops to the expedition was considered a 
betrayal by the missionary refugee community in Peking.  Reverend Perkins re-
marked that “[t]he US attitude…lacks in seriousness and seems to come from the 
same source that disbelieves in all punishment and would leave everything to 
moral maxim.  I think it would not take this attitude had it lost heavily in com-
mercial ways.” ABCFM, at Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 7 Perkins to Smith (November 30, 
1900).  From the correspondence of medical missionary Henry Porter: “The lesson 
of the assembly of the nations here had scarce been appreciated by the [Chinese] 
Court.  Of course the Missionaries felt, as did the general public in China that the 
terrible massacre of American and other citizens at Pao Ting and in Shanshi 
should not pass without its real and fruitful lesson and result.  That Americans 
should consider it a matter of no importance that those dear ladies should be 
killed in cool blood by the acting Governor of a province, or that China should 
consider every man defending his life as a fit subject for beheading with indignity, 
seemed to us an impossibility. . . .  It seemed a small matter for the Americans to 
take a reasonable interest in the effort to find out at least whether her citizens 
were still living.”  ABCFM, supra note 15, at Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 124, Porter to 
Smith (Oct. 10, 1900). 
22 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 463. 
23 Id. at 463. 
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make an impartial examination into the conduct of the offi-
cials and any other accused persons, and whose report and 
recommendation might serve as a basis for action.24  
  
Gaselee answered that the same idea had occurred to him and 
on October 21 he established an International Commission to 
“make inquiry into the treatment of the foreigners of various na-
tions who had suffered” at Paoting-Fu.25 
 Although the Commission did not formally meet until Octo-
ber 23, and there is no indication that provincial administrators 
were directly informed that they were susceptible to punishment, 
it was obvious to them that the walls were closing in.  The highest-
ranking members of the local government used their remaining 
time to make what efforts they could to secure foreign patronage.  
Newspaper correspondents from the United States were treated to 
generous accommodations, translators and guides, as well as let-
ters of introduction that ensured that they would remain unmo-
lested in their travels throughout Chili.26  They were in turn 
pumped for information about their European occupiers and felt 
out for their own views on the expedition, presumably in the hope 
that they might endeavor to persuade the United States, which had 
declined to contribute troops to the expedition, to intervene in fa-
vor of the Chinese officials.27  The frontline report of the US corre-
                                                          
24 Id.  
25 Id.  Gaselee was anxious that punishment not derail peace negotiations in 
Peking, and he sought then-British delegate Claude MacDonald’s opinion as to 
how to deal with Ting Yung in the event he was found guilty.  See 
NA, PRO 30/33/7/9 Jamieson to MacDonald (October 20, 1900) (showing that Ja-
mieson welcomes an indication of MacDonald’s view as to how to deal with Ting 
Yung).  I have been unable to locate any reply by MacDonald. 
 The official French Journal de Marche described the Commission as having 
been formed to “investigate the causes of the Boxer movement, the perpetrators of 
the massacres of missionaries and Christians, the fire of the Christians [presuma-
bly, this refers to the fire that some Christians were burned in], and propose a 
strict sanction against culpable parties to Field-Marshall Waldersee.” (trans. 
Brockman-Hawe).  Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre au Château de Vin-
cennes [SHAT], 11 H 3, Corps Expeditionnaire de Chine – Etat Major de la 2nd Bri-
gade – Journal de Marche –  No. 1, Entry of October 21, 1900, p. 16.  
26 See, e.g., Ralph D. Paine, In Desolate China, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 10, 1901, at 
21 (“Such extraordinary favors showed that the taotai was trimming his sails, now 
that the foreigners had him at their mercy . . .  His treatment of a correspondent 
was moved by fear was selfishness, no doubt . . . ”); Ralph D. Paine, Taking Pao-
Ting-Fu, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 24, 1901, at 7 (describing one correspondent’s gener-
ous treatment by the Chinese in Paoting-Fu).  
27 Id.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
 
640 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
spondent for the Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) highlights one such 
last-ditch effort to drive a wedge between the United States and the 
other Allies, and escape through the gap created.  At a dinner at-
tended by himself, the Allied commanders, and the Prefect and 
Subprefects of Paoting-Fu, 
 
There were scores of dishes served, but only chopsticks as 
weapons of attack, and the tyro made small headway until 
he sharpened one of them to use as a harpoon or one-tined 
fork.  This amused the taotai, who laughed as heartily as if 
his death sentence were not already in preparation.  Cold 
ham and chicken, rice, tea, soup and cakes were sufficient 
for a “square meal,” without rashly experimenting with in-
numerable mysterious compounds. 
The taotai asked many questions regarding the foreign 
forces, and said that he was grateful to the Americans for 
not sending soldiers with the allied expedition.  “It shows 
that you are a kind hearted people,” he continued. “You do 
not want to rob and murder the poor Chinese.”28 
  
Eleventh hour blandishments did not forestall the arrest of the 
officials whose hands, it was believed, “instead of restraining, ac-
tually guided and goaded the maddened rioters” responsible for 
Christian deaths.29  Within three days of the Allied parade through 
the city, four provincial leaders were placed under arrest.30  The 
names and positions of the accused were recorded by Hutcheson: 
  
1. Ting Yung – “the fantai or provincial treasurer, formerly 
and at the time the niehtai or provincial judge” 
2. Quei Heng – “the chief tartar official of the city” 
3. Wan Chan Kuei – “a lieutenant colonel in the Chinese 
army” 
4. Shen Chia Pen – “the niehtai or provincial judge, but 
prefect at time of murders.”31 
                                                          
28 Id.  The taotai was reluctant to discuss the massacres; he “would say no 
more than that the Boxers alone were responsible for their deaths.” 
29 ARTHUR JUDSON BROWN, NEW FORCES IN OLD CHINA: AN UNWELCOME BUT 
INEVITABLE AWAKENING 209 (1904). 
30 Id. 
31 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 472 (emphasis added).  Hutcheson also 
reported that T’an Wen Huan “the present taotai, who it is alleged sent money 
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The International Commission before which they were tried 
was comprised of German, Italian, British, and French nationals, 
though the precise makeup of the body remains unsettled.  In his 
communications home, Hutcheson listed the Commission’s mem-
bership as follows:  General Bailloud (French army), Colonel Ram-
sey (British (Indian) army), Lieutenant Colonel Salsa (Italian army), 
Major von Brixen, (German army), and J. W. Jamieson (civilian, 
British consul at Shanghai).32  There is no reason to disbelieve that 
French General Maurice Bailloud was President,33 or doubt the fact 
of von Brixen’s participation.  But inconsistencies among certain 
archival sources, as well as between these documents and public 
sources, cast doubt on Hutcheson’s identification of the Italian and 
British Commissioners.  The Commission’s procès-verbal (“Session 
Records”), as recorded by the Italian Lieutenant Sambuy,34 sug-
gests that he, not Colonel Salsa, was Italy’s man on the Commis-
sion.35  These records, in conjunction with the private journal of 
British Captain Francis Poole, also suggest that it was Poole alone 
who represented the British (as a substitute for Ramsey, who fell 
ill); Jamieson’s name appears nowhere within them.36  Notably, the 
                                                                                                                                   
and arms from Tientsin for boxers at Paotingfu” was sent by the Commission to 
Tientsin for trial.  Id. at 467.This decision, if it was made by the Commission in its 
formal capacity, was not memorialized in the Session Records.  The ambiguity in 
the record is discussed in greater detail in infra note 65.  
32 Jamieson was described by Sir E. Satow as “a very competent Chinese 
scholar” who was “not popular with the men of his own service, [and who] in fact 
appears to be the object of universal dislike among his equals.”  
NA, PRO 30/33/14/11, No. 43 Satow to Bertie (November 8, 1900).  See generally 
THE ANGLO-AFRICAN WHO'S WHO AND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHBOOK (David Saffery 
ed., Walter H. Wills comp., reprint 2006) (1907) (sketching briefly the biography of 
Jamieson). 
33 According to war correspondent George Lynch, Major-General George 
Richardson was initially selected as President, “but on the French remarking that 
‘Il y va de l’honneur de France’ [the honor of France is at stake] he withdrew in fa-
vour of the French commander.”  Lynch, supra note 12, at 204. 
34 The “Session Records” that comprise Annex 1 of this paper are a transla-
tion of “Commissione Internazionale D’inchiesta Circa Il Massacro Di Cristiani” 
found in the AUSSME, E-3, Rac 54, fol 40 (Federico Solchi trans.).  The diary of 
Captain né Commissioner Poole contains fragments of these procès-verbal.  Na-
tional Army Museum, ‘Microfilm diary of Capt (later Lt Col) F G Poole, Middle-
sex Regiment, at Peking, China, 1900; associated with the 3rd China War (Boxer 
Rebellion) (1900–1901)’ [hereinafter POOLE DIARY].  
35 See generally Annex 1 (also suggesting that Sambuy was a substitute for 
Italian Major Agliardi, not Salsa). 
36 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, at diary entry of October 26, 1900.  He was 
originally secretary for the Commission.  Id. at Letter to Mother of Nov. 25, 1900. 
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Session Records align with the identities of those acknowledged as 
Commissioners in a sketch of the Commission at work that ap-
peared in the January 19, 1900 Supplement to The Graphic, itself 
based on a drawing sent in by an unnamed British soldier.37  Yet 
Jamieson, consistent with Hutcheson’s Report, described himself as 
a Commissioner in his own brief account of the Paoting-Fu opera-
tion.38   
Missionary literature suggests that Reverend James Walter 
Lowrie, an American who accompanied Gaselee’s troops as an in-
terpreter, was de facto a Commissioner as well; “To the people he 
appeared to have the power of life and death.  All examinations 
had to be conducted through him.  All accusations and evidence 
had to be sifted by him” recalled the missionary Arthur Brown 
several years later.39  But this source is best approached with a 
boulder of salt; Brown also describes Lowrie as “the only man [on 
the Commission] who could speak Chinese, and the only one, too, 
who personally knew the Chinese,” a blatant falsehood assuming 
Mr. Jamieson’s involvement, as well as that of Dr. Gatrell, a British 
interpreter with the expedition who wrote in his letters that he was 
“busy on investigation all the time.”40  The most likely scenario is 
                                                          
37 See Annex 2, Figure 4.  Jamieson may be the unnamed British official stand-
ing in the background.  One of Gaselee’s translators described Jamieson as “the 
interpreter at the court.”  Gatrell, supra note 19, at 149. 
38 JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17.  Jamieson was under orders to ac-
company the expedition as “Political Adviser to General Gaselee” in which capac-
ity he was to provide counsel as to “the most effective measures of punishing the 
city in certain given contingencies.”  Id.  He arrived in Paoting-Fu with sugges-
tions for punishment already drafted, including (1) the execution of those con-
cerned in murders of missionaries and converts, (2) destruction of the four corners 
of the city walls, (3) destruction of the gate towers, (4) burning of the temple of the 
guardian spirit of the town and (5) levying a fine on the city.  CHINA NO. 6, supra 
note 17, at 17, Inclosure 2 Memorandum, No. 40 Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salis-
bury. 
39 ARTHUR J. BROWN, REPORT OF A VISITATION OF THE CHINA MISSIONS 7–8 (3rd 
ed.1901).  Lowrie, upon seeing the five imprisoned, wrote “I am frank in saying 
that I do not feel any impulse in seeking their reprieve, so horrid was their crime, 
and so important is it that future mandarins should realize this responsibility of 
protecting foreigners’ lives, where possible, rests on them personally.”  The Story 
of Paotingfu, THE ASSEMBLY HERALD, Feb. 1901, at 61, 62. 
40 Gatrell, supra note 19, at 149.  A further hint that Lowrie’s role in the 
Commission was overstated comes to us in the form of a breathless eulogy from 
William Ellis.  Ellis credits the minister, who “cherished no bitterness in his heart 
toward the poor, deluded people who had so foully ravaged his him and slain his 
closest friends and dearest comrades,” with single handedly convincing the com-
manders at Paoting-Fu to spare the city, but tells us “the missionary himself re-
fuses modestly to talk about it, disclaiming merit for what he did, and declaring 
that the saving of the city was by no means his work alone.”  William Ellis, How a 
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that Lowrie was used as a translator by the investigators, and his 
role was subsequently exaggerated to nurture a missionary 
metanarrative of strength and mercy in the wake of the mass kill-
ings.41  
Over the course of seven sessions the Commissioners directed 
the investigation and heard the evidence against the accused.  In-
terrogations were brief and not subtle.  The fantai was bluntly 
asked, for example, why he did not assist the (missionary) Bagnall 
family, “becoming in this way an indirect accomplice of their 
deaths.”42  The question encapsulates the approach of the Commis-
sioners: capital sentences were considered appropriate where, as 
here, those high in authority had reinforced any single link in the 
chain of events that led to the massacres.  
The guilty verdicts were rendered on a rolling basis.  The 
Commissioners’ minds were made up about Quai Heng (Chief Tar-
tar) and Wan Chan Kuei (Lieutenant-Colonel in the Imperial Ar-
my) by the end of their third session.  Death was recommended for 
the former in light of his indirect support of the Boxer movement 
on the fantai’s evidence that Boxers had organized themselves in 
the Tartar court.  Lieutenant-Colonel Wan was convicted on the 
basis of witness statements that his soldiers, either with his explicit 
or tacit consent, handed over an English missionary family (the 
Bagnalls) to the Boxers.  His defense that he had transferred them 
to the Imperial army, over which he had no control, was unavail-
ing.43  The Commissioners deposed Ting Yung, the fantai, during 
their second session, when he evaded answering a series of pointed 
questions concerning his support for the Boxers and neglect in pro-
tecting American and European missionaries.44  Ting Yung was 
                                                                                                                                   
Princeton Man Saved a City, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Apr. 21, 1915, at 680. 
41 For more on representations of Boxer punishments in missionary dis-
course, see James L. Hevia, Leaving a Brand on China: Missionary Discourse in the 
Wake of the Boxer Movement, MODERN CHINA, July 1992, at 305 (arguing that mis-
sionary discursive practices were intended to, and in fact did, shape reality as op-
posed to  merely passively reflecting or mirroring it). 
42 Annex 1, Second Session. 
43 Annex 1, Third Session.  See also HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 466, 
which describes the Colonel as “the military commander of the cavalry camp 
where the Bagnell family repaired without avail for refuge, and by whom their 
silver and other valuables were removed.” Quai Heng was “one of the most 
prominent men to offer moral, financial, and official aid to the Boxer movement.”  
44 George Lynch hints at an aspect of the fantai’s defense in his post-war pub-
lication that does not appear in the Session Records: “That past master of equivo-
cation . . . declared that no foreign lives had been taken within the city.  The ex-
planation lies in the fact that those unfortunate missionaries were just conducted 
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condemned, however, at the fourth session after being confronted 
with a copy of a telegram he sent to the Emperor stating that he 
lacked the resources to kill the Christians.45  Shen Chia Pen, the 
neitai, was to be removed from office at the same time.46 
The Session Records paint a picture of a Commission that 
struggled to find witnesses against the accused (with the exception 
of the case against Wan Chan Kuei) or identify additional individ-
uals who should be investigated.  This experience was consistent 
with that of Hutcheson, who noted a number of variables that con-
founded his ability to put together his final Report on the events 
that transpired in Paoting-Fu: 
  
It must also be borne in mind that the events to be de-
scribed happened nearly four months ago, and, except in a 
general way have passed from the minds of most people 
here; that immediately following the occurrences they were 
much talked about, so that different versions and stories 
were currently believed to be true; that the principal actors 
have fled; that few persons can now be found who will ad-
mit having been present; and above all the slight regard in 
which the truth is held by the Chinese people.47 
                                                                                                                                   
without the boundaries, and there met their fate.”  Lynch, supra note 12, at 204. 
45 The authors of China Under the Empress Dowager published a letter, pur-
portedly between Chinese officials in early July, 1900, in which it is stated that 
Ting Yung 
was largely responsible for the beginning of the trouble.  I hear that 
about ten days ago he sent for all his subordinates to attend at his 
Yamên, and the Prefect of Hsüanhua, who was passing through, came to 
pay his respects with the others.  This man said, ‘in the reign of the Chia 
Ch’ing there were heterodox cults of this kind, and the Emperor ordered 
them to be suppressed.’ T’ing Yung replied, ‘circumstances alter cases.  
Why should you now refer to those days?’ The Prefect answered him, ‘It 
is quite true that the calendar is no longer the same as it was at that time, 
but the enlightened principles laid down by our sacred ancestors should 
be a guidance to us for ever.’ T’ing had of course nothing to say, and 
could only glare at him in silence and change the conversation. 
J. O. P. BLAND & E. BACKHOUSE, CHINA UNDER THE EMPRESS DOWAGER 247–48 (1911). 
46 Annex 1, Fourth Session. 
47 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21 at 468.  In the earliest draft of his report, 
dated October 22, 1900, Hutcheson states that he had at that time received “no di-
rect testimony of eyewitnesses . . .”  Over the course of the next few days at least 
one eyewitness must have come forward, as this language was changed in the fi-
nal version, dated October 25, 1900, to “little direct testimony of eyewitnesses . . .”  
NARA, RG 395/906, Grote Hutcheson, ‘Pao-ting-fu China, Oct. 22, 1900 - State-
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There are nevertheless some indications that the accused were 
convicted on the basis of more evidence than was memorialized in 
the Session Records.  Gatrell wrote that the written testimonies of 
the Green family (who had been freed by the French soldiers ap-
proximately one week previously) “went a long way toward bring-
ing about [the] punishment” of Ting Yung and the other officials, 
that “everyone [he interviewed] laid the blame on the Fan t’ai,”48 
and that testimony which directly implicated Ting Yung and Quei 
Heng was “brought up against” them.49  He mentioned other evi-
dence that would have been critical to a conviction; testimonies 
which, despite being “contradictory in parts,” were in general 
agreement that “the people of the villages immediately around the 
compounds took a large share in the work of destruction.”50  Addi-
tionally, former German Army Lieutenant Alfred von Müller, in 
his post-war retrospective, listed among the sources of evidence re-
lied upon “the testimony of the French missionary Pére Du Mont, 
who barely escaped death,” as well as the “concurring testimony of 
                                                                                                                                   
ment of the Death of American Missionaries’ (October 22, 1900).  Reverend Arthur 
Brown, who travelled to China in 1901 to assess the state of the Presbyterian 
Church in the aftermath of the widespread attacks on missionaries, put together 
his own account of the events at Paoting-Fu and explained the difficulties he had 
faced in acquiring reliable information: 
None of the foreigners live to tell the painful story.  No other foreigners 
reached Paotingfu until the arrival of the military expedition in October, 
three and a half months later.  The Chinese who had participated in the 
massacre were then in hiding.  Spectators were afraid to talk lest they, 
too, might be held guilty.  Most of the Chinese Christians who had been 
with the missionaries were killed, while others were so panic-stricken 
that they could remember only the particular scene with which they 
were directly connected.  Moreover, in those three and a half months 
such battles and national commotions had occurred, including the cap-
ture of Peking and the flight of the Emperor, that the people of Paotingfu 
had half forgotten the murder of a few missionaries in June. 
. . . The guilty tried to shift the blame upon the innocent, and enemies 
sought to pay off old scores of hatred upon their foes by charging them 
with complicity in the massacres. 
BROWN, supra note 39, at 3–4, 8.  Dr. Peck, a missionary travelling through Pao-
ting-Fu in March 1901, also had a difficult time finding witnesses willing to speak 
to him about the violence of summer 1900.  He eventually found a local constable 
“who saw the affair.”  His conclusions are published in North China Mission, THE 
MISSIONARY HERALD, June 1901, 244, 245–46. 
48 Gatrell, supra note 19, at 149. 
49 Id. at 150. 
50 Id. at 149. 
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numerous Chinese Christians whose women and children had 
been killed in gruesome manner by higher level order.”51  There 
may have been additional documentary proof as well; in a January 
1901 dispatch, a correspondent for The Times described a damning 
communique submitted into evidence in which Ting Yung stated 
that he would consider it a “disgrace to himself if one foreigner 
was left alive in his district.”52  
The Commissioners never issued a final report describing what 
happened in Paoting-Fu and clarifying precisely which acts (or 
omissions) of the local officials were considered criminal.  Ja-
mieson’s expedition report described the activities of all three offi-
cials sentenced to capital punishment in strictly passive terms, not-
ing that they had “aided and abetted” the murders by their 
“culpable negligence.”53  But this is in tension with the “court-
martial verdict” that appeared (in German) in Alfred von Müller’s 
Die Wirren und die Kämpfe der Verbündeten Trüppen (1902).  Dated 
November 4, 1900, the ‘verdict’ sets forth the following basis for 
the convictions: 
  
Sentenced to receiving the death penalty through decapita-
tion are the Fantai Ting Yung, who neither managed to pro-
tect Europeans and Chinese Christians, nor to prevent 
murder, such as massacre of missionaries, railroad officials 
and Christian Chinese; the Tartar Governor Kuli keng 
[Quei Heng], who favored and organized the Boxers; the 
cavalry colonel Wang chan kuai, who allowed the massacre 
of the American missionary Bagnell, along with his wife 
and little daughter, who sought refuge in his camp. 
The Nientai Shen chia kuai, whose guilt is lesser because of 
smaller authority, who however participates no less in the 
responsibility for the misdeeds, is removed from his office 
and declared void of his rank.54 
                                                          
51 ALFRED VON MÜLLER, DIE WIRREN UND DIE KÄMPFE DER VERBÜNDETEN 
TRÜPPEN 432 (1902). 
52 The Pao-Ting-Fu Expedition, THE TIMES, Jan. 5, 1901, at 3. 
53 JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17 (“[T]he Commission . . . had 
brought before it certain evidence strongly incriminating [the three officials sen-
tence to capital punishment] of having been actually concerned in aiding and 
abetting the Boxer movement and thus practically directly responsible for the 
murders which took place.”). 
54 MÜLLER, supra note 51 (Brockman-Hawe trans.).  This verdict, however, 
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Both sources are, to some extent, in tension with Hutcheson’s 
report, which describes the current fantai, Ting Yung, as having 
presented a local Boxer with a gilt button “in the nature of a deco-
ration or badge of distinction” in recognition for his “zeal and en-
ergy in the Boxer movement” the day before the massacres.  Hut-
cheson understood that this lent the subsequent carnage “a certain 
official sanction.”55  The British Intelligence Department’s “Official 
Account” also suggests a heightened responsibility for the former 
neitai, noting that Ting Yung “did all in his power to encourage the 
Boxers.”56 
                                                                                                                                   
cannot be regarded as definitive, as Müller never stated whether his reproduction 
was copied from an archival source, or based on his own recollection of either the 
text of the Chinese language posters hung by the Allies around the city to publi-
cize the sentences or the public read-through of the Commission’s decision done 
just prior to the execution.  It may be significant though that the published mem-
oires of General Voyron, Commander of the French Expeditionary Forces in Chi-
na, presented Quei Heng as having been more actively and intimately involved 
with the Boxers than his colleagues, and otherwise generally tracks the ‘verdict’: 
   
The Fan-Tai [Ting Yung], who had protected neither Europeans or native 
Christians and allowed the massacre at the very gates of the province, 
the Tartar governor of the City [Quei Heng], who was a principal organ-
izer of the Boxer movement, and a Tartar cavalry colonel [Wan Chan 
Kuei], who had left in his camp the murderers of an American mission-
ary and her family, were beheaded in the presence of detachments of all 
the troops of the garrison, at the same place where the British and Amer-
ican missionaries were murdered. 
The Nieh-tai, who seemed less guilty than the Fan-Tai, who though sec-
ond in command still had a share in the responsibility for the disorder, 
was deposed and degraded at the same location.  
GENERAL VOYRON, RAPPORT SUR L’EXPÉDITION DE CHINE 1900–1901 211 (Brockman-
Hawe trans.).  
 Reverend Arthur Smith, who took a great interest in news of the massacres 
and punishment of Paoting-Fu, wrote in 1901 of the sentence on “Ting-Jung, who 
had been the patron of the Boxer movement for the whole year . . .  together with 
the Tartar General of the city and the Lieutenant-Colonel of the camp, who had 
refused protection to foreigners, and whose soldiers had stood idly by while the 
burning of the mission premises and the slaughter of missionaries was in pro-
gress.”  Arthur H. Smith, China Six Months after the Occupation of Peking, THE 
OUTLOOK, Apr. 13, 1901, at 865, 866. 
55 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 464. 
56 NA, FO 881/9496x, OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 
CHINA, 1900–1901 133 (E. W. M. Norie comp., 1903) [hereinafter OFFICIAL 
ACCOUNT].  The Account was based on “all official reports and publications . . . 
and . . . unofficial diaries and descriptions of various incidents of the campaign.”  
Unfortunately, repeated searches of the National Archives have revealed none of 
the original reports, publications, journals, etc. that the Intelligence Department 
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Thanks to “the officiousness [of a staff] understrapper” the 
press was denied entry to the proceedings, accounting for the rela-
tive paucity of firsthand accounts of the trial.57  Nonetheless, one 
journalist, Luigi Barzini, correspondent for the Italian Corrirere della 
Serra, either found a way in or cultivated a contact with first-hand 
knowledge of the proceedings.58  His version of the Commission’s 
second sitting does not precisely track the Session Records, but it is 
consistent enough to warrant reproduction for the flavor of the 
proceedings it alone is capable of imparting:   
  
The Fang-tai was accused of having supported anti-Europe 
forces.  
This magistrate defended himself with a real fury in front 
of the International Military Tribunal.  Small, plump, bili-
ous, with numerous words and gestures he worked tre-
mendously to tear any responsibility from his shoulders, 
throwing it profusely over the Emperor, Empress, and 
Prince Tuan.  [Realizing it was a] lost game, he embraced a 
leg of the table of the court, as if begging from the table the 
justice denied by the white men.  The table was, naturally, 
Chinese.  
The Tar-Tar governor put the court in a good mood.  Imag-
ine a seventy-year-old man, deaf as a post, who does not 
understand a word unless it is yelled in the left ear of a 
servant, especially in charge of this operation, who has the 
voice of a terribly shrill musician.  The questions from the 
judges passed to the interpreter, then from the interpreter 
to the servant, and finally from the servant to the governor, 
who did not understand.  
                                                                                                                                   
ostensibly relied on in the course of compiling its chapter on the Paoting-Fu expe-
dition.  It thus remains an open question how much the acknowledged “consider-
able revision and editing” of these sources resulted in a dilution of content, or loss 
of subtleties in language and tone that might provide insight into the operation of 
the Commission or resolve the tension between sources.  Id. at Preface. 
57 Lynch, supra note 12 at 204.  See also The Execution of Ting Yang, THE JAPAN 
WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 25, 1900, at 4 (“In forming an opinion [about the Commission] 
we labour under the great disadvantage of not knowing exactly what evidence 
was submitted to the court martial.”); Millard, supra note 15, at 192 (“The commis-
sion began sitting immediately in secret session.  No correspondents were permit-
ted to be present.”).  
58 I refer here to Luigi Barzini, Senior (1874–1947) and not to his son (1908–
1984), a famous Italian correspondent in his own right. 
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Why—they asked him—have you allowed Boxers 
to use rooms in your house for meetings?  
My son—he answered—has been in Peking for six 
months.  
He was also accused of having directly encouraged I-ho 
T’ciuan and the Ta-To-Que.  
The colonel of cavalry had delivered the American mis-
sionary Bagnall and his family to the Boxers.  He defended 
weakly.  He simply asked if they would cut off his head.  
They answered yes.  Then he made a gesture as if to say:  
It's fine!—and  withdrew with dignity.59 
  
Ting Yung, Quei Heng, and Wan Chan Kuei were recommend-
ed to capital punishment by beheading—the “Chinese method in 
vogue for criminals.”60  The Commissioners also advised the de-
struction of several local sites of religious and civil import, includ-
ing all the pagodas, buildings and towers along the city walls.61  
General Gaselee left for Peking on October 28, 1900 and personally 
delivered the recommendations to the Field-Marshal.62  
As they waited for Waldersee’s confirmation, residents of Pao-
ting-Fu were treated to the Commission-mandated destruction of a 
temple that the Boxers had used for their meetings and as a prison 
                                                          
59 LUIGI BARZINI, NELL’ESTREMO ORIENTE 306–07 (1904) (Brockman-Hawe 
trans.).  It is also possible that Barzini did not witness these testimonies himself, 
but instead relayed the story as he heard it from someone present at the hearing.  
For more on Barzini in China, see SHIRLEY ANN SMITH, ITALIANS IN CHINA, 1900–
1947 at 25–66 (2012), and Piero Corradini, Luigi Barzini e la Guerra dei “Boxers,” 
4 CINA 70 (1958).  
60 HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 465; JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra 
note 17 (“The sentence . . . was in the nature of a recommendation to the Field 
Marshal, with whom the ultimate decision rested . . . .”). 
61 See HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 466 (reporting the Commission’s 
recommendation that various temples, pagodas, and gates be destroyed as part of 
Paoting-Fu’s punishment).  See also BROWN, supra note 39, at 9 (“The Generals, 
therefore, felt that some punishment must be inflicted upon the city . . . . All of 
[the towers on the city wall], but two comparatively small ones, were blown up by 
order of the foreign generals.  The temples which the Boxers had used for their 
meetings . . . were also destroyed, while the splendid official temple of the city . . . 
was utterly wrecked by dynamite.”).  
62 See JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17 (indicating that General Gaselee 
left Paoting to return to Peking with Jamieson).  See also NA, FO 17/1449, Move-
ment of Troops (Nov. 3, 1900) (noting that Waldersee had sent for Gaselee to bring 
his battalion to join Waldersee in Shanghai). 
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for various captured missionaries (Chi-Sheng-An Temple), and the 
official temple of the city (Cheng-Huang-Miao Temple).63  Mean-
while the captured officials, who knew nothing of their proposed 
fate, ruminated in their cells.64  Reverend Lowrie, passing by the 
makeshift prison, observed their sorry state: 
  
[We] looked through the window, . . . and heard [Ting 
Yung’s] pitiful sighs and moans as he lifted up this morsel 
of food and that only to put it down again untasted.  He is a 
handsome man of forty-five.  A reporter visited him two 
days since and after a conversation in which he deplored 
his folly in seeking enormous wealth and failing to discover 
the empty boasts of the Boxers, he then asked the reporter 
to loan him his revolver evidently intending to commit sui-
cide.  This I should not be surprised to hear he had done be-
fore the day of execution arrives.  
In the same . . . [building] . . . is another distinguished crim-
inal under the sentence of death if Count Waldersee ap-
proves, which he is almost certain to do, Fair [T’an] Wen 
Huan, a taotai of Tientsin.  These men together with an old 
Manchu Commandant, Keui Hong [Quei Heng], bitterer 
even than they, the entire population of the city unite in 
judging worthy of death.  There is another, Wang Chan 
Keui [Wan Chan Kuei], a military man in charge of the 
camp east of the city, who stopped the Bagnalls in their 
flight, took their valuables and gave themselves over to the 
hands of the Boxers.65 
                                                          
63 Annex 1, Third Session.  See also HUTCHESON REPORT, supra note 21, at 466 
(reporting the Commission’s recommendation that various temples, pagodas, and 
gates be destroyed as part of Paoting-Fu’s punishment).  It is a mystery why the 
Commissioners destroyed these sites without Waldersee’s confirmation, but 
awaited his approval for other acts of symbolic punishment.  
64 See BROWN, supra note 29, at 209 (noting the irony that these were the very 
same rooms that had been utilized by the Presbyterian mission for Sunday ser-
vices in Paoting-Fu before the violence). 
65 The Story of Paotingfu, supra note 39, at 62.  The precise relationship between 
the Commission and T’an Wen Huan needs to be explored further.  Hutcheson’s 
Report, Lowrie’s letter home, and news media suggest that his case was decided 
by the Commission.  See Australians in China, THE EVENING NEWS (SYDNEY), Jan. 28, 
1901, at 8 (“Documentary evidence was found in the Yamen that the man had act-
ed as paymaster to the ‘Boxers,’ and he was known to have taken a very active 
part in the proceedings generally.  While in Pao Ting-Fu, a day later, fresh evi-
dence was found convicting him of his anti-foreign sentiments.”).  See also The Po-
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That Waldersee approved the Commission’s recommendations 
would have surprised few.  This was, after all, a man who de-
scribed himself as having only two principles of action in the China 
theatre:  “to treat all Chinese like dogs, and to refuse everything 
asked of him by the Russian Minister.”66  On November 6, the 
noises of a capital city waking up were punctuated by a series of 
explosions; part of the city walls and adorning pagodas had been 
blown up.  Two hours later Ting Yung, Quei Heng and Wan Chan 
Kuei were executed, and Shen Chia Pen was publicly degraded.  
Their sentences were carried out with all the theatrics befitting 
their status as the first Chinese officials to be punished by Allied 
                                                                                                                                   
sition of China, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 1900, at 10 (“Tang Wen Huan, 
the Provincial Treasurer, who was sentenced to death by the Paoting-Fu military 
tribunal, is being brought to Tientsin to be publicly decapitated by the City Gov-
ernment executioner at the request of the Paoting-Fu military authorities.”); De 
Midi a Minuit, LE MATIN, Dec. 1, 1900, at 1. 
 There is, however, no mention of T’an Wen Huan’s case in the Session Rec-
ords.  Moreover, per the minutes of the Tientsin Provisional Government (“TPG”) 
meeting of November 26, 1900, he was offered up to the Allied council governing 
the city by the Germans and described at that time as having been “tried by a 
Chinese court and condemned to be decapitated, the sentence being approved by 
the Emperor.”  NA, FO 233/218, Minutes of the Seventy Fourth Meeting of the Coun-
cil of the provisional Government of the Chinese City of Tientsin 64, 66 (Nov. 26, 1900) 
[hereinafter TPG].   
 Although the Council had agreed at that meeting to decapitate the prisoner, 
notes from the subsequent December 5, 1900 meeting indicate that the TPG was 
furnished “certain documents” by the Chinese, suggesting that a fresh review of 
the case accounting for new evidence was undertaken at that time.  The TPG af-
firmed its earlier decision, and apparently felt the need to ensure that his death 
was at least as spectacular as that of his peers in Paoting-Fu, as they now ordered 
that he should be “marched through the streets with a proclamation stating the 
cause of his execution and that “his head be exposed for five days with a copy of 
the proclamation.”  NA, FO 233/218, Minutes of TPG meeting of Dec. 5, 1900, at 87, 
also available at PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES SÉANCES DU CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENT 
PROVISOIRE DE TIENTSIN [hereinafter PVCGPT] 61 (1911).  The actual execution was 
also noted in the meeting minutes.  See NA, FO 233/218, Minutes of TPG meeting 
December 7, 1900, at 88.  Their orders were carried out to a tee.  See Australians in 
China at 8 (reporting that many executions took place).  See also Execution of an Of-
ficial, PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Dec. 8, 1900, at 122 (describing the execution of 
Tan Wen-huan); The Execution of Tan Wen-Huan, PEKIN AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Dec. 
15, 1900, at 126 (describing the execution as welcomed by foreigners and locals 
alike). 
66  NA, FO 800/119, Colonel Satow to Lord Lansdowne (Dec. 20, 1900) (describ-
ing Waldersee’s comments to his English adjunct, Colonel Grierson).  Waldersee 
wrote in his diary that “[o]nly if one behaves harshly and ruthlessly against [the 
Chinese] can one make progress with them.”  Annika Mombauer, Wilhelm, Wal-
dersee, and the Boxer Rebellion, in THE KAISER – NEW RESEARCH ON WILHELM II’S ROLE 
IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 91, 115 (Annika Mombauer & Wilhelm Deist eds., 2003).  
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forces for the “crimes against humanity”67 of previous months: 
 
In the distance, now the sounds of a lively march were au-
dible, international policemen (soldiers with red armbands) 
cleared the roads, the troops that were selected to be pre-
sent during the execution of the three condemned moved 
in.  Under the burning pagoda, through the mighty gate, 
passing by the hills of a Chinese cemetery, the march went 
past the destroyed part of the wall, where the execution 
was to take place in the presence of the magistrates and 
personally led by the police prefect.  There the troops as-
sembled in the form of a rectangle open to the wall, French 
and German troops side by side.  Two sections of German 
soldiers, led by an officer, brought the delinquents and 
placed themselves with them in the open side of the rectan-
gle.  Major von Brixen and Lt. Col. Ramsey stepped for-
ward and read aloud, each in his own language, the judg-
ment of the court-martial as confirmed by Field Marshal 
Count Waldersee.  The condemned were led into the center 
of the rectangle, where the Chinese executioner was wait-
ing for them.  There followed successively and with much 
circuitousness, thus slowly and mercilessly for the delin-
quents, the execution of the three condemned, while the 
fourth had to watch.  The corpses were packed in black cof-
fins, while the heads of three were fixed on high bars, 
where they remained until the Chinese people had been 
convinced of the enforcement of the judgment.  It was im-
pressive how those condemned ones went to their deaths.  
With firm steps, but ashen faces, they walked up to the exe-
cutioner; proudly they looked around before they knelt 
down without being forced in order to receive the mortal 
blow. 
Soon after the retreat of the troops the Chinese rushed to 
the execution place and looked respectfully at the heads of 
the men, by whom they had previously been oppressed.  Si-
lently they crept home, but not without pausing to read the 
large posters on the way, which announced the wording of 
                                                          
67 Allied Forces in China, MANCHESTER COURIER AND LANCASHIRE GENERAL 
ADVERTISER, Sept. 13, 1900, at 6.  
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the judgment in Chinese.68 
                                                          
68 MÜLLER, supra note 51, at 433–34 (Brockman-Hawe trans.).  At least three 
first-hand accounts of the sentences were published by the press.  Two of the three 
correspondents were cognizant that what they were witnessing was no mere exe-
cution, but a performance intended to send a message, though their responses to 
the fact of the staginess and theatricality of the beheadings varied.  The unnamed 
reporter from The Advertiser relished the martial atmosphere, underlining the ac-
robatic prowess of the executioner and his assistants, the efficient order to the 
proceedings, the evil nature of the deceased, and the merciless nature of the 
spared magistrate.  See Winter Quarters, THE ADVERTISER, Jan. 22, 1901 at 7 (describ-
ing the scene of beheading as magnificent).  Barzini painted a more intimate pic-
ture, calling attention to the spoken and unspoken behavioral ticks of the parties 
involved, humanizing all in the process: 
  
Killing a man is nothing, especially for soldiers, even more so when in 
China; watching him be killed is terrible.  . . . General von Kettler nerv-
ously tapped his boots with his riding stick, committing all of his atten-
tion to this gesture.  General Bailloud repeated to his neighbors: Mais 
c’est bien long, mon Dieu! [But this is taking long, my God!] . . .  
Suddenly a large blade, grabbed with two hands, shone in the sun.  The 
executioner beat the ground with his foot and raised the Sciabola.  Twice 
he approached the bare neck to make a cut, there was a flash, and then a 
thud.  . . . The executioner turned toward the members of the military 
court, raising his thumb as if to say: ‘this makes one!’  After a few 
minutes the three heads of the condemned were hung on top of as many 
pikes in the middle of the square.  The executioner threw the bloody 
sword on the grass, approached the judges, and uttered the sacramental 
words: “xing xian fa” [justice has been done!] 
Meanwhile, a curious scene took place.  The ancient Nieng-tai of Paoting-
Fu, condemned to destitution, seeing himself in the square expected a 
terrible punishment.  After losing "face," he should have to lose his head.  
With Chinese resignation he waited his turn.  But after these executions, 
[Shen Chia Pen] looked around in wonder, supposing that he had been 
forgotten by the axman.  The interpreter of the military court told him 
that he was to be returned to prison, and that from this point forward he 
was no longer a Mandarin, but a Cooley.  With every word the interpret-
er spoke, the old Nieng-tai was filled with superhuman joy; his eyes 
sparkled, his cheeks reddened, and his mouth opened up and, with a 
smile of bliss, sent exclamations of glad surprise.  When the soldiers re-
sumed bringing the new Cooley to prison, he went gleefully, lavishing 
bows and smiles to all the Zouaves of his escort. 
   
BARZINI, supra note 59, at 307–13 (my translation from Italian).  The correspondent 
for Le Petit Parisien provided a third description of the executions.  See infra below. 
See also Bourgon, supra note 6, at 48–50 (quoting Barzini’s account of the execu-
tions); BROWN, supra note 29, at 209 (describing that the Chinese officials were be-
headed themselves near where the Western missionaries were beheaded).  Ac-
cording to Norie’s Official Account, “[t]he astonishment and horror of the Fen-tai, 
when he realized that he was to be executed for his guilt, were almost ludicrous.  
It was impossible, to his Chinese mind, that a magistrate of his rank could be in 
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3.  THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AND ESSENTIAL CONTEXTS 
  
Why did General Gasalee deviate from the pattern of rough 
justice that characterized Allied behavior in China prior to the Pao-
ting-Fu expedition by convening an International Commission?  
Although the General left no notes behind to explain his choice, 
exploring the Commission’s essential cultural and legal backdrops 
provides some hints as to the reasons events may have unfolded as 
they did.  In this section, I first suggest that, from the perspective of 
the commanders and sub-commanders involved in the Paoting-Fu 
operation, the Commission was a legally viable option for holding 
Chinese officials accountable, as it was compatible with (1) the law 
of occupation, (2) the law of diplomatic protection, and (3) emerg-
ing principles of international criminal law, as each would have 
been interpreted by representatives of the world’s ‘civilized’ pow-
ers.  I then propose that as a practical matter, the Commission was 
an effort to mediate between the humanitarian and revengist sen-
timents that vied for dominance during the Boxer intervention. 
  
3.1.  The Culturo-Legal Context 
  
The conflict in China coincided with a profound transformation 
in the law of occupation.  The newly minted Convention with re-
spect of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II, 1899), 
imposed obligations on commanders, including a general obliga-
tion to treat civilians with humanity and a responsibility to respect 
local law as they found it.69  But the obligation had not yet been in-
corporated into any Western military manuals, and the old stand-
ard afforded the commanders wide discretion over matters of jus-
tice.  From the British Manual on Military Law (1899): 
  
                                                                                                                                   
such a position, without hope of escape.”  OFFICIAL ACCOUNT, supra note 56, at 134.  
Le Petit Journal (‘Exécution à Pao-tin-fu,’ illustrated supplement dated 21 January 
1901), The Graphic (5 January 1901), and Le Petit Parisien, (‘Les Executions a Pao-
Ting-Fou,’ illustrated supplement dated 20 Jan 1901) depicted the execution.  See 
also Annex II, Figure 1, 2, and 3. 
69 The Hague Convention of 1899 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land art. 43, July 29, 1899 [hereinafter HAGUE CONVENTION].  
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A commander of troops in time of war, and in occupation 
of a foreign country, or any part thereof . . . stands tempo-
rarily in the position of governor of the country or part of 
the country which he occupies.  In this latter capacity he 
imposes such laws on the inhabitants as he thinks expedi-
ent for securing, on the one hand, the safety of his army, 
and on the other, the good government of the district 
which, by reason of his occupation, is for the time being 
deprived of its ordinary rulers.70  
As a general rule, the rule of military occupation extends 
only to such matters as concern the safety of the army, the 
invader permitting the ordinary civil tribunals of the coun-
try to deal with ordinary crimes committed by the inhabit-
ants.  The course, however, to be adopted in such cases is at 
the discretion of the invader.  He may abrogate any law of 
the country and substitute other rules.  He may create spe-
cial tribunals, or leave the native tribunals to exercise their 
usual jurisdiction. 
The most important power exercised by the invader occu-
pying a territory is that of punishing, in such manner as he 
thinks expedient, inhabitants guilty of breaking the rules 
laid down by him for securing the safety of the army.71 
                                                          
70 GREAT BRITAIN WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 2 (1899). 
71 Id. at 297.  The Manual’s broad conception of occupying powers was af-
firmed by jurists.  From Halleck’s International Law: 
  
Although the laws and jurisdiction of the conquering State do not extend 
over such foreign territory, yet the laws of war confer upon it ample 
power to govern such territory, and to punish all offences and crimes 
therein by whomsoever committed.  The trial and punishment of the 
guilty parties may be left to the ordinary courts and authorities of the 
country, or they may be referred to special tribunals administering mar-
tial law, organized for that purpose by the government of military occu-
pation . . .  
HENRY WAGER HALLECK, 2 HALLECK’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 439–40 (3rd ed. 1893).  
See also WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (4th ed. 
1895) (“On entering an enemy’s territory an invader replaces the civil government 
by military control, and makes any changes which are necessary for his safety and 
success”); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 484–85 (4th ed. 
1904) (“Military government . . . supersedes, as far as may be deemed expedient, 
the local law, and continues until the war or rebellion is terminated”).  The British 
Manual was also consistent with the U.S. Army’s field guide.  LIEUTENANT 
COLONEL JOHN BIDDLE PORTER, THE MILITARY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 830 (4th 
ed. 1901) (“It is authorized by the laws of war for a military officer commanding 
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Although Hague II rendered this understanding of the law passé, 
old habits of thinking would not have been replaced overnight 
even under the best of circumstances.  Where, as here, the conflict 
involved intervention in the affairs of a semi-civilized state like 
China, there would have been even less incentive to evolve.72  At 
any rate, Hague II offered its own potential justification for the es-
tablishment of the Commission:  Article 43 only obliged occupying 
powers to respect local law to the extent that doing so did not in-
terfere with their primary obligation to ensure “public order and 
safety.”73  It is doubtful that any officer present in Paoting-Fu 
                                                                                                                                   
in time of war in a region of military occupation, and where the ordinary courts 
are closed by the exigencies of the war, to appoint a special court or judge for the 
determination of cases not properly cognizable by the ordinary military tribu-
nals.”).  The Hague Conventions were not incorporated into the British Manual 
until the 1907 reprint. 
 The German Militärstrafgesetzbuch (Military Code) of 1872 specifically made 
foreigners and Germans “in a foreign territory, occupied or garrisoned by German 
troops” who commit “an act punishable according to the laws of the German Em-
pire, against German troops or others appertaining to the same, or against any au-
thority constituted by an ordinance of the Emperor” subject to Germany’s domes-
tic criminal law, “as if such act had been committed [in Germany]” (Art. 161).  
MILITARY PENAL CODE (MILITAR-STRAFGESETZBUCH) FOR THE GERMAN EMPIRE 50 (W. 
Winthrop trans.) (1873).  A slightly different translation of Article 161 was given 
in ISABEL V. HULL, ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION—MILITARY CULTURE AND THE PRACTICES 
OF WAR IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 125 (2005) (“Section 161 of the Military Penal Code 
(1872) made ‘all foreigners or Germans in foreign territory occupied by German 
troop’ subject to German domestic law, ‘just as if their act had been committed in 
Germany”).  See also Art. 5(4) Militärstrafgerichtsordnung (Military Procedure Code) 
(1898) available in ADOLPH WEISSLER, PREUSSISCHES ARCHIV: SAMMLUNG DER 
GESETZE UND DER DAS RECHTSWESEN BETREFFENDEN VERORDNUNGEN UND 
VERFÜGUNGEN PREUSSENS UND DES REICHES (1898) (reaffirming Art. 161 of the 1872 
Code by providing German court-martials with jurisdiction over natives).  The 
French Code de Justice Militaire (1857, updated 1875) granted French conseils de 
guerre operating in foreign occupied territory jurisdiction over “nationals of the 
invaded country, foreigners found there, and French who, being outside of 
France, and may not come before the ordinary justice system of the French 
courts.”  ANDRÉ TAILLEFER, LA JUSTICE MILITAIRE DANS L'ARMÉE DE TERRE EN 
FRANCE ET DANS LES PRINCIPAUX PAYS 224 (1895).  The Italian Codice Penal (1869) 
was more limited, affording martial courts convened during war personal juris-
diction only over persons involved with the military, their servants, prisoners of 
war, and anyone who perpetrated some specifically enumerated crimes.  CODICE 
PENALE PER L'ESERCITO DEL REGNO D'ITALIA Arts. 545–46 (1869). 
72 Nor was China a signatory to Hague II in 1900.  Although China had par-
ticipated in the treaty negotiations, it did not accede to the 1899 Convention until 
1907.  
73 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 69, at Art. 43.  The obligation to respect 
local law was rarely taken seriously in the immediate aftermath of Hague II.  For 
example, the otherwise law-abiding Japanese gave the provision short shrift dur-
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would have hesitated to declare that provincial officials who par-
ticipated in mass crimes represented a security threat.74  
An expansive concept of diplomatic protection endorsed by 
contemporary jurists and backed by extensive state practice also 
supported the turn towards foreign justice in China.75  The follow-
ing from Paul Pradier-Fodéré’s Traité de Droit International Public, 
Européen et Américain may as well have been written just for the oc-
casion:  
  
It is the duty of all states to protect their nationals in foreign 
countries by all means which international law authorizes.  
. . . It owes them such protection when the foreign state has 
proceeded against them in violation of the principles of in-
ternational law:  for example, if the foreign state has . . . 
Forced them to abjure their religion, if it has despoiled them 
of their property, if it has treated them with cruelty.  . . . It 
ought to protect them even when the bad treatment or 
damages sustained by its nationals are not directly the act 
of the foreign state . . . But of persons having a private char-
acter . . . From this results . . . the right to obtain justice by 
force, if it cannot be done otherwise.  . . . Whoever maltreats 
a citizen indirectly offends the state which ought to protect 
this citizen.  The sovereign of such citizen ought to avenge 
his injury, and compel, if he can, the aggressor to make en-
tire reparation or punish him.  . . . To oppose the acts which 
caused the damage, to make reparation, or to punish the authors, 
the state of the offended persons [ . . . may go] even to war.76 
                                                                                                                                   
ing the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), during which they tried dozens of “trea-
sonous” Chinese before military courts applying martial law in Japanese occupied 
territories of neutral China.  NAGAO ARIGA, LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE AU POINT 
DE VUE CONTINENTAL ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL D'APRÈS LES DOCUMENTS 
OFFICIELS DU GRAND ÉTAT-MAJOR JAPONAIS (SECTION HISTORIQUE DE LA HUERRE DE 
1904–1905) 378 (1908). 
74  Field-Marshal Waldersee would later declare that setting up an inter-
Allied criminal tribunal in the occupied city of Tientsin was “in perfect accord-
ance” with Hague II. No. 98 Count von Waldersee to M. de Cologan, May 25, 1901, in 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901.  AFFAIRS IN CHINA. 179, at 179–80 (1902).  
75  See generally MILTON OFFUTT, THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE 
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1928).  See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE 
OF THE SOLICITOR, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING 
FORCES 26–34 (2nd rev. ed. 1929) (summarizing the state of the doctrine) [hereinaf-
ter RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS]. 
76  RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS, supra note 75, at 26–27 (emphasis added) 
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Most significantly, by 1900 entanglements between the notions 
of humanity, mass violence, personal accountability and punish-
ment had reached such a critical density that allegations of crimi-
nal responsibility for acts of massacre could conceivably be an-
chored in international law.  In fact, the Commission emerged 
against the backdrop of negotiations between Western powers and 
the Qing government over the question of punishment of Boxers 
and their supporters.  The record of negotiations reveals the exten-
sive degree of consolidation that international criminal law had 
undergone by the turn of the century. 
Allied negotiators in Peking were slow to reach consensus on 
questions of punishment, as questions over who should punish the 
Chinese and how guilt should be determined proved to be signifi-
cant points of contention.77  A September 1900 German proposal 
that negotiations with China be deferred until the Imperial Gov-
ernment handed over for trial by the Powers “first and real perpe-
trators” involved in the “crimes committed in Pekin against inter-
national law” (including the murder of German Ambassador 
Clemens von Ketteler, the attack on the Peking legations, and the 
murder of missionaries) failed to find purchase with most of the 
Allies.78  Only the Italians agreed that “the punishment of the most 
                                                                                                                                   
(translating and citing 1 PAUL PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC, EUROPÉEN ET AMÉRICAIN—SUIVANT LES PROGRÈS DE LA SCIENCE ET DE LA 
PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINES 614–630 (1885–1906)).  Francis J. R. Mitchell, Interna-
tional Liability for Mob Injuries, 34 AM. L. REV. 709 (1900) (“Should satisfaction, for 
any reason, even for a defect in the organization of the government, be refused 
under such circumstances, the State so refusing gives to the claimant State a just 
cause for resorting to reprisal or even to war, to enforce her claim, and moreover 
forfeits her right to the benefits of international law and to a place among the civi-
lized nations of the world.”). 
 The German Criminal Code of 1871 embodied an understanding that “when a 
foreigner has committed a crime in a desert, or in another state which refuses to 
use its right of punishment, and thus deprives the Empire or its dependents of a 
legitimate satisfaction, the Empire acquires a natural right of punishing that for-
eigner.” GEOFFREY DRAGE, THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE TRANSLATED 
WITH PROLEGOMENA AND A COMMENTARY 90 (1885). 
77 For a more detailed exploration of punishment in the negotiation of the 
Boxer Protocol, see CHESTER TAN, THE BOXER CATASTROPHE 137–56, 216–23 (1967) 
and JOHN S. KELLY, A FORGOTTEN CONFERENCE: THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PEKING 1900 – 
1901 135–49 (1962). 
78  CHINA NO. 1, supra note 16, at No. 168 Count Hatzfeldt to the Marquess of 
Salisbury (Sept. 18, 1900) (arguing that a massacre of those “employed as instru-
ments to carry out the criminal work” would go against “civilised conscience,” 
but that the punishment of a few “instigators and leaders” whose guilt was “noto-
rious” would have a salutary effect).  The extradition demand originated with 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/6
 
2017] AN EXPERIMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 659 
culpable of the crimes committed against humanity in China and 
against the rights of nations” should be a preliminary condition.79  
The Russians deemed the demand an “anomaly” and joined the 
United States in criticizing it as impractical and shortsighted, given 
that “punishment by the Central Imperial authority would have a 
far greater effect throughout the whole Chinese Empire.”80  The 
                                                                                                                                   
German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bü1ow, who made the suggestion initial-
ly as a ploy to derail the embryonic negotiations until the German Field Marshal 
arrived in China to assume control of the international forces that had been de-
ployed there.  No. 184, Count von Bülow to Emperor Wilhelm II (Sept. 15, 1900) in 16 
DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPÄISCHEN KABINETTE, 1871–1914: SAMMLUNG DER 
DIPLOMATISCHEN AKTEN DES AUSWÄRTIGEN AMTES – DIE CHINAWIRREN UND DIE 
MÄCHTE 1900–1902 (Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and 
Friedrich Thimme eds., 1924).  See also Communique from Maximilian von Brandt 
to Lo Feng-luh (Sept. 22, 1900), in 4 THE HOLSTEIN PAPERS 205 (Norman Rich & M. 
H. Fisher eds., 1963) (urging the Chinese representative in Germany to hand over 
“those persons who are to blame for the murder of Baron von Ketteler and so 
many missionaries and the attack upon the foreign legations”). 
79 No. 258, Il Ministro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta, All’Ambasciatore a Ber-
lino, Lnaza (September 19, 1900), in Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, I Documento Dip-
lomatici Italiani, Vol. IV (Instituto Poligrafico Dello Stato, 1992) (Brockman-Hawe 
trans.). 
80 NA, FO 405/96, No. 49 Mr. C Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury (Sept. 27, 
1900).  See also the Imperial German chargé d’affaires to the Secretary of State (Sept. 18, 
1900) and Acting Secretary Hill to the Imperial German chargé d’affaires (Sept. 21, 
1900), in Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, with the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Con-
gress, December 3, 1900.  Washington, D.C., (1902) [hereinafter FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 1900], also available in NARA, RG 84/217.  The American objection 
was also rooted in notions of complementarity: “[it is] only just to China that she 
should be afforded in the first instance an opportunity to do this [punish their 
own], and thus rehabilitate herself before the world”.  Id.  Russian Foreign Minis-
ter Count Lamsdorff privately expressed a preference for exile over executions, or 
at least executions by the Chinese as opposed to foreign governments, given their 
“special aptitude for such a task.”  NA, FO 405/95, No. 192 Mr. C. Hardinge to the 
Marquess of Salisbury (Sept. 20, 1900).  The Japanese agreed that punishment of 
“real instigators” should take place prior to a formal renewal of diplomatic rela-
tions with the Chinese court, but considered the German insistence on delivery to 
be fraught with practical difficulties.  Nr. 12458, ‘Grossbritannien – Der Gesandte 
in Japan an den Minister des Auswartigen.  Die japan.  Regierung uber den 
deutschen Vorschlag’ (September 22, 1900) in 64–65 DAS STAATSARCHIV: 
SAMMLUNG DER OFFIZIELLEN AKTENSTÜCKE ZUR GESCHICHTE DER GEGENWART 276 
(1902).  See also NA, FO 46/528. No. 165, Whitehead to Marquess of Salisbury (Sept. 
22, 1900) (reporting that Japanese Foreign Minister Viscount Aoki explained that 
the German proposal would lead to military operations of indefinite duration and 
of a greater scale than originally contemplated). 
 Many periodicals regarded the US position as shortsighted and foolish, but 
the editors of The Eastern World (Yokohama) took things a step further and con-
cluded that it was incorrect as a matter of international law.  A Question of Interna-
tional Law, THE EASTERN WORLD, Sept. 29, 1900, at 4 (asserting that the U.S. posi-
tion would invalidate extradition treaties and ran counter to judicial practice).  
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British resisted as a matter of pragmatism (the plan was a “counsel 
of perfection” insofar as neither the Empress nor the most wanted 
Prince Tuan could “be expected voluntarily to sign their own death 
warrants, or those of their colleagues and supporters, though some 
among them may be ready to sacrifice the rest to the wolves in or-
der to facilitate their escape”; “[n]or does there seem to be any 
practicable way to seize the guilty parties, if their surrender is re-
fused”—punishing the Empress Dowager “would involve the de-
struction of all government in China”), perception (“[a]n adequate 
punishment of the Dowager-Empress would, from her sex, be re-
pulsive to European feelings”), and politics (“Germany may have 
the view of forcing on a logical casus belli [i.e., disruption of local 
governance] . . . [and] we may feel quite confident that the opera-
tions would be guided far more by the desire for material ad-
vantages, than the pious duty of bringing criminals to justice”).81  
Britain’s Director of Military Intelligence in the War Office, Ma-
jor-General Sir John Charles Ardagh, proposed the establishment 
of an international “judicial commission to enquire and report up-
on charges which may be brought against instigators and perpetra-
tors of outrages; and to cooperate in procuring their surrender[,] 
                                                                                                                                   
The article is also noteworthy for its articulation, a century before its inclusion in 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, of what today is known as 
the “unable or unwilling” test: “[Crimes committed against a foreign minister 
should be amenable to foreign law] when the government of the criminal . . . is 
unable, or shows itself unwilling, to bring them to trial and punish them, as is the 
case in China.”).  Id. 
81 NA, PRO 30/40/22/4, Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh, China (Sept. 30, 
1900).  See also PRO 30/40/14, Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh, China: Advisabil-
ity of Occupying Pei-Tang, Tongshan, Ching-wang-tao, and Shan-hai-kuan; and 
General Observations, (Sept. 22, 1900) (arguing that Germany’s proposed retribu-
tion was “much to be desired,” but questioning how China’s officials were “to be 
induced to put their heads into the noose?” He concluded that “[w]e shall for the 
present have to content ourselves with such reparations as may be afforded by a 
pecuniary solatium.”); NA, FO 405/95, No. 208 Marquess of Salisbury to Sir C Mac-
Donald (Sept. 25, 1900) (inquiring whether those guilty of attacks on the legation 
and “other recent outrages” could be identified and “seize[d]”); NA, FO 405/95, 
No. 212 The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir. L. Lascelles (Sept. 25, 1900) (discussing the 
sequencing of punishments and the commencement of negotiations); NA, 
FO 405/95, No. 238 Sir C MacDonald to the Marquess of Salisbury (Sept. 29, 1900) 
(arguing that certain responsible parties could be identified, but skeptical that the 
guilty, Prince Tuan in particular, could be obtained); HOLSTEIN PAPERS, supra note 
78, at 749, Paul von Hatzfeldt to Holstein (Sept. 26, 1900) (“[Salisbury] thinks that we 
would be perfectly satisfied if the Chinese turned down our demand for extradi-
tion, giving rise to new difficulties and the prolongation of the state of war, so that 
Waldersee . . .  would still find a situation favourable to military actions and the 
opportunity for military and political successes.”) 
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apprehension[,] trial and punishment” in the event “of the Chinese 
Government declining or neglecting to punish the guilty, proprio 
motu.”82 The German government floated a similar idea in the 
semi-official Kolnische-Zeitung, putting forward the idea of an “in-
ternational tribunal” to determine guilt based on accusations 
brought by foreign ministers in Peking.83 
The idea of internationalized proceedings was not taken up by 
the negotiators in Peking, but the Germans ultimately dropped 
their insistence on extradition or international trials and agreed to 
jointly demand with the other Powers that China itself impose “the 
severest punishment” on Imperial officials believed to be involved 
in the attacks on the foreign legations in Peking, as well as the 
murder and torture of missionaries throughout northern China, “in 
proportion to their crimes.”  In the Joint Note subsequently drafted 
by the Powers and addressed to the Chinese, these attacks were 
described as “crimes unprecedented in human history—crimes 
against the law of nations, against the laws of humanity, and 
                                                          
82 Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh, China (Sept. 30, 1900), supra note 81. 
83 The position of the German government was that although this idea was 
“out of the ordinary,” China should not be permitted to hide behind a “formality” 
of international law.  Documento Diplomatici Italiani, supra note 79, at No. 278, 
L’Ambasciatore A Berlino, Lanza, Al Ministro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta. 
 Perhaps Ardagh and the German government were inspired by the estab-
lishment, a mere two years previously, of a series of international tribunals at 
Crete to try individuals accused of participating in or inciting mass inter-ethnic 
violence.  See R. John Pritchard, International Humanitarian Intervention and Estab-
lishment of an International Jurisdiction Over Crimes Against Humanity: The National 
and International Military Trials in Crete in 1898, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS 1–87 (John Carey, William V. Dunlap, R. 
John Pritchard, eds., 2003) (discussing the formation of domestic and international 
criminal jurisdictions to try Cretans accused of what today would be considered 
war crimes and crimes against humanity) .  News reports and official documents 
suggest that comparisons between the two operations were obvious and com-
monplace, and that General Gaselee was aware of the Crete precedent in a general 
sense.  See NA, ADM 116/118, Case XIII Importation of Arms into China (discuss-
ing the Allied experience with blockade in Crete); NA, FO 17/1471, Gaselee to Sa-
tow (Mar. 1901) quoted in No. 106, Satow to Lansdowne (Mar. 16, 1901) (“There was 
no Commander-in-Chief in Crete and yet order was restored in that island.  Our 
experiences of a Commander-in-Chief [Waldersee] have hardly been happy.”).  
Certainly, Ardagh drew comparisons between the two occupations when the need 
arose.  Memorandum of Maj-Gen Ardagh (Sept. 22, 1900), supra note 81 (suggesting 
that the occupation of Chili province should be organized on the principle of one 
nationality per district “as was successfully done in Crete,” as collective occupa-
tions afforded opportunities “for plunder, extortion, massacre and wanton de-
struction, for which no one can be brought to account”).  See also Our London Let-
ter, THE MERCURY, Dec. 15, 1900, at 4 (comparing the Crete and China expeditions). 
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against civilization.”84  The Chinese agreed to the condition, and 
over the course of the following year nearly one hundred Imperial 
officials were executed, punished, or downgraded at the hands of 
their own government for their role in the anti-Western uprising.85  
Allied invocations of international law in the Joint Note gained 
an added dimension during the implementation phase.  On two 
occasions the Chinese government, when presented with a de-
mand by foreign plenipotentiaries that some particular punish-
ment be doled out, responded that the request was incompatible 
with Chinese law.  Both times the Allies responded that the re-
sponsibility of the identified Chinese official was clear under inter-
national law.86  
                                                          
84 FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at Inclosure, Dispatch 482-
Translation in No. 482 Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay (using this phrase to describe the 
murder of the Japanese and German foreign ministers, desecration of foreign 
cemeteries in Peking, the siege of the foreign legations and incidents “in several 
provinces [where] foreigners were murdered, tortured, or attacked by Boxers and 
regular troops.”).  See also CHINA NO. 6, supra note 17, at No. 233 Sir E. Satow to the 
Marquess of Lansdowne, Inclosure 2 M. de Cologan to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries (de-
scribing a joint communique of the foreign ministers to the Chinese government 
declaring twelve Chinese thought to be involved in the attacks on foreign officials 
guilty of “abominable violations of international law”); No. 531, Bülow to von 
Hatzfeldt (Nov. 30, 1900) in DIE GROSSE POLITIK, supra note 78 (“Honor and conduct 
. . . would be evenly damaged if the East Asian world would reach the conviction 
that even in case of the most heinous violations of international law the main in-
stigators get off easily”). 
85 The Allied delegates were active in gathering evidence against high and 
low level Qing officials responsible for the violence against their co-nationals.  On 
April 1, 1901 a list of ninety-six individuals with expected punishments was pre-
sented to the Chinese.  In its response the Chinese court raised legal defenses with 
the foreign Plenipotentiaries or shared with them the exculpatory results of its 
own investigations in the expectation that new information might lead to exonera-
tion or mitigation.  FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 107 Mr. Rockhill to 
Mr. Hay, Inclosures No. 1 – No.11.  See also NA, FO 405/105, No. 14 Sir E. Satow to 
the Marquess of Lansdowne (Feb. 6, 1901); NA, FO 405/107, No. 64 Sir E. Satow to the 
Marquess of Lansdowne (Apr. 24, 1901).  
86 In May 1901, the Chinese pointed out that the punishments demanded by 
the foreign Plenipotentiaries exceeded those available under Chinese law.  “The 
foreign representatives, in asking punishment of Chinese officials,” the Chinese 
optimistically wrote, “naturally can not [sic] desire that it should be in violation of 
the statutes of China.”  FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 107 Mr. Rock-
hill to Mr. Hay, Inclosure 9a.  The Allies were disinclined toward leniency and not-
ed that their “preoccupation has been to repress with moderation and justice 
crimes against the law of nations, against the laws of humanity, and against civili-
zation, crimes which, being without precedent, had not been foreseen by Chinese 
law.” Id. at No. 107 Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, Inclosure 11.  A similar objection had 
been raised (with identical results) in February 1901 about the requested punish-
ment of two high ranking court officials. NA, FO 405/105, supra note 85, at No. 14 
Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne (Feb. 6, 1901) (responding to an objection 
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The Commissioners were never as explicit as the foreign pleni-
potentiaries in Peking about the nature of the law the Chinese were 
believed to have violated, though two aspects of the Commission’s 
design and operation suggest that Ting Yung and his cohorts were 
perceived as having run afoul of the crimina juris gentium.  First, the 
Commission counted among its participants officers from states 
whose nationals had not suffered harm at Paoting-Fu (Germany, 
France, Italy), suggesting that General Gaselee and his 
sub-commanders intended to express exceptional opprobrium on 
behalf of a community of ‘civilized’ states.  Second, the Commis-
sion went beyond investigating and punishing crimes against 
Western nationals.  Colonel Garioni, commander of the Italian 
forces in China, described the Commission as also tasked with 
punishing the murderers of Chinese Christians who should other-
wise have been beyond the jurisdiction and protection of any for-
eign power.87  A letter home drafted by Commissioner Poole cor-
roborates this understanding of the Commission’s mandate and 
operation; Poole spoke of his job investigating “the massacres and 
outrages on missionaries and Christians.”88  Moreover, although 
the Session Records generally (and ambiguously) referred only to 
murdered “Christians” (without regard for nationality), the procès-
verbal of the seventh session confirms that crimes against Chinese 
converts were within the Commission’s remit.89  By assuming the 
power to investigate and punish crimes against Chinese Christians, 
conduct that was purely ‘internal’ to their state of nationality, the 
Commission exercised what we would call today universal juris-
diction.90 
                                                                                                                                   
that Ying Nien and Duke Lan should be held accountable as accessories, not prin-
cipals, as a matter of Chinese law: “I answered that the offences committed were 
not against Chinese law, but against the law of nations and of humanity.  Chinese 
law could not be taken into consideration.”).  
87 AUSSME, E-3, Rac 55, fol 30/4 La Spedizione Di Paoting-Fu. Il Combattimento 
Di Cu-Nan-Shien.  See also JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17 (speaking of pun-
ishing those “responsible for the massacres” without distinguishing between vic-
tims of various nationalities).  
88 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, Outside the Walls of Paoting-Fu (Oct. 25, 1900).  
89 See Annex 1, Seventh Session (declaring that the “military authority will 
act against all the people that will be thought to be guilty of having participated in 
the massacres against Europeans and Christians.”).  See also MÜLLER, supra note 51 
(describing the “verdict” announcing Ting Yung’s responsibility for massacre of 
Chinese and Western Christians).  
90 According to Ku Hong-Ming, a European-educated Chinese high court 
official, the punishments at Paoting-Fu were justifiable as a legitimate exercise of a 
right of reprisal under the laws of war, as “certain Agents of the Imperial Gov-
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Of course the twenty-first century historian or lawyer will no 
doubt pick up on the limits of these legal justifications.  One may 
quibble, for example, over whether the law of occupation was ap-
plicable at all to the Paoting-Fu sortie.91  The traditional under-
standing, as reflected both in the British Manual and Hague II, was 
that the existence of a state of occupation, with all of the attendant 
rights and responsibilities that implied, was predicated on the ex-
istence of an inter-state war, and the circumstances in China at the 
time the expedition was launched were ambiguous enough that it 
is not clear whether this prerequisite was satisfied as of October 
1900.  At the time of the Commission’s sitting, no declaration of 
war had been addressed by China to the foreign powers,92 and the 
Chinese plenipotentiary and new viceroy of Chili province, Li 
Hung-Chang, had not only disavowed the actions of the Boxers, 
but when informed that the Powers intended to mount an expedi-
tion to Paoting-Fu, had instructed the provincial officials under his 
authority to cooperate with the foreigners and imperial troops in 
the area and not to oppose the advance.93  The law of diplomatic 
protection was also limited, as it only allowed the Allies to reach 
cases involving their own nationals.  Nascent notions of interna-
tional criminal law might fill some of these jurisdictional and sub-
stantive gaps, but the law was in such an embryonic state in 1900 
                                                                                                                                   
ernment were believed to have been guilty of acts outraging the laws of nations.”  
Latter-Day Notes on the Chinese Question, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Aug. 24, 1901, at 20 
(text partially corrected by Author in issue of Sept. 21, 1901, at page 13). 
91 See Taillefer, supra note 71, at 241–43 (showing that in the question of 
whether Courts established by an occupying power could “reach back” and hear 
cases involving acts predating occupation, the French courts, repeatedly affirmed 
this power when confronted with the question). 
92 The Empress Dowager’s June 21, 1900 “declaration of war” was not sent 
directly to foreign ministers and was ignored by many provincial officials, sug-
gesting that the Empress lacked the capacity to speak as the “single voice” of her 
country on this issue.  See Esherick, supra note 7, at 302–03 (detailing the circum-
stances leading up to and the impact of the Qing “declaration of war”); Immanual 
C. Y. Hsu, Late Ch’ing Foreign Relations, 1866–1905, in 11 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF CHINA, 123–24 (John K. Fairbank & Kwang-Ching Liu eds., 1980) (describing 
the internal conflict within the Qing government prior to and immediately after 
the issuance of the declaration of war).  For more on the competing framings of 
the conflict as a war or intervention, see FRITZ GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND 
PEACE–A STUDY IN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 64–79 (1949); URS MATTHIAS 
ZACHMAN, CHINA AND JAPAN IN THE LATE MEIJI PERIOD 132–36 (2009) (describing 
the ambiguous way in which the Boxer expedition and China’s “declaration of 
war” were perceived by the Japanese public). 
93 CHINA NO. 5, supra note 16, at No. 80 Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of 
Salisbury. 
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that its application should have forced questions as to whether the 
legal elements of a late nineteenth century notion of crimes against 
humanity could even be identified, and whether a trial at Paoting-
Fu would have violated a norm against retroactivity in the applica-
tion of international law. 
These, however, are not matters that would have troubled the 
commanders at Paoting-Fu, who likely would have considered in-
ternational law through the lens of prevailing Western ideology, 
the mission civilisatrice.94  China, as a decadent, cruel, backward and 
violent state, was not entitled to the benefits of membership in the 
civilized community of nations, including the full panoply of legal 
niceties extended to ‘civilized’ powers.95  The point was made 
forcefully by international lawyer George Jellinek in an article ap-
pearing in the influential American Law Review:  
 
International law in war owes its greatest development to 
the last decades; it means, in many points, a substantial 
progress in the consciousness of right of the most civilized 
nations.  China surely has not taken part in this progress.  . . 
. A government which causes its high officials to be be-
headed without any legal proceeding, and which can order 
successfully the massacre of innumerable subjects, is not 
                                                          
94 See LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 33–34 (1905) (stat-
ing that China is “for some parts within the circle of the Family of Nations, [but it] 
remain[s] for other parts outside.”).  See also WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (4th ed. 1895) (“Tacitly, and by inference from a series 
of acts, states in the position of China may in the long run be brought within the 
realm of law; but it would be unfair and impossible to assume, inferentially, ac-
ceptance of law as a whole from isolated acts or even from frequently repeated 
acts of a certain kind.”).  THOMAS HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128–29 
(1898) (“[The Chinese] have shown themselves to be well versed in the ceremonial 
of embassy and the conduct of diplomacy.  To a respect for the laws of war they 
have not yet attained.”).  For more on the “standard of civilization” see generally 
GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF ‘CIVILIZATION’ IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
(1984). 
95 Nowhere is racial and cultural animus more apparent than in the reports of 
Field-Marshal Waldersee, who in the very same missive in which he informed the 
Kaiser of his approval of the Paoting-Fu expedition, contended that “one can only 
command the respect of the Asian through force and its ruthless application.”  
Sabine Dabringhaus, An Army on Vacation? The German War in China, 1900–1901, in 
ANTICIPATING TOTAL WAR: THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES, 1871–1914 
469 (Manfred F. Boemeke et al., eds., 1999).  Hull and Hevia both attributed the 
pervasiveness of Allied excesses throughout the Boxer conflict to racial attitudes.  
Id. at 463–72.  See also Hevia, supra note 6, at 186–314 (framing Western imperial 
campaigns in China as being partially motivated by a desire to “civilize” the “bar-
baric” Chinese); Hull, supra note 71, at 135–36, 148–52. 
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able to inculcate into its troops respect for the life and 
property of its enemy.  Those that have been used to mas-
sacre their own countrymen can hardly understand that 
they should spare prisoners of war.  . . . [But] [h]umanity 
should be exercised, not because China can demand it as a 
right, but because it keeps the nations, who feel themselves 
the upholders of civilization, from sullying themselves be-
fore the judgment of history.96 
  
The attitude that humanity should be exercised, but was not 
required to be, partially explains why widespread looting, rapes 
and massacres perpetrated by foreign troops in China were sanc-
tioned at the highest levels of many Allied commands, despite the 
obligation memorialized in the Preamble to the Hague Convention 
to uphold a minimum standard of conduct even when fighting an 
uncivilized power.97  The officers of the Paoting-Fu expedition, 
even those who may have deplored the us/them divide that per-
sisted and taken steps to incorporate notions of a common humani-
ty into warfare, were still operating as the representatives of socie-
ties whose relations with China had been steeped in the logic of the 
civilizing mission for a century, and whose citizens had been 
slaughtered in horrific circumstances.  Under these conditions, any 
benefit of the doubt that in other circumstances might cut in favor 
of an accused, or misgiving that their International Commission 
had exceeded the letter or spirit of the law, would have been re-
solved in favor of Allied caprice.  
Their imperialist heritage would have shaped the Commission-
ers’ attitudes towards international courts.  Over a century of colo-
nial policies had introduced into the Western intellectual portman-
teau the idea of legal spaces geographically within, but spatio-
legally divorced from, the territory on which they sat—the so-
called ‘Mixed Courts.’ Consistent with their treatment of other 
semi-civilised states, over the course of the nineteenth century Eu-
ropean nations and the United States had impelled the Chinese 
government to grant extraterritorial privileges excepting foreigners 
from Chinese law and entitling them to have their cases heard be-
fore judges from their own country or by jointly administered tri-
                                                          
96 George Jellinek, China and International Law, 35 AM. L. REV. 56, 60-62 (Paul-
ine Adelaide Thompson trans.) (1901).  
97 See generally Dabringhaus, supra note 95; Hevia, supra note 6, at 198–240.  
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bunals.98  The longstanding acceptance by all but the Chinese of 
these institutions primed officers at Paoting-Fu, as well as the wid-
er community of foreigners, to endorse the turn to exceptional in-
ternationalized punishment in China without concern for its poten-
tial legal deficiencies.   
  
3.2.  Prudential Considerations  
 
The bivalent imperatives of culture and law may explain why 
the Commission was perceived to be a legitimate vehicle for allo-
cating punishment.  But to appreciate why the turn to an interna-
tional institution was prudent, it will be helpful to understand just 
how polarized the nineteenth-century public was over the question 
of the appropriate role and degree of collective punishment.99  
In October 1900, many of the loudest voices in China were 
those demanding a “total war.”  The massacre at Paoting-Fu had 
heightened emotions, and the possibility of striking a decisive 
blow on a city regarded as one of the “main roots” of the uprising 
concentrated sentiments of revenge.100  The Pekin and Tientsin Times 
proposed reducing Paoting-Fu to ashes, and summarily removing 
the heads of those local officials against whom “any” evidence ex-
isted, every captured member of the “late [Imperial] Government,” 
and any local found to be in possession of arms.101  Reverend D. Z. 
                                                          
98 See generally THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE 
SHANGHAI MIXED COURT, 1911–27 (1992).  See also DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL 
TREATIES—NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 9–35 (2005) (examining the legal basis of 
the Unequal Treaties imposed on China by the Western Powers).  
99 The 1899 Hague Conventions marked a turning point in the erosion of the 
traditional rule that an entire population could be penalized merely by virtue of 
their association with an enemy state, in favor of a new expectation that, regard-
less of the standard of civilization of the enemy, “[n]o general penalty, pecuniary 
or otherwise, can be inflicted on [a] population on account of the acts of individu-
als for which it can not [sic] be regarded as collectively responsible.”  HAGUE 
CONVENTION, supra note 69, at Art. 50.  State practice and some segments of the 
reading public, at least, were slow to catch up with the change.  
100 Mr. C. F. Gammon, Tientsin agent of the American Bible Society, to Dr. Hykes of 
the same Society (Aug. 25, 1900), reprinted in THE BOXER RISING: A HISTORY OF THE 
BOXER TROUBLE IN CHINA 83 (1900) (“[I]t is to be hoped that some detachment of 
the allied troop may be sent to punish the people of [Paoting-Fu], especially as it is 
reported that three of four foreigners are hiding in that vicinity. [None of us asks] 
for revenge, but, as a home paper puts it, for justice.  It is right and proper to pun-
ish crime, and Pao Ting Fu has fed one of the main roots of the growth of the up-
rising.”). 
101  What We Should Do, PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Sept. 22, 1900, at 78.  W. 
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Sheffield, a high-profile American Board missionary with thirty-six 
years of missionary service in China under his belt, argued in favor 
of “such a chastisement that neither officers nor people throughout 
China would dare again to commit or allow such acts of cruel bar-
barity.”102  News of the Christian deaths at Paoting-Fu provoked 
equally extreme reactions among certain members of the diplomat-
ic community.  John Fowler, U.S. consul at Cheefo, for example, 
opined in his communiques to David Hill, Assistant Secretary of 
State, that “if this massacre is true, then it will be the duty of our 
Government to raze that City to the ground.”103  
Underlying these exhortations was the assumption that it was 
only through the crucible of punishment that the Chinese character 
could be forged into something capable of exercising the hindsight 
and foresight that are the staples of good government and the pre-
dicted cycle of revenge killings could be interrupted.  From the 
private correspondence of Rev. Sheffield:  “the punishment of 
princes and high officials who took a leading part in the bringing 
on this calamity serves to emphasize the magnitude of the crime 
against humanity, and to break the power of the part that opposes 
reform.  . . . Without restitution and punishment such people are 
certain to follow up their wrongs, and if law does not reach offend-
ers they will reach them in secret ways that will entail indefinite 
bitterness upon innocent and guilty.”104  Similar sentiments could 
                                                                                                                                   
A. P. MARTIN, THE SIEGE IN PEKING: CHINA AGAINST THE WORLD 139–40 (1900) (sug-
gesting levelling the city and salting the Earth).  
102  ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 291, No. 210 Correspondence – China’s Punishment 
China’s Salvation (printed in the BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT of Oct. 1900) (Pao-
ting-Fu, and other Chinese cities, had “outraged the laws of civilization by their 
crimes”).  See also Id. at No. 124, Porter to Smith (Oct. 10, 1900) (“It does not appear 
to any of us a matter of vengeance, but of simple justice that a punitive expedition 
should go to Pao Ting and destroy the city where such enormities against the na-
tions have been committed.”). 
103 NARA, RG 59/M102/R6, No. 335 Fowler to Hill (Sept. 5, 1900). 
104 ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 16, Sheffield to Smith (Feb. 26, 1901).  See also 
ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 17, Sheffield to Smith (Mar. 26, 1901) (“Government 
has been trampled underfoot and it can only recover itself by asserting its power.  
It is not ‘bloodthirstiness’ in missionaries to desire to see further shedding of 
blood, but an understanding of Chinese character and conditions, and a realiza-
tion that the policy of general forgiveness means the loss of many valuable native 
and foreign lives.”); ABCFM Unit 3 Reel 296, No. 282, Peck to Smith (Mar. 14, 1901) 
(“The duty of the avenger of blood is as dominant in Christian ethics it would 
seem as among the Hebrews, at least for the murder of parents, and some of our 
Christians who had had parents killed by the Boxers can hardly feel that they are 
doing their duty when they do not seek a life for a life.”); Unit 3, Reel 300, No. 18, 
Tewksbury to Smith (May 6, 1901) (attributing a revenge killing on the part of a lo-
cal Christian to delays and inadequacies in Chinese justice.); ABCFM Unit 3, Reel 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/6
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be found among Allied troops.  In James Wilson’s Under the Old 
Flag, the author recounted how a British officer, General Barrow, 
operating under his command requested permission to blow up a 
pagoda.  When Wilson questioned the rationale for its destruction 
Barrow replied that “if the Christians did not destroy this famous 
Chinese temple, the Chinese, who had destroyed many missionary 
churches, would conclude that their gods to whom the Pagoda was 
dedicated were more powerful than the God of the Christians.”105  
The semi-official German report of the Paoting-Fu expedition like-
wise editorialized that the Chinese “want to feel power and bow 
only to the feet on the ground [i.e., to those who project power in a 
strong and unwavering manner].”106 
For this portion of the population, the logic of symbolic and 
psychological warfare was simply too compelling to deny.  Mercy 
would be perceived as weakness, destruction as strength.  The 
Chinese psyche had to be crushed through holocaust.  But their 
voices were counterbalanced by individuals like journalist Thomas 
Millard, for whom “the spectacle of a Chinese baby torn from its 
dead mother and bayoneted or thrown to drown in a river, is as 
pathetic as if that child were white” and the Japan Weekly Mail, 
which in grand humanist tradition questioned “what was Paoting’s 
share in that atrocity?  Was it not perpetrated by the Boxers with 
the consent—implied if not express—of the local officials?  We 
have never heard that the citizens of Paoting were responsible for 
it, and surely to destroy the city for such a reason would be a hide-
ous outrage.”107  
                                                                                                                                   
300, Letter of Tewksbury (Jan. 23, 1901) in No. 10, Tewksbury to Smith (Feb. 18, 1901) 
(“Forgiveness of crime–moral suasion–demands an educated intelligence to un-
derstand, and this does not exist plentifully among the heathen natives here!  Le-
niency, forgiveness, are called cowardice, lack of care for our church members, 
etc. etc.”); North China Mission, THE MISSIONARY HERALD 160, 161 (Apr. 1901) (re-
producing a letter from Dr. Ament of Dec. 27, 1900: “[W]e have learned by long 
experience that the Chinese learn slowly and time is a large element in their edu-
cation.  Softness, such as our soldiers have manifested on some of their tours, is 
mistaken for weakness, and the lesson has to be taught in a more vigorous fash-
ion, however disagreeable it may be.”). 
105 JAMES WILSON, 2 UNDER THE OLD FLAG 530 (1912). 
106 DEUTSCHLAND IN CHINA—1900–1901—BEARBEITET VON TEILNEHMERN AN 
DER EXPEDITION 163 (1902) available at http://dfg-
viewer.de/show/?tx_dlf%5Bid%5D=http%3A%2F%2Fapi.deutsche-digitale-
biblio-
thek.de%2Fitems%2F37UASR7BFBLZSBMOCAA3TBD3YKSBP57F%2Fsource&tx
_dlf%5Bpage%5D=119&tx_dlf%5Bdouble%5D=0&cHash=1a17cd9d9379381b390f2
af33d62aba3 (Brockman-Hawe trans.) [hereinafter: GERMANY IN CHINA]. 
107 The Expedition to Paoting, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Oct. 20, 1900, at 406.  See also 
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There is some evidence that Gaselee was sympathetic to the 
views of those urging restraint.  According to the semi-official 
Germany in China, the General, upon arriving at Paoting-Fu, was 
initially disinclined to occupy the city, and would have preferred 
to take possession only of the outer gates, as he considered this the 
best way to guard against depredations by Allied troops.  It was 
only at the insistence of German General von Gayl, who reminded 
him that the Field marshal had intended that the Allied force sub-
jugate the entire city, that he ordered the occupation to proceed.108  
            With this in mind, the launch of an International Com-
mission looks like an inspired attempt at resolving the tensions be-
tween those who wished to see the Chinese treated with respect 
and those who perceived the country as a barbarous backwater de-
serving of whatever atrocities the Allies doled out.  A Commission, 
the thinking may have gone, simply by visibly “doing something,” 
might channel the impulse towards collective punishment away 
from looting, rape and murder, and towards symbolic (and less se-
vere) forms of retribution, like fines and destruction of cultural 
                                                                                                                                   
How China Should be Dealt With, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Jan. 26, 1901, at 11 (reprint-
ing the suggestions of the Peking and Tientsin Times of Sept. 22, 1900, noting that a 
“leading English periodical” supported these propositions, and commenting that 
the bloodthirstiness on display was excessive.); Millard, supra note 15, at 194 
(“Events such as the months of September, October and November brought to 
China have carried war back to the Dark Ages, and will leave a taint in the moral 
atmosphere of the world for a generation to come.”).  
 The same tension between progressives and martial extremists manifested in 
other turn-of-the-century conflicts.  The 1900’s saw the United States and Great 
Britain both engaged in brutal guerilla wars, the former in the Philippines, and the 
latter in South Africa.  In both the American-Philippine and Anglo-Boer wars, 
Western commanders employed policies of “total war,” directing their subordi-
nates to target civilians for torture, imprisonment and death, and collective pun-
ishment.  And in both cases scathing coverage of these strategies by the news me-
dia prompted high-profile courts-martials for these excesses.  These trials, which 
post-dated the Commission by several years, confirm that some portion of the 
public and members of the international community of states had conceded in the 
early years of the twentieth century that at least lip service needed to be paid to 
the idea that the rules of war applied even to conflicts against the ‘savages’ of the 
world and prohibited acts of appalling destruction.  See Glenn Anthony May, Was 
the Philippine-American War a “Total War”?, in ANTICIPATING TOTAL WAR, supra note 
95, at 437–59.  See also Guénaël Mettraux, US Courts‐Martial and the Armed Conflict 
in the Philippines (1899–1902): Their Contribution to National Case Law on War Crimes, 
1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 135 (2003) (discussing U.S. court-martial trials during the 
American counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines between 1901 and 1902 
in the context of their implications on the laws of war); Joseph R. Vergolina, Meth-
ods of Barbarism” or Western Tradition? Britain, South Africa, and the Evolution of Es-
calatory Violence as Policy 77 J. MIL. HIST. 1303 (2013). 
108 GERMANY IN CHINA, supra note 106, at 128. 
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property.109  And although it might not have been possible to elim-
inate collective punishments completely, they could at least be le-
gitimated through their association with an international, and pre-
sumptively reasonable, institution.  International commissions on 
the whole had cultural cachet among those Westerners interested 
in humanizing, systematizing and rationalizing punishment by vir-
tue of their inclusion in the Hague Convention for the Pacific Set-
tlement of International Disputes (1899).110  With respect to indi-
vidual punishment, trial by International Commission implied that 
the accused had received the benefits of, if not the most due pro-
cess theoretically possible, at least a rational process.  In short, by 
mediating punishment through an International Commission, the 
Allies might be able to legitimize any punishments doled out to 
city officials, justify as not unduly harsh or illegal the other “indel-
ible brand[s]” left on the city,111 manifest the sort of decisive and 
spectacular action expected of them as Great (and Christian) Pow-
ers occupying a semi-civilized country, and otherwise bridge the 
gap between their traditional imperial obligations and emerging 
ethical imperatives.112 
 
                                                          
109 For more on looting and Allied crimes, see DAVID SILBEY, THE BOXER 
REBELLION AND THE GREAT GAME IN CHINA 214 (2013).  See also Dabringhaus, supra 
note 95, at 466–67 and James Hevia, Looting and Its Discontents: Moral Discourse and 
the Plunder of Beijing, 1900–1901, in THE BOXERS, CHINA, AND THE WORLD 105–06 
(2007) for more on press criticism of Allied excesses. 
110 Commissions of Inquiry were described by the 1899 Hague Convention 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, according to which Commis-
sions could be called into being by the mutual agreement of disputing states to 
elucidate “the facts” and “facilitate a solution of . . . differences.”  HAGUE 
CONVENTION, supra note 69, at The Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific Set-
tlement of International Disputes, Arts. 9–14. 
111 See Smith, supra note 12, at 616.  For more on the punitive and retaliatory 
impulses of the Allies, see Hevia, supra note 6, at 195–235 (describing the “total 
war” practices used by the eight powers in their Chinese expeditions). 
112 The British government was sensitive to the criticism from the progres-
sive camp.  In early August, 1900, Acting Consul-General Warren cabled Salisbury 
with a proposal “that they will be held responsible for any outrage . . . , and fur-
ther, that their ancestral tombs at Mukden and Peking . . . be utterly destroyed.”  
NA, FO 405/94, No. 17 Acting Consul-General Warren to the Marquess of Salisbury 
(Aug. 2, 1900).  The return cable was instructive: “The threat to destroy the tombs 
of the Manchu dynasty would be very repugnant to public opinion here in Eu-
rope, and we are also informed that it would create a bad impression in China 
generally.”  NA, FO 405/94, No. 29 The Marquess of Salisbury to Acting Consul-
General Warren (Aug. 3, 1900). 
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4.  THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO PAOTING-FU TRIAL  
  
The executions attracted significant interest and sparked a 
global conversation concerned with the same Great Questions that 
bedevil diplomats, politicians, lawyers and academics today:  How 
should captured enemies be dealt with?  Who is an appropriate 
target for punishment?  Who should determine guilt?  Will a judi-
cial reckoning reinforce or undermine peace?  What are the goals of 
international justice and what sort of institutions accomplish them?  
What punishment is appropriate for heinous crimes?  Does it mat-
ter for sentencing purposes that the perpetrator was swept up in a 
mob frenzy?  What is the appropriate relationship between for-
giveness and unforgivable crimes?  How much should the rule of 
law be bent in the quest for accountability or truth?  
From the Chinese point of view, the Commission and execu-
tions were not only incursions on their sovereignty, but an existen-
tial threat to the Imperial government.113  By deputizing and rely-
ing on local officials to assist with the investigation and carry out 
the capital sentences, the Allies had signaled their willingness to 
openly convert traditional power-brokers from Chinese to Western 
agents.  Concerned that such visible incursions on Imperial author-
ity would only encourage domestic challenges to the Qing gov-
ernment, Chinese plenipotentiary Li Hung-Chang, suggested ap-
                                                          
113  Li Hung-Chang was “extremely saddened” to hear of the execution, and 
privately questioned the Empress Dowager “how [the foreigners] could violate 
our sovereignty like this?” Guojia dan an ju Minq Qing dang an guan, 2 Yi he tuan 
dan an shi liao 765 (Zhonghua shu ju, 1959).  The execution must have made quite 
an impression on the minister.  At an interview with Barzini in December, after 
covering the proposed indemnities, the behavior of the foreign troops, and the 
Russian activities in Manchuria, the Li Hung-Chang asks the correspondent “why, 
if he [Waldersee], is a kind person, did he behead the mandarins at Pao-ting-fu?”  
When Barzini replied that it was a military tribunal that had ordered the decapita-
tions on the grounds that the officials were guilty of the persecution of Europeans, 
Li Hung-Chang—no doubt disappointed not to have found a sympathetic ear that 
might provide him with some insight into how to avoid a similar outcome in the 
future—replied simply “then you have done well to kill them” and quickly 
changed the subject.  BARZINI, supra note 59, at 331 (Brockman-Hawe trans.).  Jung 
Lu, a senior minister and confidant of the Empress Dowager, felt that “the death 
of these officials should be sufficient for the wrong suffered by the Powers.”  Tan, 
supra note 77, 140 citing Li Hung-Chang, Li Wen Chung Kung Ch'uan Chi, in 
COMPLETE WORKS OF LI HUNG-CHANG (1905), Jung Lu to Shêng, K26/9/24 and 
Wuanhuai Sheng, Yu ̈-chʻai tsʻun kao (We ̂n hai chu pan shê, 1963) 45/23 and 45/26.  
There were reports that Shin Sin, the former President of the Board of Rites, com-
mitted suicide specifically to avoid the fate of the officials at Paoting-Fu.  The Cri-
sis in China, CHRONICLE, Jan. 5, 1901. 
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proaching the Allied negotiators with a request that they refrain 
from punitive expeditions in the future.114  U.S. minister William 
Rockhill was the first diplomat contacted, no doubt because of his 
recent and forceful rejection of the German plenipotentiary’s pro-
posal that high level Chinese officials be tried by the Powers.  The 
Chinese communique framed the request as one that would be in 
the Powers’ own interest to grant:  
  
Sir:  I have learned that the allied forces at Paoting Fu killed 
the provisional treasurer of Chihli, Tung Yung, and others, 
in all six men.  I have also learned that the foreign soldiers 
have gone to various districts, imprisoned and killed vari-
ous magistrates.  Although the reports in the foreign press 
say that the treasurer, Ting, had connived at and tolerated 
the “Boxers,” nevertheless since August he certainly re-
pented of his past deeds and dispatched soldiers to exter-
minate the “Boxer” bandits.  Further, when the foreign sol-
diers went to Paoting Fu and the various districts, the 
treasurer did not lead his troops against the foreign sol-
diers, but went outside of the city to receive them and pre-
sented them with oxen and wine.  It may be said that he 
certainly treated them kindly.  Nothing was said before-
hand that it was the purpose of the foreign forces to kill the 
treasurer, and, further, no explanation was made as to the 
crime he committed and a request made to China to deal 
with him herself.  This can only cause foreigners to be treat-
ed with contempt, and still further give rise to a feeling of 
hatred in the future.  It will be difficult for the Chinese offi-
cials to open their mouths in having any control in arrang-
ing peace, and the will be very much harassed.  . . . I ask 
you to consult with Mr. Conger and request the United 
States Government to use its best endeavors with the for-
eign powers to prevent them from again using their mili-
tary power, so that the minds of the people may be set at 
rest and avoid further complications . . . .115 
                                                          
114 Specifically, Li Hung-Chang intended to “try to stop them from taking 
action that would damage the peace.”  Yi he tuan dan an shi liao, supra note 113, at 
765. 
115  FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 22 Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, 
Inclosure No. 1 Viceroy Chang Chih-tung to Mr. Rockhill.  An examination of the ex-
tensive list of Chinese sources listed in Xiang’s bibliography has not revealed the 
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Rockhill forwarded the telegram to Washington D.C., but by 
way of substantive reply would say only that the U.S. took “no 
part whatever” in the Paoting-Fu expedition.116  The matter ap-
                                                                                                                                   
existence of additional documents that might shed light on how the events at Pao-
ting-Fu influenced the subsequent behavior of the Qing government.  LANXIN 
XIANG, THE ORIGINS OF THE BOXER WAR: A MULTINATIONAL STUDY 335–36 (2003).  
See also PETER FLEMING, THE SIEGE AT PEKING 108 (1959) (providing further evidence 
that the Allies’ actions at Paoting-Fu offended the Chinese). 
 The executions at the provincial capital were also mentioned in a letter by Ku 
Hong-Ming, a European-educated Chinese high court official and author of the 
well-known anti-imperialist Papers from a Viceroy’s Yamen (1901) in the Japan Week-
ly Mail.  In his letter, Ku argues that the punishment of Chinese subjects was, from 
the perspective of international law, a matter exclusively for China, though Pao-
ting-Fu was acknowledged to have been an exception to this rule.  In that city, 
  
. . . certain Agents of the Imperial Government were believed to have 
been guilty of acts outraging the laws of nations, the Allied Powers were 
justified, if they thought fit, to exercise what in modern usage of war, is 
called the right of reprisals, i.e., to seize and summarily punish the guilty 
Agents.  Such a punishment, however, is an act of war: it is not a judicial 
punishment.  . . . 
The execution of the Provincial Treasurer of Paoting-fu would be a legit-
imate act of reprisal.  But the allied Powers gave no warning or notice: 
therefore the Chinese looked upon it as an act of bad faith and treachery.  
H[is] E[xcelleny’s] the Viceroy Liu’s feelings on the execution at Paoting-
fu were . . . pity and indignation. 
 
Latter-Day Notes on the Chinese Question, JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Aug. 24, 1901, at 20 
(text partially corrected in issue of Sept. 21, 1901, at page 13). 
116 FOREIGN RELATIONS 1901, supra note 4, at No. 16 Mr. Hill to Mr. Rockhill.  
See also NARA, RG 84/763, Rockhill to American Consul, Hankow (Nov. 16, 1900).  
Rockhill’s reply, though an exaggeration by the standards of a common-sense def-
inition of ‘participate,’ was consistent with the views of the commander of Ameri-
can forces in China, Major General Chaffee: “The United States troops did not par-
ticipate in [the Paoting-Fu expedition], it being my opinion that the less the 
disturbance of the country by military operations, the sooner would arrive the 
opportunity to diplomatically arrange full reparation for all wrongs committed, 
and for the further reason that every indication pointed to the utter collapse of or-
ganized armed opposition by the Chinese.”  ARWD 1901, supra note 10, at 450 
(‘Report of Lieut. General Commanding the Army’) (emphasis added).  It was 
nevertheless a stretch to assert in absolute terms that the U.S. did not participate 
in the expedition; Hutcheson had accompanied General Gaselee, suggested the 
idea of an International Commission to General, and had undertaken his own in-
vestigation into the massacre (the results of which the U.S. diplomatic community 
in Peking took a special interest).  RG 395/929, Letter from Conger to Hutcheson 
(Nov. 7, 1900) (“Am I asking too much in requesting a copy of your Paoting Fu 
Report?  I would like very much especially to have that portion relating to your 
investigation of the murder of our American Missionaries and the trial and sen-
tence of the Chinese officials by the Military Court of the Allies.”).  I can find no 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/6
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pears to have rested there, as there is nothing in the Italian, British 
or German records to suggest that the Chinese ever lodged a for-
mal protest with the Powers officially represented on the Commis-
sion.117  Edwin Conger, U.S. Ambassador to China, privately ex-
pressed that the convicted “richly deserve the punishment 
inflicted” but thought that the means chosen had been counterpro-
ductive:  “a wiser course would have been to hold the prisoners for 
execution by the Chinese authorities, under a peremptory demand 
by the powers.”118  James Ragsdale, the U.S. Consul in Tientsin, ei-
ther harbored his own reservations about the proceedings or was 
aware of a general sense of dissatisfaction with the executions, 
though he certainly approved of the end result:  “Whether the pro-
ceedings of the Court Martial is [sic] justifiable or not, at this time, 
there can be no question that [the fantai] richly deserves the pun-
ishment proposed.”119  Sir E. Satow, British minister in Peking, 
called the executions “fitting atonement” and anticipated an “ex-
cellent effect.”120  Waldersee similarly reported to the Kaiser that 
                                                                                                                                   
other instance where the U.S. representative requested a military report from the 
China Expedition. 
117 Even though a formal protest was never filed, the Chinese objections were 
well-known and widely reported.  See, e.g., Foreign Politics, THE PIONEER, Dec. 5, 
1900, at 2 (“The Celestial authorities . . . are bewildered and indignant that the 
Powers should have made him [Ting Yung] a victim, instead of contenting them-
selves with a few of the helpless coolies whom the soldiers of the German Emper-
or are slaughtering whole sale with Attila-like barbarity.”); China, JACKSON DAILY 
CITIZEN (Jackson, Mich.), Nov. 19, 1900, at 4 (“The state department is reported to 
have declined to interfere [with the international court martial], reminding [Minis-
ter Wu] that the United States is in China as the equal and associate, not the supe-
rior, of the other powers.”). 
118 FOREIGN RELATIONS 1900, supra note 80, at No. 451 Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay.  
119  NARA, RG 84/218, No. 110 James Ragsdale to Conger (Dec. 4, 1900).  Rags-
dale misidentified the individual “tried by a Court Martial, found guilty and con-
demned to be executed publicly in Tientsin at an early date” as the Fan-Tai of Pao-
ting-Fu.  Ragsdale corrected his error two days later, identifying the prisoner as 
“Tan Wen Huan, a Hee pu tao who held the office of Military Intermediary and 
was prominent as a Boxer leader.”  NARA, RG 84/218, No. 111 Ragsdale to Conger 
(Dec. 6, 1900). 
120 CHINA NO. 6, supra note 17, at No. 40 Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salis-
bury; NA, PRO 30/33/14/11, No. 44, Satow to Admiral (Nov. 8, 1900) (“ . . . the 
Paotingfu expedition has returned & 3 leading officials who were convicted of re-
sponsibility for murder & ill treatment of foreigners have been executed by Count 
Waldersee’s orders […] It will produce an excellent effect.”).  Satow recorded in 
his diary on November 3, 1900 that he “abstained from interfering” in the execu-
tion as it was a “military matter” and he wished to disclaim all official knowledge 
of them.  He added that it was “quite possible that these executions would pro-
duce a good effect.”  He later informed the translator for the Chinese plenipoten-
tiary that he had “tried to delay [the] execution, but [the] order had already been 
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the expedition had exercised “a moral influence of far-reaching 
importance […]”121 though French General Voyron felt that the re-
ferral of the decision to the Field-Marshall in Peking had actually 
diminished its moral impact.122  
Popular opinion of the trial and execution can be gauged from 
an examination of contemporaneous press reports.  The clear ma-
jority of papers either reported a favorable view among Westerners 
of the path justice had followed in Paoting-Fu, or editorialized with 
their own expressions of approval.  The Peking and Tientsin Times 
(Tientsin) called the arrest and conviction “the only satisfactory re-
sults of the expedition”123 while the Peking correspondent for the 
Manchester Guardian (Manchester, GB) reported on the “feeling of 
lively satisfaction” at the prospect that the days of “misplaced leni-
ency” were over.124  The Pall Mall Gazette (London) lamented that it 
would be some time before the next “sanguinary but salutary crop 
of heads is harvested,”125 as the Times (London) predicted that 
events would be “received with satisfaction throughout the civi-
lized world” and hoped that the Chinese had “awakened to the 
fact that the International Commission are as ready to condemn on 
sufficient evidence, and the Powers are as ready summarily to be-
head, Prince Tuan [a member of the Imperial family and high rank-
                                                                                                                                   
sent.”  Either Satow waffled in his support for the execution, or he was lying in an 
attempt to turn the situation to the advantage of England.  1 THE DIARIES OF SIR 
ERNEST SATOW, BRITISH ENVOY IN PEKING (1900–06) 45, 52–53 (Ian Ruxton ed., 2006), 
publishing journals found at NA, PRO 30/33/16/3 and PRO 30/33/16/4. 
121 ALFRED, COUNT VON WALDERSEE, A FIELD MARSHAL'S MEMOIRS: FROM THE 
DIARY, CORRESPONDENCE AND REMINISCENCES OF ALFRED, COUNT VON WALDERSEE 
226 (Frederic Whyte trans., 1924).  See also GERMANY IN CHINA, supra note 106, at 
128, 163 (“The harsh but well-deserved punishment exerted a moral influence in 
the whole province . . . The relationship between the Europeans and the citizenry 
changed when the sentences were passed with the consent of the Field Marshal 
and when he rejected amnesties, especially with regard to the high officials”). 
122 SHAT, 11 H 4, folio A.1.1, No. 9, General Voyron to General Bailloud, (No-
vember 7, 1900) (writing that in the future, “if new culpable parties are to be tried, 
they must be judged on the spot by local military authorities.  The transfer of this 
affair to Peking has the drawback of lessening the moral effect produced in the 
country”).  
123  The Return of the Pao-ting-fu Expedition, PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, Nov. 
10, 1900 at 106. 
124  China, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 1900, at 6 (“The news of the 
sentence pronounced by the International Tribunal in the case of the Pao-Ting Fu 
officials has evoked a feeling of lively satisfaction here, as it is that hitherto the 
Powers have treated the Chinese officials who were known to be guilty with mis-
placed leniency.”). 
125  Occasional Notes, THE PALL MALL GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 1900, at 2.  
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ing Boxer supporter] himself […].”126   
In France, Le Temps (Paris) commended the “salutary effect” of 
sentencing of the “complicit” local officials on the Chinese gov-
ernment-in-exile—it was reported to have prompted an apology 
for the murder of German representative in Peking von Ketteler 
the previous June127—and Le Petit Journal lauded the “advanta-
geous” example that had been made and struck terror into the 
Chinese of the region.128  Correspondence published in La Civiltà 
Cattolica (Rome, Italy), a semi-official organ of the Holy See and a 
bellwether for Catholic papers around the world,129 endorsed the 
example of “European justice” before a “field military court” as a 
solution to the dilemma of how to rouse the Chinese government 
to more vigorous repression of the Boxers.130  
                                                          
126  THE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1900, at 9 (“Without the stern punishment, not merely 
of the highest local officials who instigated or participated in the Boxer outrages, 
but of the highest Imperial officials who devised that patriotic volunteer move-
ment for the murder of foreigners, the insecurity of European residents in China . . 
. will certainly continue, and almost certainly increase.”).  See also Foreign Politics, 
THE PIONEER, supra note 117 (“The most satisfactory feature of the week is the exe-
cution, in accordance with the sentence of the International Commission, of three 
of the principal local officials responsible for the massacre at Paoting-fu.”); Fitting 
the Crimes, SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 4, 1900, at 8 (“The allies at Pao-ting-fu have arrest-
ed the Governor of the city and other officials for their complicity in the massacres 
by the Boxers.”); Our London Letter, THE MERCURY, Dec. 15, 1900 at 5 (“Surely the 
Government and officials concerned in such atrocities [European casualties] de-
serve exemplary punishment.  But there is grave reason to fear that the higher 
personages connected with these diabolical acts will escape.”); THE TIMES, Nov. 5, 
1900, at 9 (“A beginning has been made at last in the necessary work of punishing 
Chinese officials of rank for the atrocious crimes perpetrated at their instigation, 
or with their connivance.”  Also, attributing expression of “profound regret” at 
the death of von Ketteler issued by Imperial edict in October to Paoting-fu, which 
“supplied the incentive for its issue.”); China, ST. JAMES GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 1900, at 
3 (“It is mere human nature to rejoice that these officials have met with their de-
serts, and it would seem that for once in a way it is really the guilty officials who 
have now been executed”). 
127  Affaires De Chine, LE TEMPS, Nov. 6, 1900, at 2.  Villetard de Laguerie, cor-
respondent for L’Illustration, sought to present the punishments as a French ac-
complishment alone.  In his article, the trial and punishment are presented as a 
boon from the French General Bailloud to the slow-footed British.  En Chine, 
L’ILLUSTRATION, Jan. 12, 1901, at 22 (describing the inquiry as “serious, solemn, 
and adversarial”). 
128  Evenenments de Chine, LE PETIT JOURNAL, Jan. 20, 1901, at 5.  Le Petit Journal, 
like L’Illustration, presented the executions as a strictly French accomplishment. 
129 RONALD MODRAS, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ANTISEMITISM 334 (2005).  
130  1(10) La Civilta Cattolica 379 (1901) (“If the mandarins are convinced they 
have to pay out of their pockets, their person will be imprisoned, and [they may] 
even as appropriate [pay] with their lives, oh I can tell you that they will display 
the most zealous and solicitous to prevent the [Boxer] movement and to repress 
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Westerners outside of Europe and China also generally wel-
comed the trial and execution.  A number of U.S. papers positioned 
the executions as a victory; the San Francisco Chronicle printed an 
interview with Lieutenant Turner, General Gaselee’s other Ameri-
can aide-de-camp, in which he asserted that the expedition, includ-
ing the executions and acts of destruction, could not help but have 
a strong “moral effect” on the locals.131  Meanwhile, the Jackson City 
Patriot (Jackson, Mich.) maintained “[t]hat the murderers of Ameri-
cans should be punished by German and British officers is evi-
dence that national vindictiveness did not dictate the penalties.”132  
In Australia The Age (Melbourne) styled the “court-martial” a tri-
umphant “commencement of the righteous work of doing jus-
tice.”133  The Pioneer (Delhi, India) described the punishment as 
“the most satisfactory feature of the week.”134  The Japan Weekly 
Mail (Tokyo) (initially and with reservation) embraced the trial and 
execution as “one of the most satisfactory incidents of the cam-
paign,”135 though later, it deemed the punishment insufficient giv-
en the enormity of the crimes, and opined as to where the Com-
missioners had gone wrong:  
  
[T]hat summary punishment was inflicted upon the three 
officials principally responsible must be regarded as a very 
lenient administration of justice.  It is becoming the fashion 
in these latter days to plead mob suggestion as rendering a 
crowd immune from responsibility for the acts it perpe-
trates.  There is something to be said on behalf of that theo-
ry, and still more on behalf of the undoubted truth that alt-
hough the resultant of the forces exercised by units of a 
mob be savagely murderous, the forces themselves may be 
                                                                                                                                   
them.”) (Brockman-Hawe trans.). 
131 Lesson to the Boxers, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 2, 1900, at 12.  
132 China, JACKSON DAILY CITIZEN, Nov. 19, 1900, at 4.  Other US papers re-
garded the trial and punishment as acts of treachery and betrayal based on a mis-
apprehension that the Chinese government had consented to the proceedings in 
advance and reserved for itself the right to punish in the event the accused were 
found guilty.  See e.g., Punishments Too Light, THE TIMES, (Washington, D.C.) Nov. 
20, 1900, at 1; MISSOURI VALLEY TIMES (Iowa, USA), Nov. 29, 1900, at 1. 
133 The Situation in China, THE AGE, Nov. 26, 1900, at 5. 
134 Far Eastern Affairs, The European Outlook, THE PIONEER, Dec.5, 1900, at 2. 
135 Notes on Current Events, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 17, 1900, at 9.  The 
approval expressed in this issue was preliminary and conditioned on whether 
“sufficient evidence of their guilt has been obtained.” 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/6
 
2017] AN EXPERIMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 679 
almost harmless separately.  A party of soldiers have been 
known to bear a man into a pulp with their belt-buckles, 
though each delivered only one blow and that a compara-
tively light stroke not intended to do serious injury.  . . . But 
surely neither hypnotism nor the resolution of forces can 
apply apologetically to officials who superintend and sanc-
tion such performances.136 
  
A few observers gave their imprimatur only begrudgingly.  
The correspondent for The Times of India found himself sympathiz-
ing with the “difficult position” of the punished, whose tolerance 
of crimes against Christians he attributed to their erroneous back-
ing of the wrong horse at a time of national upheaval.137  In Aus-
tralia, the Evening News (Sydney) approved of the “necessary’” 
punishment but predicted that “the next missionary who preaches 
the gospel of peace and goodwill at Tientsin will find sceptics 
among his audience.”138 
A small number of papers questioned the effectiveness of the 
executions, and echoed Conger’s anxiety that the beheading of 
provincial officials who had handed over the keys to the city with-
out a fight would be perceived as treacherous and ultimately derail 
the Peking negotiations.139  Others worried over the potential for 
                                                          
136 Pao-Ting-Fou, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Feb. 9, 1901, at 11.  The reaction 
serves as a stark lesson in the value of public over private proceedings.  The edi-
tor’s vitriol was predicated on his (incorrect) understanding that the international 
inquiry had confirmed the worst of the rumors—that “young girls had had their 
breasts shred off and in that condition had been led through the streets; that 
women had been abominably outraged, and that little children had been slung 
upon poles, one ankle and one wrist tied together, and in that plight had been car-
ried about the town.”  Id.  This information was supposedly withheld “lest a 
knowledge of them should rouse the allied troops to ungovernable fury.”  Id.  
Hutcheson specifically disclaimed these rumors in his authoritative report.  
Though the missionaries at Paoting-Fu were murdered and humiliated, they were 
not tortured in the manner described by the Japan Weekly Mail.  HUTCHESON 
REPORT, supra note 21, at 465. 
137 With the Indian Contingent, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 7, 1900, at 4.  
138 China, EVENING NEWS, Jan. 28, 1901, at 4. 
139  Mistakes of the Powers in China, THE LITERARY DIGEST, Dec. 1, 1900, at 1 (re-
printing and quoting critical articles from the Springfield Republican, the New 
York Sun, and the St. Louis Globe-Democrat); Pekin, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, 
Nov. 29, 1900, at 7.  
 At least two of the West’s ‘old China hands’ agreed that the trial and execu-
tions had caused more harm than good.  Hosea Morse, 3 THE INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 317 n. 130 (1918) (citing R. Hart, Inspector-
General of China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service, to E. B. Drew, Commis-
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intensified conflict, convinced that the Allies had created martyrs 
and that vengeance in their name would follow.140   
Outright criticisms of the Commission itself were rare.  A Ger-
man soldier who participated in the punitive expedition spoke of 
“faint hearted” Germans back home holding the opinion that the 
local officials should have been warned they were not immune 
from punishment before the city was occupied.141  The Los Angeles 
Herald reprinted an Associated Press telegram deriding the “interna-
tional court” as a “star chamber” and criticizing the foreign com-
manders for holding proceedings behind closed doors.142  At one 
point the Japan Weekly Mail doubted that a Commission “composed 
of foreign officers sitting at Pao-ting and obliged to rely upon such 
scraps of testimony as could be obtained from Chinese witnesses 
themselves in terror of their lives” could effectively reach the 
truth.143  The Japan Weekly Mail also called attention to the hypocri-
                                                                                                                                   
sioner of Customs; “The Paotingfu doings will, I fear, brand us forever with 
treachery in Chinese estimation: we got the Prince to order Chinese soldiers out of 
the way, and the officials came out and met them in a friendly manner: we then 
turned round and tried a lot of the officials, sentenced them, etc., and if report is 
true, the next step will be the looting of the city!  It is a nasty business altogeth-
er.”).  See also 2 THE I. G. IN PEKING - LETTERS OF ROBERT HART, CHINESE MARITIME 
CUSTOMS, 1868–1907, 1246 (John King Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, & Eliza-
beth MacLeod Matheson eds., 1976) (containing Robert Hart, who worked closely 
with Li Hung-Chang to negotiate the Boxer Protocol, writing that “[t]hey have ex-
ecuted the Actg. Viceroy Ting Yung at Paotingfoo and occupied (and looted?) the 
Imperial Tombs . . . —very appropriate as punitive action, but decidedly impoli-
tic: the first will enrage the whole mandarinate and the second prevent the Em-
peror’s return—so that order will not be speedily re-established.”).  The traveler-
adventurer James Miller also attributed anti-Western sentiment and delays in the 
negotiation of the terms of peace to the fact that foreigners had ordered “[t]he 
summary execution of three officials convicted of the murder of the missionaries 
at Paoting-Fu by drum-head court-martial.”  JAMES MILLER, CHINA, ANCIENT AND 
MODERN: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE FROM THE DAWN OF CIVILIZATION TO THE 
PRESENT TIME 477–78 (1900). 
140 Les Évenements de Chine, LA PETIT PARISIEN, Nov. 7, 1900, at 2.  See also Dis-
turbed China, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 24, 1900, at 2 (“The affair…shows the 
danger of any attempt on the part of the foreigners to administer justice on their 
own account.  The Pao-ting execution was intended to strike terror into the hearts 
of anti-foreign officials.  Apparently its effect has been to rouse a strong anti-
foreign sentiment among the people.”); Mistakes, supra note 139; Pekin, THE 
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 1900, at 7. 
141 JUSTUS SCHEIBERT, DER KRIEG IN CHINA, 1900–1901: NEBST BESCHREIBUNG DES 
LANDES, SEINER SITTEN UND GEBRÄUCHE 481–82 (1909).  According to the German 
Army Major, none among the French, German and Italian soldiery regretted this 
omission. 
142 Marching to Pao Ting Fu, LOS ANGELES HERALD, Dec.13, 1900, at 3. 
143 Disturbed China, supra note 140 (“It is not easy to see how a court martial 
of foreign officers, sitting in a place just occupied by their troops, could thorough-
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sy of the foreign powers, who had tried provincial officials under 
circumstances they would have found offensive had the boot been 
on the other foot.144  The atheist, anti-religious, and secular Free-
thinker (London) likewise pointed to the double standard on dis-
play, and questioned the Commission’s (purported) finding, as re-
ported (inaccurately) by the Peking correspondent for the London 
Times, that an American woman had had her breasts removed be-
fore being forcibly paraded through the town to her death:  “we 
know that all Asiatics are apt to be cruel, though hardly more so 
than American lynchers of Negros.  But does any man in his right 
senses believe this extravagant story?”145  
What of the missionary societies whose members had suffered 
at the hands of the Boxers?  By and large, the community was 
pleased with the actions of the Allies.  W.A.P. Martin, for example, 
a notable missionary famous for his translation of Henry 
Wheaton’s Elements of International Law into Chinese, noted with 
some passion in his memoirs that Paoting-Fu, “the scene of un-
heard-of atrocities,” had been “intentionally subjected to disgrace,” 
though he would have preferred to see the city “sown in salt” as 
opposed to merely cut off at the knees.146  But amid widespread ac-
cusations that their relentless and un-Christian demands for pun-
ishment had kept Western sentiment at a boil and exacerbated the 
poor circumstances of the Chinese who fell into the hands of West-
ern troops, mentions of Paoting-Fu within the missionary commu-
nity largely took on a defensive tone.”147  Prominent missionaries 
                                                                                                                                   
ly investigate candidates and justly judge charges such as those upon which Ting 
and his colleagues were presumably arraigned . . . [A] drumhead court martial is 
of all tribunals the least fitted to render an impartial judgment”).  
144  Disturbed China, THE JAPAN WEEKLY MAIL, Nov. 17, 1900, at 4 (“Had the 
mayor and municipal officials of an American or European city, surrendered the 
place peacefully to an American or European army, and had the latter then pro-
ceeded to apprehend the mayor and municipal officials, try them by drum-head 
court marital and place them before a platoon of musketry, the civilized world 
would have raised a cry of indignation”).  
 Six months after the executions, the Shen Pao (Shanghai News) alluded to new 
evidence, Ting Yung’s “published correspondence,” which purportedly cleared 
him of “complicity” with the Boxers, and labeled the fantai’s death “a judicial 
murder on the part of the too hasty allies.”  Notes and Queries, 36 J. OF THE CHINA 
BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOC’Y 223 (1905) (reprinting Shen Pao article of 20 
Apr. 1901).  I’ve found nothing among the archival records that confirms this sto-
ry. 
145 Acid Drops, 20 THE FREETHINKER 710 (Nov. 11, 1900). 
146 W. A. P. MARTIN, THE SIEGE IN PEKING, CHINA AGAINST THE WORLD 139–40, 
165–66 (1900). 
147 No less an insightful and influential personage than Mark Twain had attacked 
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belonging to the same society as the U.S. victims at Paoting-Fu (the 
American Board) devoted significant time, intellectual capital and 
ink to justifying themselves.148  Arthur Smith, for example, a veter-
an American Board missionary in China, called the executions a 
“fit penalty” and passionately argued in his memoires that pun-
ishment was the only bulwark against repeated acts of barbarity.  
For Smith, the punishment of Paoting-Fu’s leadership was precise-
ly the sort of example that needed to be made: 
  
Of all the acts of the military since the capture of Peking, 
[the investigation of punishment at Paoting-Fu] is the one 
most righteous in itself and most salutary in its result, yet it 
has been perversely criticized as a bloodthirsty cry for 
“vengeance,” unworthy of Western nations!  . . . When it is 
remembered what these men have done, and with what 
savage brutality many of them have plotted to exterminate 
every foreigner in their jurisdiction, it is evident to every 
one acquainted with the conditions that in the New China, 
that ought to ensue after peace negotiations have been 
completed, such officials ought not for a moment to be tol-
erated.  . . . If Western Powers, whether moved by senti-
mentality or by a desire to trade upon the supposed good 
                                                                                                                                   
the missionaries for their revengeful zeal with his characteristic sarcasm: “We 
have Mr. Ament’s [a prominent missionary in China] impassioned assurance that 
the missionaries are not ‘vindictive.’  Let us hope and pray that they will never 
become so, but will remain in the almost morbidly fair and just and gentle temper 
which is affording so much satisfaction to their brother and champion today.”  
Mark Twain, To the Person Sitting in Darkness, 122 N. AM. REV. 161, 165 (1901).  See 
also LARRY CLINTON THOMPSON, WILLIAM SCOTT AMENT AND THE BOXER REBELLION: 
HEROISM, HUBRIS AND THE “IDEAL MISSIONARY” 205–14 (2009) (providing back-
ground information on the dispute); WILBUR CHAMBERLIN, ORDERED TO CHINA 59–
60, 129 (1903) (exemplifying the missionaries’ approval of the Allies’ actions: “I 
have talked with a number of them and they all insist that the only thing to do in 
China is to cut off the head of every mother's son of a Chinaman who had any-
thing to do, directly, with the Boxer movement, or who sympathized with it.  In-
deed, they are much more emphatic in their demands for blood than was Emperor 
William a month ago.  . . . [I]t sounds a little strange to hear a disciple of the Mes-
senger of Peace calling for blood so loudly that everybody hears him or her . . . We 
are condemned by the missionaries and the citizens because we have been lenient.  
They say, ‘Chaffee is chicken-hearted.  Why don't he kill a lot of these devils and 
teach them a lesson?’  They demand blood, always blood, and they point us to 
Germany as an example of what should be done!”). 
148 Missionaries on their Defence, 32 THE CHINESE RECORDER AND MISSIONARY 
JOURNAL – JULY 1901 TO DECEMBER 1901, 371 (1901) (quoting an editorial from the 
North-China Daily News). 
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will of the Chinese, to be gained by minimizing the guilt of 
the guilty, are to slur over the past and deal weakly with 
those who are not only criminals in our eyes but in those of 
the Chinese themselves, the inevitable result must be to re-
awaken in all Chinese officials and people alike a thorough 
contempt for Westerners who are so easily hoodwinked.  
The Chinese will attribute the result to every motive but the 
real one, and will certainly think and feel that Powers who 
have held the sword in hand so long, and yet have failed to 
employ it as Chinese know that it ought to be employed, 
are not to be dreaded in the future; and it is a moral certain-
ty that the Chinese will act in accordance with this view.149 
 
Missionary passions were occasionally justified in secular 
terms, as an appropriate expression of a value—justice—deeply 
embedded in the fundamental order of social and interstate rela-
tions.  This leaning towards natural law is apparent, for example, 
in Dr. Henry Porter’s private letters:   
  
[With reference to missionary criticisms of the U.S. decision 
not to participate in the Paoting-Fu expedition] The Ameri-
can commanders here ask, out of their ignorance; why the 
Missionaries are so blood thirsty?  There is a sense of justice 
in the minds of men which must be met.  It is not blood-
thirsty to expect and to secure the ignominious death of a 
murderer and a brigand.  When a Nation undertakes really 
to punish another Nation for its bitter crimes there is no 
other element, than that of simple justice to be consid-
ered.150 
                                                          
149  Smith, supra note 12, 500, 714–15, 726–27.  See also The Situation in China, 69 
THE CHRISTIAN WORK 1 (Nov. 29, 1900) (“The way to prevent a repetition of the 
terrible outbreak in China . . . is to bring the Chinese mind into close touch with 
the mills of justice when they grind exceeding fine.”). 
150 ABCFM Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 126 Porter to Unknown’ (Oct. 28, 1900).  See 
also ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 124 Porter to Smith (Oct. 10, 1900) (“It does not 
appear to any of us a matter of vengeance, but of simple justice that a punitive ex-
pedition should go to Pao Ting and destroy the city where such enormities against 
the nations have been committed.”); MARTIN, THE SIEGE IN PEKING, supra note 101, 
at 165 (“The punishment of the guilty princes commends itself to our sense of jus-
tice.”); Id. at 165–66 (commenting that the punishment of inner-circle officials for 
attacks on foreigners in Peking “commends itself to our sense of justice”); 
SHANGHAI MERCURY, THE BOXER RISING: A HISTORY OF THE BOXER TROUBLE IN CHINA 
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Of course Paoting-Fu was only one specific instance, albeit an 
outstanding and highly visible instance, where missionaries had 
demanded punitive action in China.  The events of October and 
November 1900 were ultimately subsumed into broader public and 
private discussions concerning the justification and appropriate 
role of punishment.  On the public side, Gilbert McIntosh, in his 
aptly named apologia Is There Anything In It?  Some After-Crisis 
Vindication, offered a riposte to the claim that calls for the punish-
ment of those who were guilty of massacre had been un-Christian, 
refracting international politics through the prism of Christianity to 
suggest that punishment was the superior moral and political im-
perative: 
  
If governments are the ministers of God's righteousness, 
then surely it is the duty of every Christian government not 
only to uphold the right but to put down the wrong, and 
equally the duty of all Christian subjects to support them in 
so doing.  For China as for Western nations, anarchy is the 
only alternative to law.  Both justice and mercy require the 
judicial punishment of the wrong-doers in the recent out-
rages.151 
 
Additional justifications were developed through inter-
missionary correspondence as each sought reassurance that their 
conduct was beyond reproach.  Punishment was variously framed 
as:  (1) a practical response to the existence of manifestly danger-
ous individuals;152 (2) a means of strengthening the hand of the ne-
                                                                                                                                   
83 (1900) (reprinting the letter of Mr. Gammon, Tientsin agent of the American 
Bible Society to Dr. Hykes of the same Society (Aug. 25, 1900): “[I]t is to be hoped 
that some detachment of the allied troop may be sent to punish the people of that 
region [Paoting-Fu], especially as it is reported that three of four foreigners are 
hiding in that vicinity.  We do not any of us ask for revenge, but, as a home paper 
puts it, for justice.  It is right and proper to punish crime, and Pao Ting Fu has fed 
one of the main roots of the growth of the uprising.”). 
151 GILBERT MCINTOSH, IS THERE ANYTHING IN IT?  SOME AFTER-CRISIS 
VINDICATIONS 54 (1902).  
152 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 298, Sheffield to Smith (July 25, 1901) (“it is not by 
promiscuous forgiveness that these conspicuous murderers still with weapons in 
hand and prowling the country can be made to order their lives according to law.  
If they are not punished for past crimes they will ultimately be punished for later 
ones.  I am talking about desperate characters, no men for a few months driven by 
a wave of excitement into excesses, and now ready to waken out of delirium and 
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gotiators in Peking;153 (3) an extension of Christian duty to take a 
life for a life, and generally provide for the spiritual needs of native 
and foreign Christians;154 (4) better than the amnesty or apathy, 
which would foster a perception of the Western powers as “abet-
tor[s] of the Boxers by [their] neglect]”;155 (5) an appropriate psy-
chological response to the traumas experienced by victims of the 
Boxers;156 and as (6) the only means of advancing the security of 
otherwise disempowered Chinese Christians.157 
 
5.  INTELLECTUAL RIPPLES – THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION’S 
LEGACY 
  
The Commission, like a number of other nineteenth century 
experiments with international criminal justice,158 was cursed by an 
inherently short memetic half-life.  The brief but vibrant discussion 
                                                                                                                                   
become good citizens.  . . . [T]he country will not be in settled conduction until 
several thousands of such men have been punished, or course in different de-
grees.  . . . [W]ith the country filled with desperate characters direct efforts must 
be put forth to capture and put beyond power to do further evil, a few leading 
names.”).  
153 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 297, No. 126.  Porter to Unknown (Oct. 28, 1900); 
ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 15 Sheffield to Smith (Dec. 14, 1900); ABCFM Unit 3, 
Reel 298, Sheffield to Smith (Aug.19, 1900). 
154 ABCFM, Unit 3 Reel 296, No. 282 Peck to Smith (Mar. 14, 1901); ABCFM 
Unit 3 Reel 298, No. 16, Sheffield to Smith (February 26, 1901); ABCFM Unit 3, Reel 
297, No. 126 Porter to Unknown (October 28, 1900); ABCFM Unit 3 Reel 298 No. 16 
Sheffield to Smith (Feb. 26, 1901) (“‘An eye for an eye’ is the rule of action.”). 
155 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 322, Atwood to Smith (May 4, 1901). 
156 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 322, Atwood to Smith (Sept. 10, 1901) (“It is not at all 
strange that the Christians here harbor feelings of revenge.  They can never forget 
these awful crimes against their teachers and against humanity.”). 
157 ABCFM, Unit 3, Reel 298, Sheffield to Smith (July 9, 1901). 
158 See Benjamin Brockman-Hawe, Constructing Humanity’s Justice: Accounta-
bility for ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in the Wake of the Syria Crisis of 1860, 3 HIST. 
ORIGINS OF INT'L CRIM. L. (Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling & Yi Ping eds., 2015) 
(describing the fleeing effect that the Syria Crisis of 1860 had on international 
criminal law); Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, A Supranational Criminal Tribunal for 
the Colonial Era: The Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS 50–76 (Kevin Heller & Gerry Simpson eds., 2013) (discussing the 
Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, established to try a single individual for what today 
would be considered war crimes); Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, Punishing War-
mongers for their “Mad and Criminal Projects” – Bismarck’s Proposal for an Internation-
al Criminal Court to Assign Responsibility for the Franco-Prussian War, 53 TULSA L. 
REV (forthcoming 2017) (discussing Bismarck’s 1870 proposal for an international 
criminal court to try the “intellectual originators and instigators” of the Franco-
Prussian War). 
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on matters of international justice sparked by events at Paoting-Fu 
was quickly overridden by other events, and there is nothing in the 
military and political histories, missionary literature, or the news-
papers of the subsequent decades to indicate that the Commission 
entered the collective long-term memory.159  The Paoting-Fu exper-
iment cast an equally short shadow over the West’s community of 
international law scholars.  Luminaries Robert Ruzé,160 Arthur Lor-
riot,161 and Raymond Robin162 mentioned the Commission in their 
respective treatises on occupation law, but only to develop their 
theories concerning the extent of a belligerent’s jurisdiction over 
local crimes; at no time was the Commission presented in the legal 
literature as a nexus point where the law of occupation, the cus-
tomary international law right of access to justice, and the obliga-
tions of criminal repression overlapped.  In the absence of broader 
framing, no ‘Paoting-Fu myth’ emerged that synthesized, gave a 
name to, or otherwise impelled a movement towards the criminali-
                                                          
159 The Commission and its work were mentioned in passim in a few works 
that have not yet been cited in this paper.  These include Lt.-Col. V. Tariel, La 
Campagne de Chine (1900–1901) et le Matériel de 75, 59 REVUE D'ARTILLERIE 413, 449–
50 (1901–1902) (noting briefly that a commission of enquiry was established to 
look into the causes of the Boxer movement and punish the authors of the massa-
cres in the region, as well as the death of Paoting-Fu notables and the indemnity 
imposed on the city); Les Évenements Militaires en Chine (1900–1901)(1) 59 REVUE 
MILITAIRE DES ARMÉES  ÉTRANGERS – RÉDIGÉE A L'ÉTAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMÉE 256, 262 
(Jan.-June 1902) (noting briefly the execution of Chinese officials “judged to be ac-
complices in the murders of Europeans and native Christians); FREIHERR EUGEN 
BINDER VON KRIEGLSTEIN, DIE KÄMPFE DES DEUTSCHEN EXPEDITIONSKORPS IN CHINA 
UND IHRE MILITÄRISCHEN LEHREN 53 (1902) (mentioning the commission in passing); 
GIEHRL RUDOLF, CHINA FAHRT, ERLEBNISSE UND EINDRÜCKE VON DER EXPEDITION 
1900–01 59 (1903) (mentioning the execution of the Feng-tai as well as the destruc-
tion of some of Paoting-Fu’s walls and temples); C. C. Manifold, Recent Exploration 
and Economic Development in Central and Western China, 23(3) THE GEOGRAPHICAL J. 
281, 295 (Secretary of the Royal Geographic Society ed., Mar. 1904) (describing the 
international court at Paoting-fu in passing); Smith, supra note 12, at 
611(mentioning the recommendations of the Commission regarding beheadings 
of officials in the city); MARIO VALLI, GLI AVVENIMENTI IN CINA NEL 1900: E L'AZIONE 
DELLA R. MARINA ITALIANA 632–34 (1905) (summarizing the procès-verbal of the 
Commission’s proceedings (the document reproduced in this paper as Annex 1) 
without citation). 
160  Robert Ruzé, La juridiction des armees d'occupation en ce qui concerne leur 
proper protection, 16 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: DROIT DES 
GENS, HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE, DROIT PÉNAL, DROIT FISCAL, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 134, 
148–151 (1909). 
161 ARTHUR LORRIOT, DE LA NATURE DE L’OCCUPATION DE GUERRE 339–41 
(1903). 
162 RAYMOND ROBIN, DES OCCUPATIONS MILITAIRES EN DEHORS DES 
OCCUPATIONS DE GUERRE 202–03 (Division of International Law of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace trans., 1942). 
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zation of mass violence in humanity’s name. 
Though largely consigned to oblivion, there is one occasion 
where the Allied experience with international justice carried over 
into the new century to influence subsequent political and legal 
practice.  Interestingly, the Commission in this instance was not 
presented as a landmark in the development of international crim-
inal law, but as an anti-precedent that purportedly validated a turn 
towards political, as opposed to legal, punishment in the wake of 
heinous international ‘crimes.’  
At the conclusion of the First World War a new generation of 
statesmen and attorneys confronted questions of international 
criminal responsibility.  While the Allies generally agreed that 
Germany had perpetrated war crimes during the war, they were 
divided over whether to try German leadership before an interna-
tional court and whether aggression should form part of the charge 
sheet.  In late January 1919 the legal advisers to the U.S. delegation 
to the Paris Peace Conference, David Miller and James Scott,163 
shared with the Allies a memo adopting the position that the trial 
of the Kaiser for the crime of engaging in illegal war would be con-
trary to the prohibition on ex post facto laws, but that international 
law permitted the victorious states recourse to “political action” 
that would “restrain a disturber of the public peace.”  In their 
memo, they explained why the efforts of the Allies to secure the 
punishment of Boxers and collaborators in the aftermath of the Up-
rising fell into the category of political action, and was therefore 
not a “legal” precedent to the proposed trials of Germans: 
  
[Allied actions] have been treated as an example of political 
punishment rather than as a precedent for judicial or legal 
punishment, because although the Powers stated that their 
action was taken to punish “crimes against the Law of Na-
tions,” no judicial process of any kind appears to have been 
invoked to establish the criminal responsibility of the al-
leged offenders or to determine their punishment. […] 
[With respect to the punishment of eleven high level offi-
cials in the early stages of the negotiations,] [n]one of the 
usual safeguards of ordinary jurisprudence to assure justice 
                                                          
163 David Hunter Miller & James Brown Scott, 1 My Diary at the Conference of 
Paris, with Documents 86 (1924) (entry for Jan. 21, 1919) [hereinafter “Miller Dia-
ry”]. 
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to accused persons appear to have been present in this case.  
There is no indication that any of the accused were present, 
either personally or by counsel, at the meeting of the allied 
ministers which decided their fate, or that they were given 
any opportunity whatever to defend themselves. 
The incident cannot therefore be regarded as a legal prece-
dent for the punishment of crimes against International 
Law; it was nothing more than the arbitrary determination 
by the political representatives of the Powers who had mili-
tary control at Peking that certain Chinese officials whose 
guilty connection with the Boxer uprising they regarded as 
notorious should suffer death. 
Of the same character seems to have been the actions of the 
allied military expedition at Pao-ting during the same Boxer 
disturbances. […] China protested against the violation of 
her sovereignty and of the agreement of the Allies that she 
should herself punish the guilty parties.164 
  
Miller and Scott concluded that, with respect to trials for war 
crimes before an international military tribunal, “the enemy may in 
[some] cases find ground for serious objections to the presence of 
an officer upon a commission trying crimes not committed against 
his army of nationals.”  Apprehension of this outcome led them to 
recommend “separate tribunals for each nation or each group of 
nations whose armies were actually united in campaign.”165  
Ultimately, seven of the nine powers participating on the post-
War “Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War 
and on Enforcement of Penalties” overruled U.S. resistance to in-
ternational trials and its rejection of the “laws of humanity” as a 
distinct legal category of international crimes,166 and agreed to rec-
                                                          
164  Id. at 474, Document 213, ‘Memorandum Regarding the Responsibility of 
the Authors of the War and for the Crimes Committed in the War.’  
165 Id. at 505–06. 
166  Memorandum of Reservations presented by the Representatives of the United 
States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, April 4, 1919 and Reserva-
tions by the Japanese Delegation, REP. OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING REP. OF AMERICAN 
AND JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMM’N OF RESPONSIBILITIES, 64, 74, 80 (1919) (men-
tioning the American and Japanese Delegations’ reservations: American Delega-
tion: “The laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual, which, if for 
no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, es-
pecially one charged with the administration of criminal law”; American Delega-
tion: “The American Representatives felt very strongly that too great attention 
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ommend to the Council of Four the formation of a High Tribunal to 
try individuals accused of violating international law.167  Nothing 
in the negotiation record suggests that the other Entente powers 
ever challenged the U.S. position on the punishments inflicted in 
China.  
What accounts for this quietness?  The simplest explanation 
might be that by 1919 an effective challenge to the American posi-
tion was simply impossible to mount, with the relevant documents 
either lost or buried and the institutional memories too degraded.  
Alternatively, pro-trial Powers might be attributed to anxiety that a 
debate necessitating a meticulous historic inquiry into such an ob-
scure entity would unnecessarily delay prosecutions.  Moreover, if 
the delegates had assumed (correctly, as it turned out) that the 
Americans would resist “legal” international trials on principle no 
matter how much evidence or pressure was brought to bear,168 
                                                                                                                                   
could not be devoted to the creation of an international criminal court for the trial 
of individuals, for which a precedent is lacking, and which appears to be un-
known in the practice of nations.”; Japanese Delegation: “A question may be 
raised whether it can be admitted as a principle of the law of nations that a High 
Tribunal constituted by belligerents can, after a war is over, try an individual be-
longing to the opposite side, who may be presumed to be guilty of the laws and 
customs of war.”). 
167  Id. at 23.  The delegates rejected U.S. suggestions that a Commission of 
Inquiry be established “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors 
of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws 
and customs of war committed during its course.”  Under the American proposal, 
the Commission would have a mandate to “examine the evidence, and to reach a 
judgment, and then to present this as a report to the world at large through the 
public press in order that the opinion expressed in the report should be examined 
or tested by public opinion.”  Suffice to say, the proposal was rejected.  “A trial 
they wanted,” Scott said during a subsequent interview, “and [they] were satis-
fied with nothing less than a trial.”  The Trial of the Kaiser – January 21, 1921, Ques-
tions Answered by James Brown Scott, Legal Adviser to American Peace Commission 
(Appendix X), in WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS – THE STORY OF THE PEACE 
CONFERENCE, 1918–1919 477–78 (Edward House & Charles Seymour eds., 1921). 
168 The United States never was able to coax the other members of the Coun-
cil of Four out of their plans for a trial of the Kaiser or others accused of war 
crimes, though they were ultimately victorious in persuading them to ignore the 
Commission’s recommendations and remove any reference to “international law” 
in favor of language in the Versailles Treaty to the effect that the Kaiser’s trial 
would be for “a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties” and that the trial would be guided by “the highest motives of interna-
tional policy.”  Article 227, Treaty of Versailles.  Robert Lansing, American repre-
sentative and Chairman of the Commission on Responsibility, wrote that 
“[m]anifestly the tribunal . . . is not a court of legal justice, but rather an instru-
ment of political power which is to consider the case from the viewpoint of high 
policy and to fix the penalty accordingly.”  R. Lansing, Some Legal Questions of the 
Peace Conference, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 631, 647 (1919).  James Scott noted that 
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convincing them that Boxer punishments were more legal than po-
litical would only have only have diminished the prospects of 
achieving even quasi-judicial ‘political’ prosecutions, as these 
would now be shown to have been unprecedented.  Then again, 
the thinking might have been that defending a Commission so in-
trinsically connected with a war widely criticized for the lack of re-
straint with which it was fought was a losing strategy for legitimat-
ing an international trial intended to cast the Germans as 
barbarians and reinforce the civilized status of the Entente powers.  
  
6.  THE JUDICIAL CHARACTER OF THE COMMISSION AND FAIRNESS OF 
THE TRIAL 
  
Hutcheson’s Report, presumably the only source of infor-
mation about the punitive expedition available the US negotiators, 
exclusively referred to the court as a “Commission of Inquiry” and 
“International Commission,” titles evocative of a body limited in 
its mandate to determining factual causes and not charged with as-
signing legal responsibility.  Had a more complete record of the 
Commission been available to them, perhaps their reasoning 
would have taken a different turn.  Once the global and public rec-
ord is taken into account, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the Commission was, in fact, a court of law.  
The general understanding, shared by diplomats, the military, 
and the foreign population of China, was that the Commission was 
fundamentally a judicial body.  The full name of the Commission 
(as recorded in the Session Records)—“The International Investiga-
tive Commission to seek out, judge and punish the principal authors 
of the massacres of Christians, and the promoters of the same” – 
connotes an institution with the full panoply of powers ascribed to 
courts, as well as one that is owed more than mere political defer-
ence.169  In his reports home, Colonel Garioni, commander of the 
                                                                                                                                   
“[b]ecause of [President Wilson’s] refusal [to consent to the Kaiser’s trial for a 
criminal offense,] the Supreme Council rejected the majority report of the Com-
mission of Responsibility, and as a compromise agreed upon an article according 
to which the Kaiser, if the Allied could get their claws on him, should be ar-
raigned for an offense against international morality.  President Wilson thought, 
as I believe, that this was the most that could be permitted, and that it would not 
be a legal but a political offense that the punishment should not be a criminal but 
a political punishment.”  WHAT REALLY HAPPENED, supra note 167, at 475. 
169 Supra Annex 1, Introduction (emphasis added). 
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Italian forces in China, discussed the Commission in a way that 
suggested that the exercise of investigatory and sentencing pow-
ers—the sine qua non of a court – were the raison d'être of the body 
from the beginning.170  Moreover, whatever its formal title and 
mandate, in practice the Commission received evidence concerning 
the responsibility of individuals for crimes, apportioned responsibility 
among them, and determined the legal consequences that would fol-
low – inherently judicial tasks.171  Although their findings were 
styled “recommendations,” the act of handing these over to su-
preme commander Waldersee for confirmation, remittance or dis-
missal paralleled the process of review of courts-martial verdicts 
that was a standard part of domestic law.172  Finally, the record is 
rife with the use of signifiers – ‘court martial,’ ‘international mili-
tary tribunal,’ ‘war crimes trial,’ ‘international court,’ ‘international 
tribunal’ and ‘military court’ – that connote judicial power and 
process.173  Jamieson even described himself as “the delegate of 
General Gaselee on a Military Court of Inquiry or court-martial 
[…].”174  If anyone at the time questioned the general use or ap-
                                                          
170  AUSSME, E-3, Rac 55, fol 30/4 ‘La Spedizione Di Paoting-Fu. Il Combat-
timento Di Cu-Nan-Shien.’ The semi-official Germany in China referred to the pro-
ceedings as “criminal” and the executed Chinese officials as the “convicted.” 
GERMANY IN CHINA, supra note 106, at 163, 264.  
171  A debate over the judicatory nature of various statutory tribunals estab-
lished by Parliament played out in Britain over the course of the nineteenth centu-
ry.  In 1873, the House of Lords considered the judicial nature of the military 
courts of inquiry.  Despite their executive origins, limited powers and administra-
tive function, the military courts, which were organized pursuant to the Queen’s 
Regulations for the Army (1859), were determined to be “court[s] duly and legally 
constituted and recognized in the [A]rticles of [W]ar” for domestic purposes, 
based on their having “all the qualities and incidents of a court of justice.”  Daw-
kins v. Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255 (Eng.) cited in CHANTAL STEBBINGS, LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TRIBUNALS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 302 (2006). 
172 3 UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA AND ATLAS 222 (1900); see also Military Law, 15 
THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (1891) (indicating that a verdict 
of a court martial was reviewed and concurred in by a military commander, simi-
lar to the process by which the Commission submitted their recommendations to 
Field Marshal Waldersee). 
173 The wide variation in nomenclature used to discuss the Commission is 
awkward, though unsurprising given the relative secrecy in which the body oper-
ated, its distance from the command centers of Tientsin and Peking, and the nov-
elty of the institution. 
174 NA, FO 405/102, Inclosure 1 Memorandum of Mr. Jamieson’s Visit to Paoting 
in No. 131 Satow to Marquess of Salisbury (sent 14 Nov. 1900, received 21 Jan. 1901) 
(un-redacted version of Jamieson Memorandum) (adding “[I act] not by any 
means in a civil capacity, inasmuch as the modes of procedure differed toto valo 
from those observed in Civil Courts and I have absolutely no locus standi in the 
matter as a civilian.”).  Elsewhere in the same communication Jamieson referred to 
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plicability of these overtly judicatory appellations, I have not un-
covered their objections. 
Miller and Scott’s accusation of unfairness is more problematic.  
It is difficult to determine today what ‘fairness’ meant or even 
should have meant in the context of the Paoting-Fu trial.175  Con-
sider, for example, the question of whether the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege existed in 1900.  The prohibition on ex post facto laws 
was implicit to the German, British, French and Italian Military 
Manuals, but only insofar as those manuals dealt with crimes per-
petrated by their own citizens.  Moreover, those rules had been de-
veloped primarily to dissuade soldiers from disobedience and 
cowardice with the threat of harsh, quick and decisive punishment.  
The Commission, however, existed to hear the case of an atrocity 
perpetrated by a quasi-belligerent enemy.176  Given the different 
                                                                                                                                   
the body as a “Military Commission.” JAMIESON MEMORANDUM, supra note 17.  
Prior to the first sitting of the Commission, Jamieson wrote MacDonald that if 
TingYung were guilty a “drumhead court-martial could suffice.”  NA, PRO 
30/33/7/9, Jamieson to MacDonald (Oct. 20, 1900).  
 The Intelligence Department’s Official Account used the linga franca of law as 
well, stating that Ting-Yung, Quei Heng and Wan Chan Kuei each had their cas-
es…tried before the International Commission” which “sentenced” them to be-
heading.  OFFICIAL ACCOUNT, supra note 56, at 134.  Gaselee reported the outcome 
of the proceedings to London thusly; “[t]he trial was by International Commis-
sion, and the proceedings were confirmed by Count von Waldersee.”  CHINA NO. 
5, supra note 16, at Inclosure No. 3 General Sir A. Gaselee to Sir E. Satow and the Sec-
retary of State for India; in No. 40 Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury.  Enrico 
Morin, Minister of the Italian Navy between 1893 and 1903, described the Com-
mission to Foreign Minister Venosta as an “international military tribunal.” No. 
531, Il Ministro Della Marina, Morin, Al Ministro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta 
(29 Nov. 1900) supra note 79. 
175  There is also a problem in determining whose perceptions of fairness 
should be dispositive.  Should we reference those of a nineteenth century jurist?  
A military officer?  A clique of military officers of diverse nationalities? 
176  To be sure, by 1900 the prohibition on ex post facto laws and punishments 
was a common fixture within regular European criminal justice systems.  See 1 M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INT'L CRIM. L. 78–79 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 2008) (citing Guili-
ano Vassalli, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 8 Nuovo Digesto Italiano 1173 (1939) as the 
most comprehensive comparative analysis of the principle nullum crimen sine lege 
(no crime without law)).  This does not mean that the principle would have ap-
plied in contexts where the law of occupation held sway.  French military law 
permitted the prosecution, even for crimes that did not appear in the Code of Mil-
itary Justice, of foreigners who threatened the safety of the occupying army.  Ni-
colas, infra note 182, at 33 (Art. 63 (commentary)).  Taillefer acknowledges this line 
of precedent, but nevertheless claims later that “[…] in French practice, the inhab-
itants of occupied countries are entitled to justice in accordance with the same 
procedure and the same conditions as the soldiers of the French army.”  Taillefer, 
supra note 71, at 225, 230.  The British Manual afforded invaders complete discre-
tion over the law that would apply in occupied territories, and did not even guar-
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context in which these two spheres of justice were operating—in 
the international/China context goals to be achieved were of larger 
consequence (if not loftier), the passions of local and foreign gov-
ernments were more roused, and the pressure to secure punish-
ment greater—it would have been far from obvious to the leading 
military and legal authorities of the era that principles developed 
for application in the domestic military sphere could or should au-
tomatically pertain in the international context.177  
Attempting to test the Commission a posteriori against some 
theoretical ‘ideal’ proceeding for 1900 might be possible, if signifi-
cant divergences between the relevant national military codes from 
this period in the rights they recognized and in their conception of 
the circumstances and persons to which those rights would apply 
were less extreme.  The German Militärstrafgerichtsordnung (1898), 
for example, afforded a right to adduce arguments on appeal, 
which its British analog did not.178  Likewise, the British Manual of 
Military Law (1898) (unsurprisingly, given its common-law roots) 
provided extensive procedural protections for the accused in most 
cases, incorporating the entire corpus of English evidentiary law 
                                                                                                                                   
antee locals recourse to a legal process.  Commanders were specifically authorized 
to punish “in such manner as he thinks expedient, inhabitants guilty of breaking 
the rules laid down by him for securing the safety of the army.”  MANUAL OF 
MILITARY LAW, supra note 70, at 297.  The German military code mandated the ap-
plication of German law in occupied territories.  See MILITARY PENAL CODE 
(MILITAR-STRAFGESETZBUCH) FOR THE GERMAN EMPIRE, supra note 71.  The Italian 
Codice Penale provided that, in times of war, “persons outside the army that com-
mit or contribute with someone in the army to commit an offense under this Code 
will be subject to the same punishments [under this Code].” CODICE PENAL, supra 
note 71, at Art. 236.  In terms of personal jurisdiction, however, courts-martial 
could only hear cases against persons involved with the military, their servants, or 
prisoners of war.  Id. at Art. 545.  In short, it seems that in 1900 the prohibition of 
ex post facto laws was not envisioned as extending to natives residing in occupied 
territory.  
177 See HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 87 (1944) (arguing, in 1944, in fa-
vor of the development of an international judiciary that “[t]here is no rule of gen-
eral customary international law forbidding the enactment of norms with retroac-
tive force, so called ex-post facto laws”).  See also B. BROOMHALL,  COMMENTARY ON 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, 
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 713, 735 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2nd ed. 2008) (“By the start of the 
First World War, [nullum crimen sine lege] was recognized in the legal systems of 
all developed countries and their dependent territories, although not always in 
the same way.”). 
178 See MILITÄRSTRAFGERICHTSORDNUNG, supra note 71, at Art. 382; MANUAL OF 
MILITARY LAW, supra note 70 at 66 (pointing out that verdict needed to be con-
firmed, disconfirmed or revised by officer holding the authority to do so), 153 (in-
dicating that the accused could challenge a court-martial for lack of jurisdiction or 
failure to adhere to the rules concerning proper constitution). 
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and adopting as a guiding philosophy the principle that “[t]he ac-
cused is to be allowed great latitude in making his defense, and 
will not, within reasonable limits, be stopped by the court merely 
for making irrelevant observations.”179  But the British Manual also 
introduced the Field-General Court-Martial, a forum which ex-
empted commanders from applying these and other burdensome 
rules when “necessary” and limited defendant’s rights to those 
which were “practicable” given the exigencies of the situation.180  
Foreigners within the ambit of British military justice were explicit-
ly not guaranteed even these limited protections.181  The French 
Code du Justice Militaire (1857, modified 1875) also truncated the no-
tice, case-preparation and appeals rights of defendants as necessity 
dictated.182  The Italian Codice Penal went one step further and au-
thorized trials in absentia at the discretion of the military authori-
ty.183  The Militärstrafgerichtsordnung, in comparison, set a single 
standard for justice that applied to foreigners and occupier alike, 
during times even of heightened danger, but (consistent with its 
civil-law heritage) provided far fewer rules concerning the admis-
sibility of evidence.184  No indication of a shared concept of ‘essen-
tial’ or ‘universal’ procedural rights emerges from these sources.  
How then to settle the question of fairness? After setting aside 
concerns over anachronism and embracing an intuitive notion of 
fairness, the impression I am left with is that of a body that was 
fair, in that it was conspicuously rational and decorous.  Transla-
tors were employed for the benefit of defendants, the accused were 
given an opportunity to state their case and comment on the evi-
dence against them, and Chinese law was considered for sentenc-
ing purposes.185  There is nothing to suggest that an attempt was 
made to force confessions from the accused, or that the integrity of 
the proceedings was affected by meddling from the military and 
                                                          
179  MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, supra note 70, at 58, 71–106. 
180 Id. at 657–65.  
181  Id. at 297.  
182 See VICTOR NICOLAS, COMMENTAIRE COMPLET DU CODE DE JUSTICE MILITAIRE 
POUR LES ARMÉES DE TERRE ET DE MER 87 (1898) (Art. 156, commentary) (stating that 
the usual formalities of justice are to be complied with “only if there is time.”). 
183  CODICE PENAL, supra note 71, at Art. 557. 
184  See MILITÄRSTRAFGERICHTSORDNUNG, supra note 71, at Art. 304 (explaining 
that as a general rule, witness testimony could not be replaced with interrogato-
ries; see also Id. at Art. 293 (explaining that the accused, counsel, and/or the judges 
may examine witnesses at trial). 
185  See Annex 1, Second Session.  
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political leadership in Peking.  Nor is there any evidence that the 
verdicts were preordained; when the foreign-appointed Prefect 
and Subprefect scared up some purported Boxers for presentation 
at the sixth session, the Commissioners declined to scapegoat the 
three suspects they considered innocent.186  The Commissioners al-
so forewent making a sentencing recommendation with respect to 
suspected Boxer Chen-Che-Chiang, declining to try him in absen-
tia.187  Sentencing followed the placement on the record and “care-
ful investigation” of evidence that indicated support for the Boxer 
cause or more direct involvement in Christian deaths.188  It is also 
noteworthy that the Commissioners doled out sentences other than 
capital punishment; the decision to demote Shen Chia Pen suggests 
that verdicts were not predetermined, and that there was an effort 
to make punishment proportional to crime, a fundamental princi-
ple of justice common to the legal traditions of all of the countries 
from whence the Commissioners hailed.189  
A core value of fairness is that those who participate as judges 
remain free from bias and prejudgment.  In this measure the corre-
spondence of the British Commissioners presents a mixed picture.  
Poole was a survivor of the fifty-five day siege on the international 
legations of Peking.  When the siege was lifted, he was tasked with 
renewing his mission of learning Chinese, and in the course of re-
cording in his diary the challenge this posed for him he made a 
frank admission of enmity towards his antagonists: “I hate the 
Chinese so.”190  This naturally raises some questions as to Poole’s 
impartiality.  But how much should be read into this singular re-
mark? Poole was not one to editorialize, so its inclusion in his diary 
testifies to the honesty behind the sentiment as well as his dis-
tressed state of mind.  On the other hand, aside from a remark that 
Chinese soldiers who attacked the legations were cowards, it is on-
                                                          
186 See Annex 1, Sixth Session. 
187 See Annex 1, Seventh Session. 
188 Lieutenant Turner, another American, also accompanied Hutcheson as an 
aide-de-camp to General Gaselee.  Although his report emphasizes the logistical 
aspects of the operation, the author noted that he fully concurred in the version of 
events described by Hutcheson, and mentioned in passing the punishments rec-
ommended by the “international court of inquiry” after “careful investigation.”  
Soulard Turner, Report on March of Troops Composing Paotingfu Expedition, ARWD 
1901, supra note 10, at 468 (Nov. 2, 1900).  Turner’s report is also available in 
NARA, RG 395/913. 
189  See also Annex 1, Second Session (considering mitigating Quei Heng’s 
sentence). 
190 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, entry for Sept. 24, 1900. 
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ly statement of its kind to appear in the diary.  Nor, it should be 
noted, was Poole particularly enamored with missionaries, who he 
generally considered cowardly and lazy.191  Was Poole capable of 
setting aside, or at least balancing out, his experiences in Peking 
and judging the matter before him fairly?  A letter to his mother 
written while sitting as a Commissioner describes how the horrors 
of the massacre “come out in the evidence,” implies as much, sug-
gesting as it does that he actively listened to the case presented and 
did not blindly convict.192 
Communiques from Commissioner Jamieson in the days lead-
ing up to the trial suggest that he, at least, never succumbed to re-
vengist sentiments.  In fact, he maintained an admirable impartiali-
ty toward the accused, inclining neither toward a belief in Western 
revenge as its own reward nor a presumption of guilt, at least with 
respect to the fantai.  His letter to MacDonald seeking the British 
representative’s views on the punitive role of the Paoting-Fu expe-
dition, drafted on the eve of the Commission’s first sitting, indi-
cates a mind open to acquittal:  
  
As soon as we [indecipherable] into a house (which I hope 
will be tomorrow) I shall go into the whole questions and 
be able to arrive at a conclusion as to his guilt or innocence. […]  
Ting [Yung] has certainly been courageous enough to stay 
here, has carried out his order to cause the Imperial troops 
to disperse and rendered every assistance in procuring 
supplies.  To punish little fish who let themselves be caught 
and leave unscathed the big ones who are beyond reach 
would not seem equitable[,] however I trust you will favour 
me with an expression of your opinion as to the political 
expediency at the juncture of executing Ting [indeciphera-
ble] shot should he be found guilty.  In any case he should be 
cashiered and imprisoned in neglect of duty.  He is a [inde-
cipherable] influential clansman and that in itself could tend 
to make him inclined to carry out Tuan’s orders.193 
                                                          
191 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 entries for July 11, 1900 and Aug. 8, 1900. 
192  POOLE DIARY, supra note 34, Letter ‘Outside the Walls of Poating-Fu’ (dat-
ed Oct. 25, 1900).  Though it does leave open the possibility that he did not listen 
with a critical ear. 
193  NA, PRO 30/33/7/9 Jamieson to MacDonald, supra note 25 (emphasis add-
ed). Based on the structure and tone of the note, the suggestion that Ting Yung be 
cashiered or imprisoned is best read as contingent on a finding of guilt.  
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Not every decision the Commissioners made stands up to scru-
tiny.  The proceedings are marred by (what are by modern stand-
ards) a number of clear deficiencies, lending them an indelible air 
of impropriety, including the failure to clearly identify or provide 
the accused with information concerning their charges, to explain a 
legal basis for the charges, to provide defendants with counsel, to 
clearly identify the substantive and procedural law to be applied, 
to draft and publicize a proper verdict, and to insulate the proceed-
ings from the decisive control of a Field-Marshall known for his an-
ti-China bias.  The reliance on public beheadings, as opposed to the 
court proceedings themselves, to teach the desired moral lessons 
reeks of condescension and implies that the Commissioners’ focus 
was on results and not the process employed to reach them.  Nev-
ertheless, given the politically charged atmosphere, the abject bru-
tality that had hitherto characterized the campaign in China, the 
realities of the Allied command structure, and the logistical chal-
lenges that attended occupation of the provincial capital in a hos-
tile foreign country, I am left with the firm impression that the trial 
was conducted with a surprising degree of sensitivity to due pro-
cess and the position of defendants.  If the cloth from which the 
Commission was stitched included patches of imperialism, bigotry 
and revanchism, the tapestry that emerged looked on the whole far 
fairer than what might have otherwise been expected.  Though far 
from the judicial ideal, the Commission skewed more in the direc-
tion of a good-faith stab at substantive justice than that of a star 
chamber proceeding. 
  
7.  FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
In a perfect world, the International Commission would have 
heralded the arrival of a transformative moment for the interna-
tional system.  A ‘Paoting-Fu myth,’ much like a ‘Nuremberg 
myth’ did nearly a century later,194 might have inspired a genera-
tion of jurists and statesmen to push for progressively more fair, 
transparent, and legalistic Commissions that transcended their im-
perialist attachments, displaced the idea of uncompromising sov-
ereignty, and achieved acceptance as a process by which all the cit-
                                                          
194 PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN 
HISTORY viii (rev. ed. 2010). 
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izens of the world, including the leaders of the Great Powers, 
would be held to account for their crimes against humanity.  The 
Commission was a bomb headed toward the river of twentieth-
century legal and diplomatic practice.  Had it exploded, the waters 
may have been decisively redirected towards fields where norms 
of international criminal law might have flourished.  As a dud, its 
percussive impact alone registered, barely detectable in post-war 
memoires.  
Has the field of international criminal law been ennobled by 
the Commission’s recovery from obscurity? It certainly could be 
framed that way.  The inklings of some of the most laudable as-
pects of our contemporary international legal order—a striving to 
penalize capricious butchery, to punish through judicial mecha-
nisms organized according to reason, to emphasize the culpability 
of individuals over that of groups, to distinguish between greater 
and lesser wrongdoers, to incorporate the tools of law into the sol-
dier’s and diplomat’s punitive arsenal, and to concretize a progres-
sive legal and cultural ethos in a tangible institution—are discern-
able in the tale.  As a legal matter, the Commission’s exercise of a 
universal jurisdiction over state officials accused of supporting a 
massacre acknowledged by the greater portions of the world’s 
Powers to be an international crime was significantly ahead of its 
time.  
On the other hand, the Commission is stained by its qualified 
reliance on the rationalized processes and forms of justice, as it 
tended towards emotive expressions of vengeful retribution (pub-
lic beheadings; endorsement of collective punishment in the form 
of indemnity and property destruction) to teach its lessons, as well 
as the failure of the Commissioners to display any awareness of the 
relative novelty of their inquiry and tread with appropriate care, 
for example, by producing a written verdict that developed a theo-
ry of liability that could be reviewed by the accused and the public, 
or by adopting a maximalist view of the rights to which defendants 
were entitled.  The Commission is also inextricably associated with 
an intervention in which the most ignoble and destructive impuls-
es of the Allies were often given free reign, as well as the intellec-
tual tradition of regarding the Chinese as second-class citizens that 
countenanced this.  Imperfect by any measure, the Commission is 
an uncomfortable addition to the pantheon of international crimi-
nal courts.  But acknowledging infelicities, however much they 
may complicate today’s discussions of international criminal law’s 
imperialist overtones or overreach, is a critical indicia of maturity 
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and confidence.  It is to be hoped then that the story of the Com-
mission will be embraced as an attestation to how far we have 
come, and a reminder that must always pursue justice with an eye 
towards how history will judge us.   
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8.  ANNEX 1 (SESSION RECORDS)195 
  
Paoting-Fu 
 
International Investigative Commission to seek out, judge and 
punish the principal authors of the massacres of Christians, and the 
promoters of the same. 
  
President. French General Bailloud 
  German Major von Brixen 
  English Captain Poole 
 Italian Major Agliardi (substituting Captain Ferrigo and 
 afterwards the Navy Lieutenant Di Sambuy) 
 
 
Procès-verbal of the Sessions 
  
The following notes were taken during the sessions of the commis-
sion and are not exhaustive, but include the procès-verbal of the 
members, and are an integral part of the paperwork of the Investi-
gatatory Commission that need to be presented to the Field-
Marshall Von Waldersee. 
 
  Lieutenant Di Sambuy 
 
Minutes of the 1st session (23-10-00) 
 
Field-Marshall Waldersee  
 
I have the honor of letting you know that the investigation 
commission of which you did me the honor of being made presi-
                                                          
195 Annex 1 is an English translation of ‘Commissione Internazionale 
D’inchiesta Circa Il Massacro Di Cristiani’ found in the AUSSME, E-3, Rac 54, fol 
40, (Federico Solchi trans.)  I have reproduced as closely as possible this record’s 
formatting in this Annex. 
 Fragments of these procès-verbal written in English and French are also found 
in the diary of Commissioner Poole, held as ‘Microfilm diary of Capt (later Lt Col) 
F G Poole, Middlesex Regiment, at Peking, China, 1900; associated with the 3rd 
China War (Boxer Rebellion) (1900–1901)’ by the National Army Museum in Lon-
don.  I have included excerpts from the Poole Diary in footnotes where it clarifies, 
expands, or deviates in a meaningful way from the more complete and official-
looking Italian document. 
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dent, held today its first session.  
All the designated members are present. 
The commission considered all the information available about 
the Boxer movement in Paoting-Fu, the harassment suffered by the 
Christians and the massacres. 
After a careful examination of all the documents this commis-
sion has decided to arrest all the people that were believed to be at 
fault. 
 
 (Bailloud) 
  (etc etc) 
 
This report is clearly incomplete, given that I was not present at the 
time.   
 
  Lt. Di Sambuy 
_______________________________ 
 
Minutes of the 2nd session (24-10-00) 
 
The commission held its second session on October 24th at 9 
a.m.  All the designated members are present.  The Fangtai (su-
preme treasurer) who was arrested the evening before is intro-
duced and interrogated. 
 
He is asked the following questions: 
 
1- Why have you authorized the use of your seal on the 
manifesto (of which we have here a copy) encouraging 
the insurrectional movement of the Boxers? 
2- Why have you encouraged the removal and condemned 
the Mandarins that fought against the Boxers and tried 
to protect the Christians, who were obedient to the or-
der to the Viceroy? 
3- Why haven’t you protected the Missionary Green and 
his family, leaving them in the hands of the Boxers, who 
could have killed them even if you did not give an ex-
plicit order to do so? 196  
                                                          
196 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Why have you not protected Mr. Green [un-
readable] and his family and communicated to the Boxers the desire to have them 
massacred though not actually giving the order[?]”). 
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4- Why when you heard from the Chinese Colonel Wang-
Shong-Kwei that the Europeans, American subject Mr. 
Bagnall and his family were located in a village near 
Paoting-Fu you did not do anything to assist them, be-
coming in this way an indirect accomplice of their 
deaths?197 
 
To all these questions the Fangtai gives evasive answers saying 
that he was not aware of these facts or that he did not have enough 
power to intervene or that he was only following orders coming 
from his superiors.198 
At the conclusion of these answers it seems to the Commission 
not possible to keep the Fangtai in his role, and so the Commission 
has the honor to present to Marshall Von Waldersee the removal of 
the Fangtai from his position.  The Fangtai is also kept in preven-
tive detention since the Commission needs to understand his role 
in the massacres.  
_______________________________ 
 
After this appears in front of the Commission the Nie-Tai Shai-
Kuan. 
The following questions were asked  
1- Why did you order on the 28th day of the 8th moon the 
billposting of an old edict of the Emperor that was hos-
tile to Europeans and asked the Chinese of Christian re-
ligion to forswear their religion or to face death penal-
ty?199 
2- Were you advised by Father Dermont that the Chris-
tians in the village of Thien-Che Kuang were being at-
tacked: why didn’t you do anything to protect them? 
To the first question the Nietai answers that he does not re-
member about that particular decree. 
On this matter an Italian missionary, Father Scipione asserted 
                                                          
197 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Why have you done nothing when the 
Colonel Wang told you the missionaries were there?”). 
198  POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“To all these questions, the Fengtai answered 
in an evasive fashion, pleading ignorance and superior force against him and oth-
er orders, his inability to cope with matters.”). 
199 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Why have you posted the 28th of the Eighth 
moon an Imperial edict hostile to Europeans and ordering Chinese Christians to 
abjure their religion under pain of death [unreadable] a statement hostile to Chris-
tians, and also afterwards a proclamation of the Emperor protecting the Chris-
tians?”). 
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that he had a copy of this decree in Gausu and was sent there to 
bring it to the Commission but at this stage he had not made his re-
turn, so the commission decides to postpone this part of the ques-
tioning to tomorrow in order to shed some light on this very im-
portant part of the proceedings. 
To the second question the Nietai answers that he made all that 
was in his power, but could not do more given that he was not the 
Supreme Chief.200 
Given these circumstances the Commission decides to keep the 
Nietai under house arrest with continuous surveillance of the mili-
tary authorities until tomorrow at 3 p.m.  At that time the copy of 
the decree will have come from Gausu and it will be easy to prove 
his responsibility, culpability or innocence. 
 
The third accused:  
Wang-Shang-Kui 
Colonel of the Chinese Cavalry acknowledges that he received in 
his camp the Bagnall family.  He sent the Bagnalls to Paoting-Fu 
escorted by his soldiers who gave the family to other Chinese sol-
diers, who in the end gave the Bagnall family to the Boxers, who 
killed them.  He says that the papers he was given have been 
burned but that he saved a note.201 
The Commission in the meanwhile sends for some Chinese 
who are believed to have witnessed the massacre.  While waiting 
for them to arrive the session is suspended. 
_______________________________ 
 
Once the commission is again in session the witnesses have not 
yet arrived and so the “Tartar Governor”, Commander of all the 
Manchu troops, is introduced.  He was arrested on October 22nd as 
per order of the English General Gaselee. 
The Governor has been indicated as being the supreme nomi-
nal head of the Boxers, having given them the support of his Pre-
fect, given that his age and his deafness did not allow him for a di-
rect action.  
  
1st question: Why have you given full support to the Boxers? 
                                                          
200 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“To the second question the Nietai said he 
wasn’t at the head of affairs.”). 
201 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Their valuables, etc. were handed to him, 
the papers had been burnt.  A note has been made of the amount.”). 
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1st answer: He answers that in reality he prohibited the Boxers to 
go on with their meetings but they did not obey to his orders. 
 
2nd question: Why haven’t you at least stopped your son and your 
nephew who have been a very active part of the Boxers revolution? 
2nd answer: He sustains that his son did not do anything. 
  
The commission had already decided from the first session to 
have his son arrested but unfortunately the son had been in Peking 
for more than a month. 
 
3rd question: Why, after the Fang-Tai closed the Boxers’ meeting 
place, did you allow them to use your court in order for them to 
meet?  
3rd answer: He still denies that this is the truth, but the Fang-Tai 
once more asked about this matter says that if these meetings were 
not held in the neighborhood court, they were held in the houses of 
the neighborhood of the tartar section.  The culpability of the Tar-
tar governor being verified, the Commission condemns him to the 
death penalty.  The advanced age of the Tartar governor would 
have suggested mitigation to another punishment, but given that 
there is not an alternative severe punishment available in this 
country he is condemned to death, if the Marshall approves.202 
_______________________________ 
 
Minutes of the 3rd session (25-10-00) 
President is General Baillaud 
All members present 
 
All members agree in destroying the temple where the mis-
sionaries were tortured before being massacred on the 1st of July 
and where Miss Norrell was walked naked and dragged by her 
hair and feet. (The temple was indeed burned down on the 27th day 
of this month) 
After this decision the testimony against: 
Wang-Shang-Kui 
The Colonel of the Chinese Cavalry is heard, the witnesses af-
firm that his own soldiers placed the Bagnall family into the hands 
of the Boxers and also cut the head off of their little girl.  
                                                          
202 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Tartar Chief.  Guilty, only his age in his fa-
vour.  Unanimously agreed death, regrettable owing to his age.”). 
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The witnesses affirm that Wang-Shang-Kui saw all this.203   
Unanimously the Commission decides to condemn Wang-
Shang-Kui to death.204 
_______________________________ 
 
Minutes of the 4th session (27-10-00) 
President is General Bailloud 
All members present 
 
The Fangtai (Supreme Treasurer) appears and a telegram that 
he sent to the Emperor is presented to him.  The telegram reads, “I 
do not have enough troops to kill the Christians, if a simple Chris-
tian villain or a simple solder would have come to rescue them, a 
calamity would have happened.”205 
The Commission unanimously proposed that the FangTai be 
put to death.206 
For the Nietai, the commission decides to proceed immediately 
with his dismissal. 
_______________________________ 
 
Minutes of the 5th session (29-10-00) 
 
The Commission gets together in the house of the Fang Tai 
(condemned to death) to select a few pieces of art to send as a pre-
sent to Marshall Wandersee.  Major Von Brisceu takes note of them 
and is given the task of sending them to Marshal Waldersee.   
_______________________________ 
 
Minutes of the 6th session (31-10-00) 
 
The commission is reunited for its 6th session on Wednesday 
31st October at 9 a.m.  All the members are present and the presi-
dency is given to General Bailloud. 
                                                          
203  POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Witnesses against Wung Shang Kui said that 
his soldiers had given the Bagnall family to the Boxers and had cut off the head of 
the little girl, and had seen everything.”). 
204 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Unanimously agreed guilty of death.”). 
205 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Fantai confronted with his dispatch to the 
Emperor saying he had not sufficient troops to kill the Christians, and that if a 
Christian bandit or a simple barbarian soldier came to save them it would be a 
great calamity. [sic] He turned pale and made no answer.”). 
206 POOLE DIARY, supra note 34 (“Unanimously agreed guilty of death.”). 
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The (current) Prefect is introduced.  He brings with him three 
Shen-She (counselors) of the various neighborhoods of the city.  He 
also brings nine respectable businessmen and four prisoners who 
were currently being held in Chinese prisons. 
The Prefect has brought to the commission the Shen-She and 
businessmen because they are well respected in town and could 
help the commission in making a decision about the kind of justice 
that needs to be done on this matter and the same is thought about 
the businessmen. 
All the Shen-She and the businessmen are interrogated by the 
President in order to know what is their knowledge about the mas-
sacres and if they are aware of any Boxers name that need to be ar-
rested and punished.  All of them, naturally, respond almost in a 
chorus that they are not aware of anything, that they have not seen 
anything and that during the massacres they were in their business 
or busy in other matters. 
The president tells them that since they are notables in the city 
they must be aware of what happened in their city, and that in 
some way they are also indirectly responsible of the massacres.  
The President adds that if they refuse the answer he will ask the 
commission to condemn them with a fine. 
All the witnesses continue their denials.  They are then brought 
outside. 
After this four peasants are introduced by the Subprefect as 
Boxers and presents to the Commission the accusation for each of 
them. 
Except for the first one whose name is Hu-Sang-Tien, who is a 
very bad person and really indicated as a Boxer, all the other three 
are just poor and dirty boys between 16 and 18 years of age that 
were arrested by the Chinese forces because they were playing 
[undecipherable] on the road at night. 
The commission unanimously decides to retain only Hu-Sang-
Tien while the other three are remitted to the Prefect and the Sub-
prefect so that they can ensure a punishment for them and this 
punishment will need to be communicated to the Commission 
once decided. 
  
After a while the Prefect and the Subprefect come back to the 
room stating that the Shen-She are not in any way useful to shed 
light on the massacres or to find people that might be involved in 
the massacres.  The Commission decides to give them until next 
Sunday November 4th, when the members of the commission will 
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reunite for the last time, to give precise indications so to find other 
guilty participants to the massacre.  
During this session the Fangtai and the Nietai are also reintro-
duced before the commission in order to understand a bit more 
about their role, but the first one is as possessed by the Devil and is 
returned to prison while the second one says he does not know an-
ything more than what he said and his powers were anyway lim-
ited, etc., for this reason also the Nietai is taken back to prison. 
  
    Von Brixen 
        Captain Poole 
       Signatures      Lt. Sambuy 
                     General Bailloud 
_______________________________ 
 
Minutes of the 7th session (4-11-00) 
 
General Bailloud is the President and all the members are pre-
sent. 
The Prefect and Subprefect are called in and are asked if they 
have any news to give and if they have found any other Shen-She 
(counselors) that need to be interrogated.  The two answer that the 
other Shen-She are not in Paoting-Fu but that they were told that 
they needed to come to be interrogated. 
The Commission decides to take down the names and the ad-
dress of these Shen-She in order to act against them, in case it was 
necessary, upon their return to Paoting-Fu, or in case they were ar-
rested.  
The Commission also decides that the military authority will 
act against all the people that will be thought to be guilty of having 
participated in the massacres against the Europeans and the Chris-
tians. 
Chen–Che-Chiang, who was suspected of having taken an ac-
tive role in the massacres, could not have been arrested since he 
had since long time taken refuge in the mountains.  
The commission, having terminated its work decides to termi-
nate the sessions.  
Given that the Shen-She are without doubt responsible, even if 
only indirectly, for the disorders in Paoting-Fu, the commission 
decides that a fine will be given to them.  The amount of this fine is 
decided to be 100,000 taels and the Prefect of Paoting-Fu is given 
the order to ensure this is executed.  The Prefect is given a month 
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of time to acquire this sum and hand it over to the military com-
mander at the headquarters of the second French brigade (this sum 
will be given to the General Baillaud, since he is older than General 
Von Kessler, who is the Commander of the German troops in Pao-
ting-Fu).  
The General Commander Bailloud will then give this sum to 
His Excellency Marshall Von Waldersee, supreme commander of 
the international troops.  He will then redistribute this sum to the 
European missionaries who had been affected during the revolu-
tion. 
The Commission also decides that the execution of the death 
penalty for the three people condemned will take place Tuesday 6th 
November 1900 at 10 a.m. at the very same place where the 
protestant missionaries were massacred.  At the same place will al-
so occur the destitution of the Nietai after the execution of the 
death penalties.  The destruction of the pagodas located on top of 
the city walls and the breach in the walls will also occur on the 
same day at 8 a.m. 
 
 
 
The commission will take part at the execution together with 
troops located in Paoting-Fu. 
 
    Von Brixen 
         Captain Poole 
      Signatures        Lt. Sambuy 
        General Bailloud 
Paoting-Fu, 6 November 1900 
 
Execution of the punishments decided by the International In-
vestigative Commission. 
_______________________________ 
 
At 8 a.m. the explosion of 6 mines prepared by the German ar-
my causes the breach of the walls of the city of the dimension of 
approximately 50 meters.  This breach is located on the east part of 
the walls and in the proximity of the South East corner.  In the 
meanwhile the four pagodas that were on top of the door of the 
walls and the other four that were on the corners of the walls were 
set on fire and were almost completely destroyed. 
At 10 a.m. on the ground just outside the above mentioned 
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breach and in proximity of the place of where the Boxers massa-
cred the Europeans and in presence of the French and German 
troops detached in Paoting-Fu, together with 4 Indian chevaliers 
representing the English troops and 4 Italian Navy troops repre-
senting the Italian forces. 
The French forces are being represented by circa 1000 men are 
formed by navy infantry, a squadron of chivalry and a legion of 
mountain artillery.  The German forces, also being represented by 
circa 1000 men, are formed by marine infantry and a battery of 
country artillery. 
General Baillaud, together with his Chiefs of staff and the 
members of the investigative Commission take place in the middle 
of the square and so does General Von Kettler with his Chiefs of 
staff. 
The troops pay their honors to their respective Commanders 
and after that following the order of the President, are brought in 
front of the people by German solders: 
The Fangtai 
The Tartar Governor 
The Colonel of Cavalry 
The Nietai 
The first three are condemned to decapitation while the fourth 
one is condemned to degradation and removed from office. 
The executioner, once he obtained the authorization from the 
President, proceeds in cutting off the heads of the first three.  The 
heads are then held up to be shown to those in attendance.  The 
Nietai is taken to prison. 
The troops disperse and return to their headquarters 
 
  Signed Di Sambuy 
  Member for Italy of the Investigative Commission  
  Peking, November 1900. 
 
Lieutenant Pietro Verri made a true and faithful copy of this 
document. 
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9.  ANNEX 2 (IMAGES) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - The Graphic, March 9, 1901, at 4 
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Figure 2 - Supplement to The Graphic, January 19, 1901, at 1 
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Figure 3 - Le Petit Journal Supplement Illustre, January 20, 1901 
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Figure 4 - Drawing of the execution by Commissioner Poole found in his 
diary 
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